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1. Introduction
‘This is where we take the drugs across’, the smuggler explained, point-
ing at a spot at the narrow river called Golok that separates Thailand from 
Malaysia. It was getting dark but I could make out small boats crossing 
the river, transporting all kinds of goods: drugs, but also big bundles of 
t-shirts, canisters of petrol, cigarettes, migrant workers, and local people 
who just want to have a drink after work on the other side. The border is 
almost invisible and the cross-border economy is vibrant.
Armed soldiers sitting on plastic chairs languidly watched the bustle 
on both sides of the river. We were in Thailand’s Narathiwat Province, 
the country’s ‘Deep South’, an area with an active armed independence 
movement that is subject to frequent attacks. Not far from the tourist 
destination Phuket, the Thai army appears to be at war. Here there are 
checkpoints every few kilometres on the road and heavily armed soldiers 
wearing balaclavas and dressed all in black roam around. Since 2004, 
more than 7,000 people have been killed in Thailand’s Deep South.
Transnational crime and armed conflict seem to be a good match. They 
often make headlines together: ‘Congolese blood diamonds’, ‘Afghan 
opium’ and ‘made-in-Myanmar meth’. Such reports depict conflict 
zones as ‘ungoverned’ spaces where insurgents and criminals cannot 
be distinguished. Scholars and policy-makers extensively discuss what 
they call the ‘conflict–crime nexus’. Prominently, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000; 2004) claim that most armed groups are driven by greed rather 
than grievance, making them similar to organised criminal groups. 
Meanwhile, studies on ‘terrorism’ describe the phenomenon as deeply 
intertwined with transnational crime (e.g. Shelley, 2014). However, the 
empirical basis for such discussions remains thin, not least because of the 
difficulties of collecting data in such areas.
We have limited knowledge of how armed conflict and transnational 
crime connect and affect one another. In particular, we know little about 
the role insurgents play in the smuggling economies of conflict zones. In 
the case of Thailand’s Deep South, for example, state authorities com-
monly accuse the insurgency of driving the drug trade. But do conflict 
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zones really attract transnational crime? And do non-state armed groups1 
actually finance their activities by smuggling goods such as drugs?
Driven by such questions, this book sets out to explore the links 
between armed conflict and transnational crime through an analysis of 
the smuggling economy in borderlands that are characterised by armed 
conflicts. Smuggling takes place in borderlands, and also armed conflict 
is widespread in these areas, which often appear to be remote and far 
away from the central state. This book investigates whether crime and 
conflict gather in such areas simply because of conditions that draw them 
both, or whether their relationship is more symbiotic.
Drawing on extensive field research, the chapters that follow will 
investigate and compare the dynamics of four border areas in Southeast 
Asia: the borders of Thailand and Malaysia, Myanmar and China, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the maritime border region of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. It explores the perspectives of the various 
involved actors, including the armed groups, the smugglers and the 
victims of the conflict. While policy-makers are particularly concerned 
with the smuggling of drugs and other illicit goods, this book considers 
the smuggling of all types of goods, including ordinary consumption 
goods such as rice that matter much for the local economy and the com-
munities in the borderlands. It also pays close attention to the smuggling 
of people.
This book’s findings challenge common views on the conflict–crime 
nexus. While, for instance, a common narrative states that insurgents and 
rebels largely drive smuggling activities in conflict zones, state actors 
often play a much more prominent role in the smuggling networks that 
operate in Southeast Asia’s borderlands. The book offers a nuanced 
understanding of armed groups and their involvement in the smuggling 
economy that goes beyond the narrow focus on their economic motives.
Just like states, non-state armed groups are political authorities, actors 
that exercise social control and have a structuring influence on societies.2 
Political authorities, states and non-state armed groups alike have to 
consider and balance a number of factors that will ultimately shape their 
involvement in the smuggling economy. Particularly important are the 
extent of territory an authority controls and the sources of its legitimacy. 
An authority that controls the monopoly of force in a certain territory and 
can therefore protect smugglers is a more attractive business partner for 
transnational criminal networks than one that operates underground and 
has limited opportunities. Meanwhile, an authority that wants to build 
local legitimacy and support is likely to limit its involvement in smug-
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gling activities to those that are not considered to be harmful locally. 
Non-state armed groups often lack territorial control and rely on local 
legitimacy. Not only does this make them less attractive to smuggling 
networks; being concerned about how they are perceived locally, they 
may well want to limit their involvement in smuggling activities. State 
authorities, which usually control territory and are often less dependent 
on local legitimacy, are less constrained.
SMUGGLING ECONOMIES
We often associate smuggling with ungoverned spaces and conflict 
zones, deserts and remote mountain paths. But smuggling can occur 
anywhere; in 2019, two Australian farmers were sentenced to several 
years in prison for smuggling pig semen from Denmark to Australia in 
shampoo bottles. Danish pigs produce considerably more piglets a year 
than Australian ones, but biodiversity guidelines prohibit the use of 
foreign semen to breed livestock in Australia.
Whether it is tunnels, holes in border fences or shampoo bottles, we 
think of smuggling as activities that are intended to avoid detection 
through states at their borders. The idea of smuggling is closely tied to 
the concept of the nation state, which is defined by its territory and the 
borders that demarcate it. Smuggling needs the state and is defined in its 
opposition. Without states and its borders there would be no smuggling. 
Drawing on Andreas’s (2009) definition, smuggling can be viewed as 
‘all cross-border economic activity that is unauthorised by either the 
sending or receiving country’ (p.15). Indeed, border divisions and state 
guidelines about what can cross them, as well as what goods that do cross 
carry customs duties, turn trade into smuggling. People who avoid these 
custom duties or, like the Australian pig farmers, bring goods across the 
border that are declared to be illegal, are considered to be smugglers or 
traffickers.
Historically, the concept of smuggling evolved and flourished together 
with nation states around the world. The first known written instance of 
the word ‘smuggler’ refers to activities undertaken in the context of the 
English civil wars 1642–49 (ibid.), at the same time when Europe was 
being divided into nation states through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. 
Today, in a world that is defined by nation states and borders, smuggling 
is an important part of the global economy. Anything may be smuggled, 
from cooking oil to methamphetamines, from refugees to human traffick-
ing victims. However, what is legal or illegal, licit or illicit – and, hence, 
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what is considered to be trade or smuggling – can vary substantially 
from country to country. For instance, in a time when many countries are 
relaxing their laws around drugs, in many Southeast Asian countries drug 
traffickers still face the death penalty.
Andreas’s (2009) exploration of the US–Mexico border concludes that 
the main drivers of which goods are smuggled are ‘laws and consumer 
demand’ (p.17). Specifically, he finds that tariffs and taxes play a key 
role for smuggling activities as they determine their profit margin. If 
tariffs are high, smugglers prefer smuggling legal commodities, trying 
to evade the tariffs. If tariffs are low and there is little money to be made 
from smuggling legal goods, smugglers instead prefer to smuggle goods 
that are considered to be illegal. However, even when tariffs are low, 
legal goods with high taxes, such as alcohol and cigarettes, are profitable 
commodities for smugglers (ibid.).
Looking at smuggling beyond the borders of Europe and the US, 
Meagher’s (2014) work on smuggling in West Africa shows that ide-
ologies rather than empirical research have shaped our understanding 
of smuggling, criminalising ordinary cross-border trade that is usually 
peaceful. The empirical research on smuggling that has been conducted 
in North and West Africa illustrates that these practices can be best 
explained by looking at them as ordinary trade, rather than as criminal 
or subversive activities. For instance, Scheele (2012) describes the 
somewhat democratic nature of smuggling networks in Algeria and Mali, 
where trucks transport all types of licit and illicit goods across the Sahara. 
According to her analysis ‘anybody with a four-by-four, some initial 
capital, and enough cousins along the road can become a carrier or else 
trade on his own account’ (p.107). Gallien’s (2019) analysis of smuggling 
routes in North Africa demonstrates that smuggling is not ‘unregulated’. 
He finds a ‘dense network of informal institutions’ that determine which 
goods, at what cost, and in what quantity travel particular routes (p.1). 
Soto Bermant (2015) concludes that such common informal economic 
practices should not be mistaken for anti-state resistance, arguing that it is 
‘only from the point of view of the state that economic activities outside 
its control appear inevitably subversive’ (p.264).
Smuggling is often associated with ‘big business’ and famous drug 
traffickers like Pablo Escobar or Joaquín ‘El Chapo’ Guzmán. But 
smuggling is often not organised in a centralised manner. Individual 
smugglers and smuggling businesses are part of the wider smuggling 
economy, being connected through institutions and networks of people, 
just like in a formal economy. Smugglers follow the demands of the 
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market and structure their business like legal companies do and thus 
may compete with each other (see Andreas, 2009, p.21). The level of 
organisation in the smuggling economies varies considerably, depending 
especially on a state’s enforcement practices and the type of ‘commodity’ 
that is smuggled (ibid., p.20). ‘Tough enforcement’ policies on a certain 
good or at a certain border make the smuggling business more difficult. 
However, the reduced supply also increases the profit margin for smug-
glers, making the business more attractive. Hence, such policies tend to 
increase the level of organisation and monopolisation of the smuggling 
economy, pushing smaller smugglers out of the market and increasing the 
opportunity for more organised and powerful groups.
It is not just goods that are smuggled. At a time when more and more 
states become closed off and hostile to migrants, borders have become 
increasingly difficult for people to cross legally. According to estimates 
of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2018a), 
more than 2.5 million migrants were smuggled in 2016. Some become 
victims of human trafficking, which is based on threat, the use of force or 
other forms of coercion, fraud or deception (ibid.).3 As Feingold states, 
trafficking is ‘often migration gone terribly wrong’ (2013, p.214). Large 
numbers of people get killed every year while trying to cross borders. For 
instance, the International Organization for Migration (2019) estimates 
that more than 11,500 people alone died in the Mediterranean between 
2014 and 2018, trying to get to Europe.
The need to be ‘permitted’ to cross an international border is a fairly 
recent phenomenon. While the first travel documents in Europe were 
probably issued during medieval times, passports and visas only became 
a widespread and enforced policy on the European continent at the begin-
ning of the First World War. Torpey’s (2000) work demonstrates how the 
administrative use of passports and identification papers enabled states 
to monopolise the legitimate means of movement. In his autobiography 
The World of Yesterday, the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig (1943, p.410) 
describes this as an enormous loss, an ‘immense relapse’ and ‘diminu-
tion’ of ‘civil rights’, lamenting, ‘Before 1914 the earth had belonged to 
all’. He explained:
[I]t always gives me pleasure to astonish the young by telling them that before 
1914 I traveled from Europe to India and to America without a passport and 
without ever having seen one. One embarked and alighted without ques-
tioning or being questioned, one did not have to fill out a single of the many 
papers which are required today. The frontiers which, with their customs 
officers, police and militia, have become wire barriers thanks to the patholog-
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ical suspicion of everyone against everyone else, were nothing but symbolic 
lines which one crossed with as little thought as one crosses the Meridian of 
Greenwich.
But it was even more recently that the idea of ‘illegal migration’ rose to 
prominence. According to Andersson (2014), who investigates how the 
people smuggling industry at Europe’s borders functions, it was not until 
the 1970s oil crisis and the following economic stagnation, which reduced 
the demand for labour, that this terminology took on broad importance 
in the USA and Europe. He points out that the term ‘illegal immigra-
tion’ is not just pejorative but also incorrect, implying that migrants are 
criminals even though migration is not a criminal act (p.17). However, 
governments increasingly try to criminalise immigration, a trend that 
García Hernández (2014) calls ‘crimmigration’. Italy even attempted to 
criminalise the rescuing of drowning migrants in the Mediterranean Sea 
as a form of assisting illegal immigration in 2019.
This trend is not limited to the USA and Europe, but also affects other 
regions of the world. Brachet (2018) illustrates how attempts of European 
countries to fight ‘illegal immigration’ resulted in the tightening of 
border controls across Northwest Africa. As a consequence, the irregular 
but highly visible travels across borders that used to be the norm and had 
existed in the region for decades were replaced by ‘specialized passenger 
transport as a clandestine activity’. He concludes that it was ultimately 
EU migration policies that produced the migrant smuggling economy, 
increasing the travel costs for people and criminalising bus drivers by 
viewing them as smugglers or traffickers.
Looking at the US–Mexico border, Sanchez’s work demonstrates 
that most ‘smugglers’ are ordinary people, not profit-driven criminals, 
who ‘hope to improve the quality of their lives and that of their fami-
lies’ (2015, p.6). However, just like in the context of smuggled goods, 
increased prosecution has resulted in a growing professionalisation of 
how people smuggling works. According to Slack (2019, p.159) fewer 
people in Mexico now rely on guides from their hometown, who take 
groups of friends across border once or twice a year, but instead use 
guides whose primary source of income is the smuggling of migrants and 
who cross the border on a more regular basis.
Driven by policies on ‘illegal immigration’, the business of smuggling 
people has become very lucrative. UNODC estimates that it created an 
income of US$5.5 to 7 billion for smugglers in 2016 (2018a, pp.22–3). 
But it is not just the smugglers who benefit. Andersson’s (2014) work on 
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migration from Mali and Senegal to Spanish enclaves in North Africa 
shows how governments, security forces, aid organisations, and private 
companies profit from the funds that flow into the management of irreg-
ular migration.
In this book we will encounter a wide range of smuggling practices, 
of licit and illicit goods, of people smuggling and human trafficking. 
Most of the smuggling activities in Southeast Asia are best understood 
as ordinary economic activities of border communities. People use 
irregular border crossings to get to work, to find a new job or to meet 
friends; rice that is cheaper on one side of the border is smuggled to the 
other side. These local transnational dynamics are paralleled by the flows 
of goods and people across multiple countries and borders. Cigarettes 
from the Philippines are smuggled to Thailand; methamphetamines from 
Myanmar’s Shan State are distributed across the region; Rohingya refu-
gees from Rakhine State are smuggled via Bangladesh and Thailand to 
Malaysia and often end up being trafficked. Often borders are porous so 
that the level of monopolisation is low in many sectors of the smuggling 
economy, particularly with regard to the smuggling of daily consumption 
goods. Nonetheless, smuggling is not only a source of income for the 
smugglers; the authorities in Southeast Asia also benefit in many ways 
from these activities.
WAR ECONOMIES
As states are the ones setting the scene for the smuggling economy – 
providing smugglers with opportunities by declaring goods illegal, by 
imposing high tariffs or by charging high taxes while attempting to limit 
their activities through law enforcement and border control – conflict 
zones could be wonderlands for smugglers. Armed conflicts tend to 
reduce local production and increase the prices for goods while weak-
ening the state and limiting its capability to control its territories and 
borders. Hence, conflict zones seem to create the space for a flourishing 
smuggling economy.
While this is partly true, it has to be seen in the context of a generally 
different type of ‘order’ that characterises conflict zones. Wars are 
commonly viewed as a transition phase in which one party wins against 
another and establishes a new political order. And, indeed, wars played 
an important role in the formation of nation states in Europe, a process of 
monopolising force, legitimacy and economic means in a certain territory 
that ultimately resulted in what we would describe as a state today (see 
This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
Users can redistribute the work for non-commercial purposes, 
as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, as detailed in the License. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd must be clearly credited as the ownerof the original work. 
Any translation or adaptation of the original content requires the written authorization 
of Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Conflict and transnational crime8
e.g. Elias, 1982 [1939] and Tilly, 1992). However, today’s armed conflicts 
often are stable political and economic orders in themselves. Different 
political authorities – such as, most prominently, the state and non-state 
armed groups that oppose the state – compete over control and influence. 
But despite the competition on the surface-level, these conflicts are often 
underpinned by vested interests. Scholars such as Kaldor (2012) and Keen 
(2008) illustrate how many wars and conflicts appear to have become 
‘endless’ because they provide economic opportunities and therefore 
incentives to continue the war. While Collier and Hoeffler (2000; 2004) 
argue that conflicts are driven by greedy rebels, Keen (2012) points out that 
also state actors’ greed is an important driver of conflict.
Kaldor shows the range of opportunities for armed actors during 
conflicts, including not just looting but all kinds of ‘taxes’ and ‘fees’, 
for instance on humanitarian aid, at checkpoints and on various forms 
of illegal trade (2012, pp.107–13). Such a war economy or ‘clandestine 
political economy of the war’ (Andreas, 2004, p.30) can become fairly 
stable. It turns wars into what Kaldor (2012) calls ‘mutual enterprises’ 
between the conflict parties, where the goal is not winning but continuing 
violence in order to maintain the established war economy that benefits 
primarily the armed political authorities.
In such a context, ordinary people are often pushed into what 
Goodhand (2003, pp.3–4) describes as a ‘coping economy’, requiring 
them to diversify their economic activities in order to survive. We have 
gained a particularly detailed understanding of how war economies 
function through research on Afghanistan. For instance, Goodhand’s 
analysis shows that while the international community tends to focus 
on drug smuggling, the smuggling of other commodities in Afghanistan 
generated much more revenue in the 1990s (2005, p.199).
A strand of literature has evolved that investigates governance in terri-
tories that are characterised by a low degree of monopolisation of force, 
the politics and economics of what is sometimes called ‘wartime orders’ 
and ‘governance in areas of limited statehood’. Smuggling certainly is an 
important sector of wartime economic orders, particularly in borderlands. 
During wars many people rely on it to help them to escape from violence 
and conflict-induced instability and poverty. Smuggling affords people 
access to vital goods that cannot be produced locally under conflict con-
ditions and provides them with a source of income when there are few 
other employment options.
In a way, the assumption of the war zone being a smugglers’ paradise 
appears to be correct. But what role armed groups, both state actors and 
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non-state actors, play in the smuggling economy of conflict zones and 
how their activities relate to those of normal smugglers remains little 
understood. It is a common assumption that especially non-state armed 
groups generate considerable revenues from the smuggling economy. 
This idea has become dominant in the policy discourse, particularly the 
debates surrounding the conflict–crime nexus, driven inter alia by studies 
of terrorist groups and networks. For instance, Shelley (2014) describes 
how ‘entangled’ terrorism and transnational crime are, with terrorist 
groups generating revenue through criminal activities such as kidnap-
pings, the smuggling of drugs, human trafficking and arms trade. But 
global terrorist networks that want to create instability are a very different 
type of actor to local non-state armed groups in conflict zones that want 
to govern and establish control.
A rising field of research is concerned with how such non-state armed 
groups govern (see e.g. Ahmad, 2017; Arjona, 2016; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
and Turkmani, 2018; Brenner, 2019; Idler, 2019; Jackson, 2018; 
Mampilly, 2011; Thakur and Venugopal, 2018). Their work shows that 
non-state armed groups differ from criminal groups, as they are a form 
of political authority, often with sophisticated state-like governance 
structures, providing services, collecting taxes and maintaining interna-
tional relations. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some non-state armed 
groups do benefit, at least indirectly, from the smuggling economy. For 
example, Jackson’s (2018) work on Afghanistan’s Taliban shows that 
the group generates a considerable amount of revenue through local 
taxes, which also includes a tax on the production of opium that is later 
smuggled out of the country. Similarly, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) charged a tax on coca production in areas they con-
trolled. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), non-state armed 
groups more directly finance some of their activities through cigarette 
smuggling (Titeca et al., 2011).4
So what does the conflict–crime nexus actually look like? Do political 
authorities follow the same business-minded rationale as smugglers? 
Do non-state armed groups benefit substantially from the smuggling 
economy? And what affects an authority’s level of involvement and the 
type of smuggling they become involved in? Responding to such ques-
tions, this book sets out to gain a more systematic understanding of the 
role political authorities, state actors, and non-state armed groups play 
in the smuggling economy of conflict zones. It does so through a com-
parative study of borderlands in Southeast Asia that are characterised by 
armed conflict.
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Southeast Asia is well suited for this kind of analysis. Not only are 
long-standing armed conflicts widespread in the region, there also are 
numerous armed groups. In Myanmar alone, various non-state armed 
groups are at war with the military. Some conflicts and episodes of vio-
lence in Southeast Asia have gained broad international attention, such 
as the large-scale displacement of Rohingya in 2017. Other conflicts 
take place outside of the limelight, such as the violence in the south 
of Thailand. The analysis shows that non-state armed groups are not 
a homogeneous type of actor. For example, the Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA) in Myanmar is fighting the production and smuggling of 
drugs while generating substantial revenue from taxing the extraction 
and export of national resources. Meanwhile, Barisan Revolusi Nasional 
(BRN) in Thailand appears to play almost no role in the smuggling 
economy at all. However, the analysis also illustrates that it is often state 
actors who benefit from the smuggling economy much more than suppos-
edly greedy non-state armed groups.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND FINDINGS
The empirical chapters of the book illustrate that there are three key 
factors that shape the consideration of political authorities – both as 
groups or organisations and as individuals who are part of these organ-
isations – whether and in what role to get involved in the transnational 
smuggling economy of conflict zones.
1. Incentive to Smuggle: Funds & Supply
The first factor is the economic incentive to smuggle. The most obvious 
incentive for an authority to get involved in the smuggling economy is to 
make money. Smuggling is a way to garner funds, for groups in the form 
of revenue, and for individual members as a source of personal income. 
This is done either through direct involvement or, more indirectly, from 
taxing smugglers or charging them fees. Groups with other sources of 
revenue, such as external financial support, may have a lower incentive 
to earn money this way.
Beyond access to funds, participating in the smuggling economy may 
also be necessary to ensure access to vital funds and supplies, goods that 
are difficult to obtain otherwise. This is particularly the case for non-state 
armed groups – simply due to their lack of international recognition. 
While states can legally import goods, most of the cross-border economic 
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activities of non-state armed groups may be considered ‘illegal’ and cate-
gorised as smuggling, even when such groups control territory and are de 
facto states. But non-state armed groups, like states, still need supplies, 
including weapons, which cannot be sourced locally. Beyond weapons, 
non-state armed groups may, for instance, also have to smuggle their own 
fighters across international borders, either because they control the bor-
derlands themselves and cannot acquire the necessary documents from 
the state that they are fighting or because they have to avoid detection 
from the state actors that are in control.
2. Ability to Smuggle: Territorial Control
The second factor is the ability to get involved in the smuggling 
economy, which ultimately depends on an authority’s power and influ-
ence, most importantly manifested in its territorial control. While there 
are incentives for almost all authorities to get involved in the smuggling 
economy, those authorities that control territory in borderlands and parts 
of a border, or at least important bottlenecks on the way to the border, 
have the opportunity to be involved in the smuggling business on a con-
siderably larger scale than those that do not. They can easily transport, 
or facilitate the transportation, of goods or people across the border 
to or from neighbouring countries. Similarly, on the individual level, 
employees or fighters of a political authority that controls territory have 
more opportunities to get involved in smuggling than those who support 
authorities with less control.
This, in turn, makes authorities that control territory in borderlands 
attractive partners to smuggling networks. Furthermore, working with 
such an authority reduces the risk involved in smuggling as it has 
the capability to protect smugglers and provide them safe passage. 
Conversely, political authorities that do not control territory and operate 
underground have to avoid detection from the authority that is actually in 
control, limiting their ability to smuggle goods or be valuable partners in 
smuggling networks.
3. Obstacle to Smuggling: Legitimacy & Accountability
The third and final factor is political. Authorities may need to construct 
local legitimacy, which usually limits their involvement in the smuggling 
economy. Drawing on Weber, legitimacy can be seen as a source of 
authority. It ensures voluntary obedience to social control and can be con-
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trasted with coercion, the second main source of authority (see Weigand, 
2015; 2017). People bestow legitimacy based on their own needs and 
values.5 In order to construct legitimacy, authorities have to implement 
measures that match people’s expectations. Addressing people’s needs 
results in instrumental legitimacy, which can offer short-term support. 
Meanwhile, addressing people’s value-based expectations results in 
substantive legitimacy that offers more stable, long-term support (ibid.).
The need to build legitimacy can vary from authority to authority, 
depending, among other factors, on its resources and the extent of exter-
nal support.6 In order, for instance, to recruit supporters for its armed 
forces, an authority either needs substantive legitimacy or be considered 
a cause worth fighting for, offering prestige and social recognition. 
Alternatively, an authority may be able to ‘buy’ support in the short term, 
drawing on instrumental legitimacy by providing a good salary, and it can 
coerce people into fighting for them.
Authorities that are not limited by legitimacy considerations can 
get heavily involved in the smuggling economy to generate as much 
revenue as possible and fund their expensive coercive rule.7 Authorities 
that seek local legitimacy have to limit their visible and locally known 
involvement in activities that are considered to be ‘bad’ or harmful 
locally, including in the smuggling economy. What is considered to be 
harmful and legitimate may vary across contexts, depending on people’s 
needs and values. This organisational interest of a political authority 
translates to the individual level of employees and fighters throughout the 
hierarchy, which ensures accountability on the local level. For instance, 
drug smuggling and human trafficking are often perceived as harmful, 
making it difficult for an authority to be involved in it without risking its 
substantive legitimacy being undermined, requiring it to address cases of 
corruption in its own ranks that enable such activities or to hide them at 
a high risk. Conversely, not charging additional fees on smuggled daily 
consumption goods and ensuring the cheap import of goods from neigh-
bouring countries – thereby tolerating smuggling activities – may even 
help to build instrumental legitimacy.
While this is by no means an all-encompassing theory, as there may 
be additional aspects to consider in certain cases, these factors do offer 
a good understanding of why different authorities play different roles in 
the smuggling economy. Ultimately, any political authority must con-
sider all three factors, whether it is aware of it or not, and the balance it 
strikes shapes its role in the smuggling economy. This is complicated by 
the fact that the dimensions are dynamic and connected to each other. For 
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Table 1.1 Types of authority
Legitimacy + Legitimacy −
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example, controlling territory enables an authority to generate revenue 
through other means, such as, in particular, taxes. Despite having access 
to the smuggling economy it lowers the incentive to enter it, potentially 
jeopardising local legitimacy that an authority needs to maintain control 
and collect taxes. Meanwhile, a lack of legitimacy can, to some extent, be 
compensated with money that can be generated through a more extensive 
involvement in the smuggling economy, which, however, further under-
mines the authority’s legitimacy.
TYPES OF AUTHORITY
Drawing on the three factors shaping an authority’s involvement in the 
smuggling economy we can develop four ideal types. Ideal types are 
a heuristic conceptual tool that over-emphasises key characteristics of 
complex social constructs that we want to describe, highlighting the 
‘extremes’ to develop a black-and-white typology. Drawing on Weber, 
an ideal type is best understood as a utopia that ‘cannot be found empiri-
cally anywhere in reality’ (1949 [1904], p.90; see also Friedrichs, 2010). 
Nonetheless, such ideal types can help us to describe and explain empir-
ical phenomena and, in our case, to roughly categorise authorities in the 
following empirical chapters.
In our given case, I consider all authorities to have an incentive to be 
involved in the smuggling economy – to import necessary goods and/
or simply to generate funds. The two factors that are therefore crucial in 
determining an authority’s role are its ability to be involved through its 
territorial control and the limiting political consideration of local legit-
imacy.8 Hence, we can distinguish four types of authority (Table 1.1), 
each playing a distinct role in the smuggling economy.
While controlling territory and therefore being able to get involved in 
the smuggling economy easily, the legitimacy-seeking ruler is concerned 
about its local legitimacy. Hence, this type of authority limits its involve-
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ment in the smuggling economy to activities that are not considered to 
be harmful locally. It may be involved in smuggling activities that are 
locally accepted.
The legitimacy-seeking rebel does not control territory but wants 
to build, maintain or enhance its local legitimacy. Lacking the ability 
to have significant involvement in the smuggling economy and being 
further limited by legitimacy considerations, this type is a marginal 
player in the smuggling economy. Rebels of this type are most likely to 
be involved in smuggling primarily to obtain important supplies.
The legitimacy-indifferent ruler is in control of territory but is not 
concerned with its local legitimacy. Such rulers have no compunction 
about exploiting people and territory and can do so effortlessly. Such an 
authority may be involved in any type of smuggling business on a large 
scale, either directly or indirectly through taxes and fees.
The legitimacy-indifferent rebel does not control territory nor does 
it attempt to build local legitimacy. Its involvement in the smuggling 
economy is therefore only guided by economic needs and interests. 
Usually, driven by purely economic concerns, it focuses on exploiting 
people and territory as much as it can. Not aiming for social control, this 
type is similar to the idea of a ‘greedy rebel’ (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 
2000; 2004) that is better viewed as a criminal group than a political 
authority.9
The four types are analytical ideals, and as such no authority in an 
empirical case will perfectly fit any of them. However, the ideal types 
nonetheless allow us to position authorities on a spectrum between these 
extremes. While the ideal types are static, empirical authorities may 
change their characteristics over time. Generally speaking, these ideal 
types can be used to categorise any political authority. Nonetheless, they 
are more suited to the analysis of armed groups than conventional state 
actors. While state actors typically (though not necessarily)10 are ‘rulers’ 
that control territory, armed groups may cover the entire spectrum of 
ideal types.
METHODOLOGY
I set out to gain a better understanding of the relationship between 
conflict and crime and the role political authorities, especially non-state 
armed groups, play in the smuggling economy. For that purpose, I con-
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ducted comparative research in four border regions of Southeast Asia, 
which serve as case studies:
1. Thailand–Malaysia (land border)
2. Myanmar–China (land border)
3. Bangladesh–Myanmar (land border)
4. Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines (maritime border)
I conducted more than 100 interviews in the borderlands of Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines in 2017/18, 
talking to members and supporters of non-state armed groups, smugglers, 
government officials, civil society activists, victims of the conflicts, and 
people who were smuggled or trafficked. Hence, this book provides 
detailed insights into the perspectives of the various parties that are 
involved in and affected by armed conflict and transnational crime and 
enables us to approach the topic from different viewpoints, including 
a political one set around the conflict dynamics and an economic one set 
around the smuggling.
The interview questions were open-ended and set around the topics 
‘armed conflict’, ‘non-state armed groups’, ‘smuggling of goods’, 
‘smuggling of people’, and ‘role of state officials’. Building on the 
statements on these topics, links, overlaps and connections between the 
topics were identified. To protect the interviewees their statements have 
been anonymised. The interviews were complemented by ethnographic 
observations, offering thick descriptions and detailed insights into the 
local dynamics. In addition, I drew on conversations with experts and 
on secondary sources, such as reports, media reporting, and academic 
publications.
It was not possible to verify or triangulate all individual claims made in 
interviews. It comes with the territory, research on crime and research in 
conflict areas, that access is often difficult and information is contested. 
Hence, interviewees’ perceptions as well as my own should not be uncrit-
ically viewed as objective facts and some empirical insights stated in this 
book may have to be revised in the future on the basis of further informa-
tion. However, the comparative character and the work across four border 
regions support robust conceptual and theoretical conclusions.
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OUTLINE
The following chapters will explore the conflict dynamics and smuggling 
economies in the four Southeast Asian borderlands, paying particular 
attention to the role of armed groups in the smuggling economy (Figure 
1.1). Each chapter is structured in a similar way and can be read as an 
independent analysis, without requiring an understanding of the other 
case studies. I will first provide background information on the area’s 
conflict dynamics, shedding light on the main conflict parties, before 
investigating the local smuggling economy, considering both the smug-
gling of goods and the smuggling of people. Then I will have a more 
detailed look at how smuggling and armed conflict connect, and inves-
tigate general links as well as the specific roles of state and non-state 
actors in the smuggling economy. Finally, I will develop conclusions on 
the conflict–crime nexus in each border region and, drawing on the ideal 
types, explain the role of armed groups.
Chapter 2 looks at the border between Thailand and Malaysia, where 
violent conflict has been ongoing for more than 50 years. Insurgency 
groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) are fighting for inde-
pendence. While this conflict experienced a spike in violence around 
2007, hundreds of mainly small attacks continue to take place every year. 
In addition to the conflict, the border is home also to a vibrant smuggling 
economy. It is a major regional transit route for the smuggling of licit and 
illicit goods, including drugs.
Myanmar’s northern Kachin and Shan States, in close proximity to 
the Chinese border, are the subject of Chapter 3. The Kachin have the 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of the most prominent ethnic 
armed organisations in Myanmar, with an estimated 10,000 troops. In 
Shan State groups such as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) 
are active. Myanmar is also one of the main countries of origin of illegal 
drugs, natural resources, migrant workers, and trafficked people in the 
region, much of which are smuggled across the border into China.
In Chapter 4, I will examine a protracted episode of violence in August 
2017 that resulted in the displacement of more than 700,000 Rohingya 
refugees from Myanmar, who crossed the border into Bangladesh. 
A number of non-state armed groups are active in the area, most prom-
inently at the time the Rohingya insurgency group Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army (ARSA). The large number of refugees who wanted to 
cross the Naf river from Myanmar to Bangladesh was an opportunity 
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for people smugglers. The river is also a major smuggling route for licit 
goods, including daily consumption goods such as instant coffee, as well 
as illicit goods. Drugs, which are produced on a large scale in Myanmar’s 
Shan State, are smuggled across the river into Bangladesh.
Different types of non-state armed actors are also active in the mari-
time border region of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, the subject 
of Chapter 5. In Mindanao, in the south of the Philippines, organised 
non-state armed groups fight for more regional autonomy of the Moro 
people. Meanwhile, other non-state armed groups, particularly the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG), have more criminal motives. In Indonesia, more 
extremist networks, some linked to the Islamic State, conduct attacks that 
are often directed against civilians. But the area is also home to a flour-
ishing smuggling economy. Because of its maritime character and large 
size, including many small islands, the area is difficult to patrol, render-
ing it a popular smuggling route for all goods as well as many migrant 
workers who try to find work in Malaysia.
In the concluding chapter I will compare the findings from the four 
empirical chapters, identifying general trends and overarching themes. 
I will show that even though there is a conflict–crime nexus, there is also 
a striking conflict–crime disconnect. Finally, drawing on the outlined 
conceptual framework and ideal types, I will explain the involvement 
of different political authorities in the smuggling economies of conflict 
zones, particularly the dominance of state actors over non-state actors.
NOTES
1. Non-state armed groups are also often called rebels or insurgents. I use 
the terminology interchangeably in this book as different labels are com-
monly applied to these actors in different countries across Southeast Asia. 
There are certain drawbacks with all three terms. The term ‘insurgency’ 
is commonly associated with military language and ‘counter-insurgency’ 
measures, implying that the group is illegitimate. The word ‘rebellion’ 
does not capture all contexts as not all groups fight against the state; for 
instance, a group may be primarily driven by monetary considerations, nor is 
a rebellion necessarily violent. Describing these actors as ‘non-state’ might 
also be considered unsuitable by many, including the groups themselves, as 
they usually aspire to gain independence and to be states. Furthermore, they 
often already control territory and govern populations, hence, de facto, are 
states. However, as they lack international recognition as de jure states we 
can nonetheless consider them to be ‘non-state’ actors.
2. My understanding of authority rests on Weber’s work who defines it as ‘the 
chance of a specific (or: of all) command(s) being obeyed by a specifiable 
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group of people’ (1980 [1921], p.122). Drawing on this definition I view 
authority as the ability to achieve obedience. Authority does not require 
territorial control and competing authorities may exist in one territory. In 
a political context, typical authorities are the state as well as non-state armed 
groups. However, also elders or religious figures can be political authorities 
(see Weigand, 2017).
3. According to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Article 3, 
Paragraph a, ‘“Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transpor-
tation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or 
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation 
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.’
4. The role non-state armed groups play in the economy is important for how 
they are perceived locally. For example, Ahmad’s (2017) work on views and 
preferences of business communities in conflict zones shows that these com-
munities often support Islamist groups over other armed groups, assuming 
that their governance would result in lower costs and taxes.
5. This empirical understanding of legitimacy is based on the needs and values 
of the local population, not on the understanding of what I or other outsiders 
think is right or wrong.
6. An authority’s relationship with the local population – both in terms of 
revenue generation and legitimacy – vis-à-vis its ability to draw on external 
funding and legitimacy is particularly important.
7. While most authorities combine substantive and instrumental sources of 
legitimacy, others may exercise social control almost exclusively through 
coercion and/or instrumental legitimacy, for example, offering money to 
some and suppressing the rest. However, such a strategy does usually not 
offer stable governance and is expensive to maintain. It requires sufficient 
financial resources or a high degree of external legitimacy resulting in exten-
sive financial and/or military support from another authority.
8. When considering legitimacy in this context I am not measuring the extent 
of an authority’s political control (see e.g. Thakur & Mampilly, forthcom-
ing) or an authority’s public perception. Instead, I am looking at the need 
to build legitimacy from the authority’s point of view as something it has 
to be concerned about – or not (see Weigand, 2015, for a discussion of the 
different dimensions of legitimacy).
9. At the same time, externally funded groups may limit their involvement in 
the smuggling economy. For example, this could be small terrorist groups 
or networks that operate underground and have no need to generate revenue 
as they are externally funded through the umbrella organisation. In addition, 
they usually lack human resources and want to avoid unnecessary risks. 
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Instead of trying to gain territorial control or building local legitimacy, they 
aim at creating instability through violence. Their role in the smuggling 
economy will be shaped by their needs only, such as the smuggling of 
weapons that are necessary for attacks. Such actors are not connected to the 
wider local population. They have neither the need to generate additional 
revenue, nor an interest in controlling territory, nor a concern about local 
legitimacy.
10. State actors are usually rulers; however, in a given borderland they may not 
have local control of territory. Hence, the ideal types can also be used for the 
analysis of state actors.
11. All maps by Grace Fussell.
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2. Underground struggle & licence to 
smuggle: the Thailand–Malaysia 
border region
‘They usually come in the evenings, every three to four days. They 
arrive by bus and are smuggled across the border to Malaysia here. It’s 
people from Myanmar, Laos, Bangladesh and Northern Thailand. Then 
they are picked up again on the other side.’1 This is how a resident from 
Narathiwat province in Southern Thailand, at the Malaysian border, 
described the people smuggling activities in his area.
All sorts of licit and illicit goods are also smuggled across the Golok 
river, which defines the border between Thailand’s Narathiwat prov-
ince and Malaysia. Petrol is cheaper in Malaysia and is smuggled to 
Thailand; conversely cooking oil is cheaper in Thailand and is smuggled 
to Malaysia. Meth from Myanmar’s Shan State is smuggled across the 
river and cigarettes from the Philippines pass through Malaysia and are 
sold in Thailand.
The southern part of Thailand (Figure 2.1), the so-called Deep South, 
is not only a popular transit route for smuggled goods and people, 
a violent conflict between an independence movement and the Thai state 
has been going on for decades, particularly in the provinces of Yala, 
Pattani and Narathiwat. Checkpoints and Thai army soldiers are every-
where. Hundreds of mainly small attacks take place every year (Abuza, 
2017). The conflict cost more than 7,000 people their lives between 2004 
and 2018 (Blaxland, 2018; see also Abuza, 2016).
In order to explore the link between armed conflict and the smug-
gling economy, I conducted research in the area in November 2017 
and February 2018, covering both sides of the border in Thailand and 
Malaysia. On the Thai side of the border, I worked in the provinces of 
Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla. On the Malaysian side of the 
border, I spent my time in Kelantan province.
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BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMED 
CONFLICT IN THAILAND’S DEEP SOUTH
The violent conflict in Thailand’s Deep South receives little international 
attention even though there were more than 18,000 security incidents 
between 2004 and 2018 (Blaxland, 2018). The conflict has been ongoing 
since the early 1900s, making it one of the oldest conflicts on the conti-
nent (Burke et al., 2013).
The roots of the conflict are closely linked to the formation of the Thai 
state. The majority of people in the Deep South, in the provinces of Yala, 
Pattani, Narathiwat and, to some extent, Songkhla, share an identity that 
they consider to be different from the rest of Thailand, creating the basis 
for a strive for independence through armed conflict. The majority in 
Thailand is Buddhist and speaks Thai, but the Deep South, with a popula-
tion of circa two million, is predominantly Muslim (75–80%) and speaks 
Malay (Burke et al., 2013, pp.1–2; ICG, 2012, p.1; McCargo, 2014). 
While the conflict is therefore often described in religious terms, the local 
identity has multiple facets. Thailand’s Deep South and the northern parts 
of Malaysia used to form the independent Patani2 Kingdom for several 
hundreds of years. In 1786, the Siamese army conquered the kingdom 
and turned it into a loosely connected tributary state of Siam (McCargo, 
2014).
The foundation for the conflict that continues today was set in 
1909 when the Kingdom of Siam and the United Kingdom signed the 
Anglo-Siamese Treaty that determined the border between Siam and the 
British protectorate of the Federated Malay States. As part of the agree-
ment, the Patani Kingdom formally became part of Siam, while the areas 
further south, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu, which share the 
same religion and language, became part of what Malaysia is today. In 
the following centuries, and particularly after Siam had become Thailand 
in 1946, the central state sought to construct a national identity, inter 
alia, based on the Thai language and the Buddhist religion. Those in the 
former Patani Kingdom saw this as a threat to their own Patani identity 
(Horiba, 2014).
With the independence of Malaysia in 1957, Malay nationalism 
likewise started to grow in the Deep South of Thailand, leading to a bur-
geoning Malay Muslim identity. The Thai government sought to stem 
the problem by encouraging Buddhists to migrate to the south in order to 
strengthen the ‘Thai’ identity of the region. This fostered the perception 
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in the south of being colonised and stripped of its own identity. Armed 
groups fighting for independence – for instance the Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional (BRN), the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and 
Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) – evolved and conducted 
frequent violent attacks on the Thai military, such as shootings and 
bombings. The 1960s to the early 1980s are considered to be the most 
severe phase of insurgent violence in the region (McCargo, 2014, p.3).3
In order to pacify the conflict, the Thai government under Prime 
Minister Prem Tinsulanonda established the so-called Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) in 1981. Through SBPAC, 
the Thai government worked with Malay Muslim leaders and invested in 
infrastructure and education and offered a ‘surrender for amnesty’ pro-
gramme (Burke et al., 2013; ICG, 2012; McCargo, 2014). And, indeed, 
the level of violence went down and only escalated again after the new 
prime minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra, abolished SPBAC in 
2001 and strengthened the role of the security forces in the Deep South.
Tensions quickly started to grow again. Bombings conducted by the 
armed groups and fighting between security forces and armed groups 
resulted in a high number of casualities. In 2004, security forces arrested 
78 protesters and confined them in trucks where they suffocated. Such 
incidents helped to further strengthen the narrative of an oppressive Thai 
government and a victimised local population.4 Most casualties of the 
conflict have been civilians (Asia Foundation, n.d., p.173).
SBPAC was re-established in October 2006.5 SBPAC officials I inter-
viewed in 2017 emphasised that the ‘Thai government wanted to show 
understanding’ and that they tried to enable people in the Deep South to 
have normal lives. They pointed to the centre’s work aimed at improving 
the economy and the education system in the region as well as the incor-
poration of Islamic religious teaching into the public school curriculum 
and the fact that the state funds Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca each year for 
200 of the area’s Muslims.6
In 2013, members from six different movements, including BRN 
and PULO, formed an umbrella group called MARA Patani to enter 
peace talks with the Thai government.7 The Malaysian government 
provided a mediator, Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim, the former director 
of the Malaysian External Intelligence Organisation. Thailand sent 
a ten-member team into the negotiations that included representatives of 
the National Security Council, SBAC and the police. However, McCargo 
points out that the Thai team was unprepared for the talks; they had no 
strategy or plan and approached the talks without negotiating expertise 
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(2014, p.7). The representatives of the insurgency may not have been 
well-placed to broker peace either (see also Chalermsripinyorat, 2015). 
Although BRN is the most influential insurgency group, its role in the 
peace process appears to have been marginal. The discussed solutions did 
not address their key concerns of justice and accountability for violence 
by security forces and paramilitary groups against the Patani population. 
In the interviews, supporters of BRN repeatedly voiced their frustration 
with the Thai judiciary for their failures, even while they expressed 
a willingness to support peace negotiations in the future.
In October 2018 the new Malaysian prime minister Mahathir replaced 
the peace mediator Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim with Abdul Rahim Noor, 
who had successfully negotiated a peace deal with the Communist Party 
of Malaya (CPM) in 1989. At that time Thailand appointed a new chief 
negotiator, General Udomchai Thammasarorat, who has a reputation of 
being open and accessible (Macan-Markar, 2018). However, the Thai 
government had not brought in international observers, a demand BRN 
has made and which interviewees raised repeatedly.8
A heavy, visible military presence remains in the Deep South. Cars have 
to slow down on main roads every other kilometre at one of the myriad 
military checkpoints where heavily armed soldiers stop and search them. 
Armoured vehicles frequently patrol the area. Approximately 58,000 
Thai troops are currently deployed to the Deep South (Morch, 2018).
THE INSURGENCY: OBJECTIVES AND 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
In spite of the persistence of the conflict, the Deep South’s non-state 
armed groups control no territory. While it is commonly assumed that 
fighters retreat to and train in remote mountain areas, the insurgency 
operates largely ‘underground’. Many people in the Deep South are in 
favour of independence from the Thai state and sympathise with the 
insurgency. Hence, it is difficult to clearly distinguish the insurgency 
from the local population.
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), whose name means the ‘National 
Revolutionary Front’, is the most influential of the insurgency groups. 
It was formed in 1963 at a time when the government was dismantling 
Islamic education in the Deep South in favour of a secular curriculum 
(Casey-Maslen, 2014, p.224). Those affiliated with the BRN who I spoke 
with see independence as the group’s main objective, but some of them 
acknowledged it was unlikely. They seemed open to compromises and 
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suggested that having more autonomy, with local people being in control 
of their area, could be an acceptable solution. Interviewees admitted that 
the heavy Thai military presence made it difficult for them to operate, but 
expressed no interest in abandoning the cause.
The fight of the BRN and the motives that underpin it are very local-
ised. They have no ties to transnational terrorism groups such as the 
Islamic State (IS) or Al Qaeda, a point the supporters of the BRN who 
I spoke with emphasised; likely because Thai government officials often 
claim that such links exist (see e.g. The Nation, 2018). The International 
Crisis Group (ICG) summarises the situation thus: ‘Malay-Muslim mili-
tants have long framed resistance to the Thai state as a jihad, though their 
aims are primarily nationalist. Theirs may be characterised as an irreden-
tist or “nation-oriented” jihad, i.e. a fight against non-Muslims for a par-
ticular territory’ (2017a, p.1). In contrast to the extremist Salafi-jihadism 
of the IS and Al Qaeda that fight against nation states and for a caliphate, 
groups like the BRN explicitly fight for an independent nation state 
(ibid., pp.1–2). The ICG notes that the Deep South is ‘not a sympathetic 
milieu for transnational jihadism’ (ibid., p.i).9
The interviewed insurgents claimed that BRN has around 300,000 
members and that its governance structure consists of eleven departments 
that have responsibility for issues such as youth action, economic affairs, 
religious affairs, and military action. Meanwhile, an ICG report from 
2012 notes that the Thai government officially estimates that the BRN 
consisted of 3,000 fighters and 10,000 further supporters. An independ-
ent study from 2006 estimates that 100,000 to 300,000 people view the 
group favourably and are willing to provide practical support (2012, p.3).
The interviewees explained that BRN includes people from all walks 
of life, including high school age youth and government officials. Most 
villages in the region have a single designated BRN ‘representative’ with 
primary responsibility for recruitment in that village. McCargo reports 
that the movement consists of small cells of locally recruited people who 
are often quite young (2008, p.142). However, most people recruited are 
supporters without actual combat duties (ibid.).
According to the interviewees, the BRN has four distinct ways of 
generating income. First, each member pays a monthly membership fee 
to the group on a sliding scale based on income; dues can be as little 
as 60 Baht (c. US$1.80) per month. Second, if the BRN plans special 
operations, such as an attack, members may fast for a day and donate the 
money they would have spent on food for the day. Third, BRN members 
may walk from house to house, asking for additional donations. Fourth, 
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BRN invests in businesses, particularly cafés and restaurants abroad, 
most of which are in Europe or Malaysia.
The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was historically 
a highly significant player in the movement for Patani independence, 
although its influence has receded. In interviews, supporters stated that 
PULO now emphasises political action over military operations, and 
that this distinguishes it from BRN. PULO was a strong military group 
in the 1970s and 1980s, when fighters were trained in Libya and fought 
in Palestine, and when financial support was coming in from the Middle 
East. However, external support began to dry up in the 1980s. The group’s 
influence started to decline. According to the interviewees, PULO still 
relies primarily on donations. It does not ask members to contribute but 
it has wealthy supporters in the Deep South and in Europe. However, 
interviewees were sceptical of its influence. They said BRN had learned 
a lesson from PULO’s decline in influence and concluded that they 
required sources of income more reliable than external donations.10
The insurgents in the Deep South are considered to be responsible for 
a range of attacks, including on civilians. But only on rare occasions do 
insurgents admit responsibility for attacks in which civilians get killed 
(e.g. Prachatai, 2016). The interviewed supporters of BRN acknowl-
edged that the group has made specific attacks on Thai military forces, 
but claimed that the main perpetrator of violence in the Deep South is the 
Thai military. Politically, the interviewees suggested, the ongoing vio-
lence with many civilian casualties helped the military to undermine the 
legitimacy of the Patani separatist movement and bias the public against 
them, making people ‘dislike the armed groups’.11
In addition, they suggested that the Thai military had an economic 
incentive to maintain tensions. That the military financially benefited 
from the violence was an underlying theme in interviews. The inter-
viewees pointed to the fact that allocations of the Thai military budget 
in the Deep South were kept secret, saying this made it easy to divert 
funds.12 Likewise, they claimed the army was collecting bribes from the 
cross-border smuggling business, and that an ongoing level of violence 
supported its continued presence in an area that afforded that income.
Many supporters of the insurgency argued that the Thai military was 
drawing on the support of criminal groups to conduct attacks and aiding 
them in maintaining insecurity. An interviewee insisted: ‘The state uses 
criminals to work for them and create violence.’13 That the activities of 
criminal groups are responsible for some of the violence in the Deep 
South is undisputed. For instance, Connors (2007, p.157) argues that drug 
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smugglers that hire young people to attack and distract the security forces 
are responsible for some of the violence. However, most of the inter-
viewees in the Deep South thought that there was a more complex war 
economy in place, which benefitted mainly members of the Thai military 
and criminals with whom they were working hand in hand.
Identifying the real perpetrators of the violence and establishing who is 
responsible for what type of violence is beyond the scope of this research. 
It is likely that violence is not just committed for political reasons, nor 
that it is only committed by the insurgents and the security forces. There 
was widespread agreement in the interviews that at least some attacks 
were conducted by individuals with personal interests, for ‘business pur-
poses’. But in an environment of frequent attacks, it is difficult to distin-
guish between the different motives and drivers that may underpin them.
THE SMUGGLING ECONOMY
The Smuggling of Goods
Despite the ongoing violent conflict, the region is a vibrant economic 
area that benefits from trade across the border that largely ignores custom 
duties. Thailand’s southern border with Malaysia can be described 
as fairly open. While official border crossings with checkpoints exist 
(Figure 2.2), it is easy to cross the border elsewhere, often even in close 
proximity to the official border crossings. Individuals, businesses and 
networks operate across the border.
During my research in the Deep South, I could observe the large-scale 
‘smuggling’ of daily consumptions goods. Goods cheaper in Malaysia, 
for instance, are transported to Thailand, and vice versa. Thai shopkeep-
ers would usually source any products that are cheaper in Malaysia there. 
It is mainly individuals and small enterprises who transport goods across 
the porous border, using their private cars or a small boat.
However, there also are some big businesses, with bigger boats and 
warehouses (Figure 2.3). Such warehouses are prominent sights on both 
sides of Golok river, at Thailand’s border with Malaysia in Narathiwat 
Province. Goods are shipped across the river on an industrial scale, 
whether they be t-shirts going from Thailand to Malaysia or cigarettes 
coming from the Philippines, passing through Malaysia and being sold in 
Thailand. A local shopkeeper said that the only shop that sells Thai cig-
arettes is the international chain 7-Eleven.15 And once per year, usually 
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Figure 2.2 Official border crossing Thailand–Malaysia, Sungai 
Kolok (Thai side, November 2017)14
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around Chinese New Year, fireworks are smuggled from Thailand to 
Malaysia, where fireworks are banned.
The state authorities appear to be tolerating the irregular cross-border 
business. The people interviewed who ship goods on a small scale do 
not have to pay duties or bribes to the police. People who ship goods on 
a large scale, and, for instance, run warehouses on the Thai side of the 
border, pay an informal monthly ‘fee’ to the police.
In addition to ordinary consumption goods, drugs are frequently 
smuggled across the border. According to the interviewees, yaba and 
ice (methamphetamines) that are produced in Myanmar’s Shan State 
were the main drugs smuggled from Thailand to Malaysia at the time. 
Conversely, heroin smuggling was rare. The margin for methampheta-
mines was particularly high at the time of the interviews, with one pill 
costing around 80 Baht (c. US$2.50) in Thailand and 200 Baht (c. US$ 
6.20) in Malaysia. Interviewees stated that the drug trade was organised 
very professionally by networks and that it offered ‘full-time jobs’.
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Figure 2.3 Smuggling of goods across Golok river from Thailand 
to Malaysia (November 2017)
Conflict and transnational crime30
According to interviewees, the smuggling of drugs does not necessarily 
happen in remote border areas. Quite the contrary, urban areas offer 
better transportation links to the border on the Thai side and further into 
Malaysia on the other side. As security forces are usually very present 
in such populated areas, the smuggling of drugs across the border often 
happens in front of their eyes.
It was common to smuggle guns and ammunition across the border, 
but, according to those who used to smuggle them, the business had 
decreased since Indonesia granted Aceh significant autonomy in 2005, 
ending the local armed conflict.16 The conflict in the Deep South made 
weapons easily available. Interviewees described government employees, 
including bureaucrats, who often carry weapons, which they can obtain 
cheaply, for self-protection.17 Malaysia has strict gun laws, making them 
difficult and expensive to obtain. This created a considerable financial 
incentive to smuggle weapons obtained in Thailand to Malaysia and then 
on to Indonesia. According to former gun smugglers, criminal groups 
in Malaysia now drive weapons demand, but the smugglers claim to 
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be more afraid of supplying them. Further, they explained that officials 
would no longer readily tolerate bribes to smuggle guns, while the smug-
gling of drugs was still more accepted. In addition to criminal demand, 
there are some reports of Malaysian IS supporters benefitting from the 
availability of weapons in Southern Thailand, buying them there and 
smuggling them into Malaysia (see e.g. The Straits Times, 2017; Bodetti, 
2018).
Despite being highly regulated and often even having set ‘fees’, smug-
glers described the system of bribing officials for smuggling goods across 
the border in Thailand as more complex than the Malaysian system, 
which is more centralised. While in Malaysia bribes have to be paid to 
one agency only (customs), smugglers complained that eight different 
state agencies collect bribes on the Thai side of the border.
The Smuggling of People
Crossing the Thailand–Malaysia border legally at a regular border cross-
ing is easy, particularly for Thai and Malay nationals who live in the 
border areas. According to SBPAC, a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the two countries allows residents of the border areas to gain 
a ‘border pass’. These border passes allow people to cross the border 
legally at the official border crossings without a passport and a visa and 
travel up to 25km into the neighbouring country.18 Many people in the 
border area also have ID cards and/or a passport from both Thailand and 
Malaysia.
Using an irregular border crossing is just as easy – if not even easier, 
as there are considerably more irregular border crossings than regular 
ones. Taking the boat and crossing the border irregularly costs as little 
as 20 Baht (c. US$0.60). Most people who use irregular border crossings 
could cross legally, possessing all the necessary documents; they use 
irregular crossings for convenience. For example, people from Malaysia 
frequently cross into Thailand for shopping or drinking, as the Malaysian 
state bordering Thailand is dry.
State authorities often informally regulate irregular border crossings 
(Figure 2.4). Particularly in urban areas security forces are present on 
both sides of the border and, at times, check papers at the irregular border 
crossings. At one irregular border crossing that people from Malaysia 
often use to go to bars in Thailand, Thai soldiers keep the ID cards of all 
people who enter Thailand and return them when they get on the boat 
again to return to Malaysia.
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Figure 2.4 Malaysian security forces at irregular border crossing 
to Thailand (February 2018)
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Many Thai work in Malaysia while continuing to live in Thailand; 
crossing the border is simply part of their daily commute. But there also 
are people from other parts of Thailand and third countries who cross 
into Malaysia as migrant workers and stay for months or years at a time. 
Interviewees explained that there is a significant demand for cheap labour 
in Malaysia, particularly for the construction business. For instance, at 
the time of the interviews there was demand for labourers to work on 
a high-speed train track that would connect the border region with Kuala 
Lumpur. Meanwhile, according to the interviewees, 30% to 40% of the 
smuggled people are young women, often with children, who are seeking 
work as domestic cleaners or housemaids in Malaysia.
Interviewees say a large number of migrant workers are from Myanmar. 
One interviewee explained: ‘The people from Burma are very hard 
working. Malaysians like them a lot.’19 Rohingyas were a sizeable group 
at the time of my interviews and, according to the interviewees, some 
smuggling groups specialise in smuggling them, charging 4,000 to 5,000 
Baht (c. US$125–155) per refugee, some of which is used to pay off 
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officials. An interviewee explained that one such group uses the official 
papers of dead Thai citizens to help Rohingya to obtain a legal identity.20 
However, according to several interviewees, the number of Rohingya 
passing through has declined. When most Rohingya became refugees in 
Bangladesh in 2017, they were confined in camps (see Chapter 4).
Some migrant workers arrive at the border individually or in small 
groups, and manage the border crossing themselves. Others arrive in 
groups of 20 to 30 people, having paid to have a network of agents make 
their passage possible. A smuggler summarised: ‘The networks are 
organised and international. (...) Burmese, Thai, and Malaysian groups 
work together.’21 In these cases, an agent takes a group of migrants to 
the border on the Thai side, and hands them off to somebody with a boat, 
who then takes them across the river. On the Malaysian side of the river, 
they hand the group over to another agent, who takes them onwards, 
usually to Kuala Lumpur, from where they can continue to other parts of 
the country.
The local people who handle the border crossing are not necessarily 
‘specialised’ in the smuggling of migrants. Even smugglers who, for 
instance, usually take drugs may also take people across when an oppor-
tunity arises, making use of their established networks with the state 
authorities on both sides. One interviewee explained: ‘the smuggling of 
drugs and the smuggling of people is often done by the same people here. 
But there might be different bosses.’22
According to the people interviewed at the Thailand–Malaysia border, 
most of the smuggling of people from third countries happens on the 
western side of the border, in Songkhla Province, away from the con-
flict in the east. Here smugglers can use a major highway that connects 
Thailand and Malaysia and there are fewer checkpoints than in the east, 
as there is less violent resistance to government control in Songkhla, 
resulting in a far less militarised environment. The interviewees told me 
that comparatively little smuggling of migrants and illicit goods happens 
in the east, in the Sungai Kolok–Rantau Panjang area of the border. This 
is pragmatic as navigating the numerous military checkpoints on the way 
to the border in Thailand with a truck of migrants must be difficult.
At the same time what smuggling occurs can nonetheless be on a larger 
scale, with as many as 70 people arriving at a time in peak seasons 
(e.g. in empty petrol trucks) and crossing the border. But in 2017/18, 
numbers were low. In mid-February 2018, a number of interviewees in 
the east reported that the last case of people smuggling they were aware 
of had happened in early January, when a group of ten people – mainly 
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Rohingya, but reportedly also including some Vietnamese – were taken 
across the border to Malaysia. However, not all of the people smuggling 
is done for money. Some local people help others, particularly refugees 
like the Rohingya, to cross the border to Malaysia without charging them, 
out of sympathy for their plight.
SMUGGLING AND ARMED CONFLICT
Smuggling and Insurgents
At the Thai–Malay border, as elsewhere, officials blame smuggling 
on non-state armed groups. For instance, following an arrest of drug 
smugglers in Narathiwat in July 2018 the Thai police told journalists: 
‘We found links between drugs gangs and insurgents. We can confirm 
that they are connected and have a symbiotic relationship’ (BenarNews, 
2018).
My research cannot compare to a police investigation; however, it 
does paint a different picture. The interviewed insurgents claimed not 
to be involved in the business of smuggling or trafficking people. More 
significantly, the interviewed smugglers stated they do not work with 
or depend for support on insurgents, indicating that there are no major 
institutional links between the non-state armed groups and the smuggling 
business at the border. The armed groups in Southern Thailand operate 
underground and do not control territory. Hence, they have little to offer 
smugglers. Nor do insurgents have significant incentives to work with 
smugglers. Being associated with the smuggling of illicit goods such as 
drugs, or even human trafficking, could undermine their legitimacy with 
the local population, upon which they also depend for membership fees, 
and increase the likelihood of being detected by the security forces.
Looking, for instance, at the smuggling of people, local people do not 
need the help of insurgents to cross the border and work abroad, as the 
border is porous. There is no reason to believe, either, that the non-state 
armed groups in the area depend on networks to cross the border, as 
security forces do not know their identities and they can cross legally as 
residents of the border area. The smuggling of people from third coun-
tries is organised through networks of agents or brokers, who arrange the 
entire journey of migrants, often through multiple countries. Given that 
they evidently avoid the conflict areas in the Deep South in favour of the 
more peaceful west, it seems unlikely they turn to non-state armed groups 
for help with securing passage. While insurgents did report on occasion 
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helping Rohingya across the border, they said they did so, not to make 
money, but to help fellow Muslims.
With regard to drug smuggling, members of the armed groups said 
this was against their religious principles. However, other interviewees 
with a detailed understanding of the local dynamics – who were neither 
part of the BRN nor part of the security forces, such as local journalists 
and civil society activists – explained that a complex war economy was 
in place to smuggle drugs, with connections not just between the army 
and criminals, but possibly also including some insurgents.23 While I did 
not find any further evidence that supports or contradicts this idea, this 
is certainly possible. Furthermore, some members of BRN may make 
their personal income through smuggling drugs, people or other goods. 
Through their membership contributions this would indirectly contribute 
to BRN’s activities, but it does not constitute the symbiotic relationship 
police had described.
Smuggling and the State
Conversely, I found much stronger evidence of a link between smug-
gling and the state. Borders, while being at the periphery of the state, 
are symbolic also of statehood and are usually under close state control. 
Even though the border separating Thailand and Malaysia is porous, state 
security forces are very present. Several interviewees pointed out that 
the enormous military presence of more than 50,000 soldiers makes it 
impossible to do much without them noticing, which strongly suggests 
that smuggling depends on their acquiescence (Figure 2.5). A number 
of interviewees further argued that the army was driving the conflict in 
order to benefit from criminal activities in the area, particularly, to be 
able to collect bribes from the cross-border smuggling business more 
easily.
The research shows that state officials on both sides of the border make 
considerable profits charging ‘fees’ for the large-scale businesses that 
smuggle consumer goods across the border. The acceptance of such prac-
tices appears to be so systemic that extra-legal activities scarcely qualify 
as ‘smuggling’. In several cases Thai military officials themselves have 
been caught smuggling large amounts of weapons into neighbouring 
countries (see e.g. The Nation, 2017). In the context of drug smuggling, 
a smuggler reported, ‘we do not bribe the army, but we sometimes coop-
erate’,24 pointing at a fairly institutionalised role of the state in the drug 
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Figure 2.5 People crossing the Golok river from Malaysia to 
Thailand next to a checkpoint at night (November 2017)
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smuggling industry. Meanwhile, both in Thailand and in Malaysia drug 
trafficking carries capital punishment.25
Likewise, the networks of agents that smuggle people over long distances 
and across international borders seem to have strong links to state author-
ities on both sides of the border. Many interviewees echoed the sentiment 
that ‘people smuggling can’t happen without the state being involved.’ 
One person in Thailand explained in more detail: ‘State officials are 
linked to all activities here. Even a normal businessman who wants to 
open a company needs the backing of the military. (…) In terms of the 
smuggling of migrants, people usually travel here on the main road. How 
would they be able to without anyone noticing it? The state has to close 
at least one eye.’26
Most of the smuggling of people from third countries happens in the 
west, where there is no conflict and good infrastructure. Even though 
state actors often appear to be assisting people smuggling networks, 
a lower number of checkpoints compared to the conflict region and 
a lower number of branches of the security forces that are aware of the 
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smuggling reduces the costs of smuggling and the likelihood of being 
exposed.
A criminal case that came to light in 2015 represents a rare 
instance when state agents have been prosecuted for people smuggling. 
A number of mass graves with remains of victims of human trafficking 
were discovered in Thailand’s Songkhla Province and in Malaysia’s 
Perlis Province. A group of human traffickers imprisoned Rohingya refu-
gees in camps in the border region, tortured them, and demanded ransoms 
from their families in order to release them. Many Rohingya died and 
were buried at the camp sites. The investigation resulted in the arrest of 
state officials in both Thailand and Malaysia who were involved in the 
‘business’.27 One interviewee argued that the discovery of graves and the 
following arrests are likely to be the consequence of competition between 
different networks, where a rival criminal network had spread informa-
tion about the graves in order to expand its area of influence.28 Hence, 
other networks running similar operations are probably still in place.
One of the camps for abducted refugees that gained attention was 
located in a forested area not far from the border town Padang Basar. 
Other camps were located in more remote areas along the border in the 
same region, in one case a five-day hike through the forest from Padang 
Basar (see Fortify Rights and Suhakam, 2019, p.41). What makes the 
border region at Padang Basar attractive for people smugglers is that it 
offers dense forests to hide camps while having good inland connections. 
On the Thai side, Padang Basar features a good road connection and 
a railway station, which connects it with the closest bigger city Hat Yai 
and even Bangkok. Being located in the far west of Songkhla, the city 
is also considerably closer to the west coast of Thailand, where many 
Rohingya refugees arrive by boat. Similarly, on the Malaysian side, the 
city is well-connected by road and railway.
Going into the forests in Songkhla enables smugglers to avoid public 
attention. However, this comes at the cost of longer routes without proper 
infrastructure through often difficult terrain, which makes the smug-
gling operation more expensive. This makes the forest route suitable 
for smugglers who do not simply want to cross the border quickly but 
instead want to prevent people from crossing the border by kidnapping 
them and holding them (often for months), while engaging in torture and 
other violent tactics to extract greater ransoms from refugees’ families. 
Even with good links to the state in both Thailand and Malaysia, such 
inhumane criminal activities, which are strongly rejected by the public, 
cannot happen in the limelight.
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According to the interviewees, the number of trafficked and smug-
gled people has decreased since the 2015 public scandal.29 However, 
this is likely to be the result of a lower ‘demand’, rather than a lower 
‘supply’, as refugees grew frightened that migration would put them in 
danger. A number of interviewees stated that networks that facilitated 
larger-scale immigration before 2015, both humane and inhumane ones, 
are still in place, waiting for the next surge of people who want to go to 
Malaysia (see Chapter 4).
Further east along the border, in the provinces Yala, Pattani and 
Narathiwat, where violent conflict is ongoing, the role of the state 
appeared to be more passive with regard to its involvement in people 
smuggling when I conducted my research in 2017/18. Interviewees 
reported that officials on both sides of the border took bribes from people 
smugglers. For instance, an interviewee explained that in some cases 
people smugglers had to pay up to 5,000 Baht (c. US$155) per person 
to Malaysian officials, in addition to a payment to Thai officials.30 But 
one interviewee pointed out that there are exceptions. He explained: ‘the 
normal police in Malaysia is bribed. But there is one special unit which 
doesn’t accept bribes.’31 However, it remained unclear whether that unit 
would arrest smugglers.
While some involvement of state actors appears to be very organised, 
with set ‘fees’ for a border crossing, there also seems to be less system-
atised corruption. A lawyer in Southern Thailand explained: ‘The immi-
gration authorities don’t know what to do in a case where they actually 
arrest a migrant who is smuggled. They detain them but then they [i.e. 
the detained migrants] manage to “escape” from detention. So, we can 
assume that they get released.’32
Several interviewees said that it is particularly state authorities and 
criminals who benefit from the ongoing conflict in Thailand’s Deep 
South, not just because of the smuggling economy. In addition, and 
more substantially, the ongoing conflict provides political justification 
for a direct military control of civilian spheres of governance in the 
Deep South, including development projects, such as the construction 
of roads. As part of the Thai government’s strategy to appease the South 
through development, a large amount of money is available to fund such 
projects. They offer opportunities for corruption on a much larger scale. 
As one interviewee described it, ‘The ongoing conflict makes it easier 
to do secretive stuff.’33 In other words, the violent conflict reduces the 
level of public accountability of the state. In a way, another interviewee 
concluded, all parties of the conflict benefit from ongoing violence. The 
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conflict enables BRN to gain attention for their struggle and it allows the 
army to make money.34
CONCLUSIONS
At first glance, the armed conflict in Southern Thailand and the smug-
gling business in the region are disconnected phenomena. Even without 
the conflict the area would probably be a major hub for smuggling 
activities from and into Malaysia. But the conflict shapes the smuggling 
economy and creates new income avenues for actors like the state secu-
rity forces, which in turn creates an incentive to maintain the conflict.
In some cases, smuggling and armed conflict are even geographically 
disconnected. As both my interviews and the cases of the mass graves 
found in 2015 indicate, human smugglers and traffickers prefer routes 
that avoid violent conflict, choosing to cross the border in the more 
secure Songkhla province in the west rather than in the conflict areas of 
Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat in the east. Songkhla offers good road and 
railway connectivity and while the violent conflict has led to the heavy 
presence of security forces in the east, there are fewer checkpoints to be 
navigated or bribed in the west, making it a popular route for large-scale 
smuggling of people from third countries and crime that has to happen 
beyond the eye of the public – such as the violent trafficking and torture 
of refugees.
In contrast to a common perception, most smuggling activities do not 
happen in remote areas; in fact, they usually happen in the more populated 
areas at the border. This can also be seen in the east. Here, the violent 
conflict has resulted in a heavy presence of security forces, particularly in 
urban areas. Nonetheless, the populated areas are the preferred route for 
most smugglers due to good transportation links. Migrants are smuggled 
across the river on the same irregular routes that local people who want 
to cross the border to have a drink in Thailand, shop keepers importing 
small amounts of goods, and networks smuggling drugs all use.
Local people play a key role for the smuggling activities at the border. 
They may smuggle goods for themselves and may help people to cross 
the border free of charge. However, they may also work for smuggling 
networks and take drugs, as well as people, including migrants, across the 
border. Hence, even though the networks that organise migrant and drug 
smuggling appear to be disconnected, they overlap at times on the local 
level as the same people may take goods across the border for different 
networks.
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Smuggling, including that of drugs, often happens before the eyes of 
the security forces who appear to be benefitting from the activities. For 
instance, the owners of warehouses who smuggle t-shirts and other licit 
goods on a large scale pay a fixed amount to the security forces every 
month. Similarly, the drug trade is based to some extent on ‘cooperation’ 
between smugglers and security forces. While the use of urban areas 
requires payments to the security forces, passing through them is still 
cheaper – and ensures a higher level of predictability – than smuggling 
across the more rural parts of the border.
Ultimately, the violent conflict creates an environment which makes it 
easier for state authorities to justify a heavy presence, to act with limited 
accountability, and to benefit from corruption that is linked to the smug-
gling of goods and people. Resonating with the literature on war econo-
mies (e.g. Kaldor, 2012), I find that different actors, particularly security 
forces and the networks that control the smuggling of illicit goods, appear 
to be working more in concert than against each other, driven by aligned 
economic interests rather than political concerns. Meanwhile, the violent 
environment also helps criminals conceal their activities. For instance, 
it is possible to kill a rival smuggler or a business partner one no longer 
wishes to work with and police will generally attribute the death to the 
armed conflict and political motives. These vested interests may help to 
explain why the conflict has been so persistent.
By contrast, conflict does not seem to feed the smuggling economy 
through the role of non-state armed groups. The state is in full control of 
the area and the border, which gives smugglers little reason to work with 
groups like the BRN. Conversely, the insurgents would put their local 
legitimacy – which is crucial for them as they depend on local support 
– at risk if they were to get involved in the smuggling of people or illicit 
goods. Instead, they have established other modes of generating money, 
such as the membership fee, that lets them benefit financially from their 
local support.
Hence, the insurgents in Thailand’s Deep South could be described as 
legitimacy-seeking rebels. They lack territorial control and want to main-
tain or build local legitimacy, resulting in a limited involvement in the 
smuggling economy. Individual members may be feeding their families 
and ultimately also funding their membership dues through smuggling, 
but I found no reason to think there is a closer link.
In September 2018, Thailand and Malaysia announced plans to build 
a border wall, which they said would ‘combat transnational terrorism and 
smuggling’ (Reuters, 2018). Given the state involvement in the smug-
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gling business, it seems unlikely a border wall will significantly affect the 
conflict or the ease of passage of people or goods.
NOTES
1. Interview, 24 November 2017.
2. In contrast to the Thai province ‘Pattani’, the ‘Patani Kingdom’, an area 
larger than today’s province, is spelled with one ‘t’ only. Hence, the spelling 
is political, with ‘Patani’ referring to the historical identity (see McCargo, 
2007a and McCargo, 2008 for a discussion of this issue).
3. See McCargo (2008) for a comprehensive analysis of the conflict until 2008.
4. See McCargo (2007b) for a detailed analysis of Thaksin’s role for the devel-
opments in the Deep South.
5. Interview with SBAC officials, Yala, 24 November 2017.
6. Interview with SBAC officials, Yala, 24 November 2017.
7. MARA Patani is comprised of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Barisan 
Islam Pembebasan Patani (BIPP), Pertubuhan Persatuan Pembebasan 
Patani (PULO-P4), Pertubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu (PULO-dspp), 
Pertubuhan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu (PULO-mkp) and Gerakan 
Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP). 
8. This demand has also been raised in recent media reports on the conflict: see 
e.g. Pathan (2018).
9. See ICG (2017a) for a detailed analysis of the ‘jihad’ of insurgents in the 
Deep South and their differences from international terrorist groups like IS 
and Al Qaeda. 
10. Interview, 24 November 2017.
11. Interview, 10 February 2018.
12. The government’s budget for Thailand’s Deep South is under the supervi-
sion of the 4th Army Chief, who is also the chair of the Internal Security 
Operation Command Force (ISOC region 4). This budget covers all 
expenses of the state, including security, social affairs, economics, political 
affairs and technology. The details of how the budget is spent and costs are 
allocated remain secret. See Bangkokbiznews (2014). 
13. Interview, 10 February 2018.
14. All photos by the author.
15. Interview, 24 November 2017.
16. In Aceh the ‘Free Aceh Movement’ fought against the Indonesian govern-
ment in order to gain independence, driven, among other reasons, by a more 
conservative interpretation of Islam that is common in Indonesia. In 2005 
the conflict ended through a peace agreement, which granted Aceh a high 
level of autonomy.
17. Interview, 10 February 2018.
18. Interview, 24 November 2017.
19. Interview, 23 November 2017.
20. Interview, 23 November 2017.
21. Interview, 10 February 2018.
22. Interview, 24 November 2017.
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23. E.g. interview, 23 November 2017.
24. Interview, 24 November 2017.
25. Malaysia suspended executions in 2018.
26. Interview with civil society activist, 11 February 2018.
27. See BBC (2015); The Straits Times (2015); The Guardian (2015). As 
Chapter 4 will detail, during my research in the Rohingya refugee camps in 
Bangladesh, I encountered many families whose relatives were ransomed 
or disappeared. For example, a Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh said that 
his brother had been held for ransom at the border in 2012 for a month. 
Smugglers required his family to make an additional, previously undisclosed 
payment when he reached the Thailand–Malaysia border and was impris-
oned. The family successfully ransomed the brother and he was not tortured, 
but the trip cost 35 lakhs (c. US$2,215) when they had expected to pay just 
13 lakhs (c. US$815): Interview with Rohingya in Bangladesh, 3 December 
2017.
28. Interview, 10 February 2018.
29. Interview with local politician, 11 February 2018.
30. Interview, 10 February 2018.
31. Interview, 24 November 2017.
32. Interview, 11 February 2018.
33. Interview with civil society activist, 11 February 2018.
34. Interview, 23 November 2017.
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3. Meth & militias: the Myanmar–
China border region
‘The militias only work for their personal benefit’, a lawyer in Myanmar’s 
northern Kachin State, close to the Chinese border, told me. In addition to 
non-state armed groups, which are commonly referred to as ethnic armed 
organisations (EAOs) in Myanmar, state-sponsored armed militias are 
active in the region. ‘They have no salary, but they are armed. So they do 
a lot of smuggling. The Tatmadaw [the Myanmar national armed forces] 
protect them and don’t intervene because they are useful for them.’1
Some militias evolved out of EAOs or factions within them that 
switched sides in order to benefit from deals offered by the Tatmadaw, 
such as concessions to extract resources (see e.g. Callahan, 2007). Other 
militia groups were created by strongmen and later co-opted by the 
Tatmadaw; still others were established by the Tatmadaw as village-level 
forces. Militias have existed since Myanmar’s independence in 1948 and 
their number is unknown; but Buchanan estimates the number of militia 
groups in Myanmar in the hundreds or even thousands (2016, p.1).
Militias are also prevalent in Myanmar’s northern Kachin and Shan 
States (Figure 3.1). The region receives less attention in the world than 
the episodes of violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State that resulted in 
the displacement of the Rohingya, which is covered in Chapter 4. But 
a violent conflict that involves the Tatmadaw, EAOs and militias has 
been ongoing in Kachin and Shan States, in close proximity to the 
Chinese border, for decades.
Like the Thailand–Malaysia border, the Myanmar–China border is 
porous and large amounts of goods and people are smuggled across, 
primarily into China. This includes natural resources, such as timber 
and jade. In addition, Kachin and Shan States are a major source of 
opium, with Myanmar being the world’s second largest producer after 
Afghanistan (see Meehan, 2016).2 More recently, Shan State especially 
has also become a major exporter of methamphetamines (particularly 
‘yaba’) in the region, including to Thailand and Bangladesh. Conversely, 
EAOs in the region often use weapons smuggled from China.3
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Figure 3.1 States in Myanmar
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To gain a better understanding of how the smuggling business and 
armed conflict relate in Kachin and Shan states, I conducted interviews in 
the capital of Kachin State, Myitkyina, as well as in Lashio and Kengtung 
in Shan State in January 2018. To be able to go into more depth, the 
chapter focuses primarily on the findings from Kachin State, but also 
draws on examples from northern Shan State, where I observed similar 
dynamics.
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMED 
CONFLICT IN MYANMAR
Myanmar was founded as and continues to be known as Burma.4 What 
is often described as one of the longest civil wars in history has afflicted 
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the country since its independence from the British in 1948. Myanmar 
is ethnically diverse and various EAOs fight for independence, auton-
omy and/or greater political rights. Division began under colonial rule, 
when the British gave ‘Upper-Burma’ to the north far more autonomy 
than ‘Lower-Burma’ to the south. While the south was politically and 
economically dominated by the British, the north was left with a larger 
degree of autonomy. Local rulers were left to rule over their own territo-
ries with small concessions to the British.
General Aung San, who is commonly viewed as the founder of Burma 
and is the father of the Nobel Peace Prize winner and State Counsellor 
Aung San Suu Kyi, set out to create a federal state that would give 
equal rights to all ethnic groups. In 1947, the Burmese government and 
representatives of the Shan, Kachin and Chin ethnic communities signed 
the ‘Panglong Agreement’, in which they decided, rather ambiguously, 
that ‘full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is 
accepted in principle’ for these ethnic groups ‘within a Unified Burma’. 
Shortly after, Aung San was assassinated, six months before Burma 
gained independence from Britain. The country’s new constitution cat-
egorised ethnic groups differently. The Kachin, the Karen, the Karenni, 
and the Shan were categorised as ‘states’ within a unified Burma. Among 
them the Karenni and the Shan were granted the right of secession after 
ten years if they fulfilled certain requirements (TNI, 2017, p.5). The 
Chin, the Wa and Muslims in Arakan as well as other ethnic groups did 
not receive special recognition (ibid.). In 1962, the civilian government 
was toppled in a military coup and a military government, dominated 
by the majority ethnic group, the Bamar, began its rule. In an attempt to 
unify territorial control, the military imprisoned and tortured many ethnic 
minority leaders.
After passing a new constitution in 2008, the military junta proclaimed 
its plan to begin a transition to democracy. In 2010, the government 
allowed elections for the first time in decades. Aung San Suu Kyi 
was released after 15 years of house arrest and her party, the National 
League for Democracy (NLD), has been the dominant civilian political 
power in the country ever since. Nonetheless, the Myanmar military, 
the Tatmadaw, still holds substantial sway over power. Based on the 
constitution they passed, they are not subject to oversight by the civilian 
government and have a guaranteed 25% of the seats in parliament.
Armed combat between the Tatmadaw and EAOs has repeatedly 
occurred since the early 1960s.5 Many ethnic armed groups demand more 
autonomy within a federal system. However, with continued alienation as 
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a result of aggressive military interventions in the regions, some groups 
favour a solution of secession instead of federalism.
As in Thailand’s Deep South, the conflict has an economic dimension. 
The conflict is partly driven by a perceived neglect of communities and 
partly by aggressive exploitation of natural resources. Battles are not 
only fought over territory, but also over drug trade routes or natural 
resource extraction. Woods (2011; 2018) offers a detailed analysis of the 
‘conflict resource economy’ in Myanmar’s borderlands. He points out 
that ceasefires have enabled the Tatmadaw, EAOs and militias to exploit 
natural resources on a large scale in what he calls ‘ceasefire capitalism’. 
He further describes how the Tatmadaw often try to incentivise EAOs, 
or breakaway groups, to end their fight against the government and 
become ‘self-sufficient counterinsurgent forces’ by allowing them to 
continuously control their territory and exploit its resources and trade 
routes (2018, p.6).
Meanwhile, violent conflict continues across Myanmar. The UN 
Human Rights Council established a Fact-Finding Mission in March 
2017 to explore possible human rights violations in Rakhine, Kachin, and 
Shan States. The final report finds ‘consistent patterns of serious human 
rights violations and abuses’ and ‘serious violations of international 
humanitarian law’, principally committed by the military, in all three 
states (Human Rights Council, 2018).
The most recent initiative to negotiate peace through the Nationwide 
Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 failed. A number of key EAOs, such 
as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army-North 
(SSA-N) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), refused to sign the 
agreement because the Tatmadaw had excluded other EAOs from par-
ticipating in the talks, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army 
(TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA).6 Influential non-signatory groups 
formed the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee 
(FPNCC), which is backed by China and does not accept the NCA 
‘because it is not all-inclusive and does not recognize the political rights 
of all ethnic nationalities’ (FPNCC, 2018; see also Lintner, 2018).7
The Kachin Independence Army
One of the largest ethnic minority groups in Myanmar are the Kachin 
people. The Kachin trace their history back to migration from the Tibetan 
Plateau around ad 500. Today, a large population of Kachin lives in 
Myanmar’s Kachin State as well as in China’s neighbouring Yunnan 
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Figure 3.2 Manau Shadung, Kachin National Manau Park, 
Myitkyina, Kachin State (January 2018)
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Province (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Due to the influence of American mis-
sionaries who began travelling to Kachin in the nineteenth century, most 
Kachin are Christians of Baptist faith. The majority of Kachin speaks 
Jingpo, but some subgroups speak different languages.8
The Kachin also have one of the most prominent EAOs in Myanmar: 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), with an estimated 10,000 
troops, which functions as the armed wing of the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO). Brenner (2019, p.76) describes how their informal 
capital Laiza at the Chinese border has turned into a ‘Mecca of armed 
ethnic resistance’, a symbol of resistance within Myanmar.
The Kachin signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947, surrendering the 
right to secede in exchange for more territory under the constitution (TNI, 
2017, p.5). But following a perceived neglect of the Kachin and a lack 
of implementation of Panglong after Burma’s independence in 1948, 
an ethnic armed movement gained ground. In 1960, university students 
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Figure 3.3 Kachin State
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established the KIO and in early 1961 established the KIA (Jaquet, 2015). 
The group demanded autonomy and self-determination for the Kachin, 
and frustration grew further when the constitution gave Buddhism 
a stronger role in the country that same year.
The group grew quickly and expanded its influence. In 1976, the 
KIO/A and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) formed a coalition, 
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which ensured the KIA access to weapons smuggled from China (Burma 
Link, 2018). By the 1980s, the group controlled large parts of Kachin 
and northern Shan States (Brenner, 2019, p.75; Lintner, 2011). After 
the collapse of the CPB in 1989, which made access to weapons more 
difficult, the KIA negotiated a ceasefire with the Myanmar government 
in 1994 (Burma Link, 2018). The ceasefire allowed both sides to accumu-
late substantial profits from resource extraction and sale (Brenner, 2015, 
p.338), in line with what Woods (2011; 2018) describes as ‘ceasefire 
capitalism’. Kachin State has substantial natural resources – particularly 
jade – that have been extracted aggressively in recent decades (Global 
Witness, 2015).
Woods finds that controlling the mining town of Hpakant in eastern 
Kachin State had allowed the KIO/A to monopolise the jade trade until 
it relinquished this territorial control through the ceasefire agreement, 
after which it turned to timber in the areas it continued to control. He 
concludes that deforestation ‘skyrocketed’ at the Kachin State–Yunnan 
border after the peace agreement (2011, p.750). However, Brenner 
(2015; 2019) points out that while the mutually beneficial enterprise 
allowed for peaceful years in the region, the focus on revenue generation 
and neglect of local grievances has left underlying problems unresolved. 
Communities are now increasingly sceptical, not only of the national 
government, but also of the KIO/A leadership (2015, p.338).
In 2008, the Tatmadaw called on ethnic armed groups to transform 
themselves into Border Guard Forces (BGF), militias subordinate to 
the Tatmadaw. While some groups complied, this request resulted in 
a breakdown of the ceasefire with the KIA in 2011 (see South, 2018, 
p.4). Brenner explains that the young leadership of the KIA rejected the 
Tatmadaw’s proposal, feeling alienated as older generations of leader-
ship had flourished as a result of natural resource exploitation, creating 
stark inequalities within the movement (2015, p.343). Meanwhile an 
interviewee in Kachin State, reflecting a common perspective on the 
streets, argued: ‘Both parties just want money. During the ceasefire the 
government and the KIA shared the revenues. The ceasefire broke down 
because the two parties couldn’t agree on who gets what share of the 
revenue.’9
Fighting resumed between the Tatmadaw and the KIA in 2013 when 
the Tatmadaw launched an offensive on the KIA headquarters in Laiza, 
located at the Chinese border. Later attacks were launched in Kokang 
and Palaung. In June 2017, the Tatmadaw attacked gold and amber 
mines operated by the KIO/A in Tanai in Kachin State (Min Tun, 2018). 
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Fighting intensified in the following months and was ongoing at the 
time of this writing. The spokesperson of the KIO/A’s liaison office in 
Myitkyina, the Technical Advisory Team (TAT), claimed: ‘Originally 
we fought army against army. But then the government changed its strat-
egy around 2014 and started to attack villages that are close to KIA posts. 
Hence, many villagers have been displaced. (…) Hundreds of villages 
have been burnt down.’10 Indeed, UN estimates say that 60,000 people in 
Kachin and Shan State were displaced between January 2017 and March 
2018 (OCHA, 2018).11
Most of the internally displaced people (IDP) now live in camps along 
the Chinese border (KWAT, 2013, p.5). A resident of an IDP camp in 
Kachin State said that his village comprised 2,300 families before it 
became ‘a conflict zone’ where ‘[n]obody takes responsibility for our 
safety (…) neither the government nor the KIA’. He often goes back 
because he is the head of the village, though most people have moved 
to IDP camps. He also noted that he did not consider the IDP camps to 
be safe, citing an incident where the Tatmadaw shelled Mung Lai Hkyet 
IDP camp in January 2018. ‘The war is driven by the government. It feels 
as if the camps were shelled intentionally’, he says.12 Help for displaced 
people has largely come from local civil society and faith-based organisa-
tions, rather than the international community (South, 2018, p.25).
But the KIO/A does not limit its activities to fighting; it also governs 
parts of territory in Kachin State. The organisation built schools and uni-
versities and created its own quasi-governmental structure in the territo-
ries under its control, with departments for health, education, agriculture 
and women’s affairs (Brenner, 2015, p.347). Education plans integrating 
Kachin language and culture into the public education system are in 
place. Combined with the perceived cultural and political alienation by 
the national government, and the armed conflict that often also resulted in 
civilian deaths, this has contributed to a strengthening of Kachin identity.
Like most governments, the KIO/A generates revenue through taxes, 
which are levied on companies extracting natural resources, especially 
jade (see e.g. Brenner, 2019, p.80; Global Witness, 2015). A number 
of interviewees in Kachin State complained that the KIO/A was taxing 
people, shops, and sometimes also cars at checkpoints.13 One interviewee 
from Myitkyina, which is under government control but close to KIA 
territories, explained:
In downtown Myitkyina, small shops pay a tax of around MMK 1 million 
[c. US$720] to the KIA per year. But it’s not done very systematically. 
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Sometimes they come twice per year; sometimes once per year. Private car 
owners have to pay at checkpoints. If they give you a receipt, you can use it 
for a year. But if you have a receipt from the KIA and the government finds 
it, you may get arrested. And the government is collecting taxes too. So most 
people in the city pay to the KIA and the government.14
According to interviewees the group is involved in other business activ-
ities. For instance, the KIO/A owns hotels on the Chinese border and 
provides Chinese businessmen with licences for casinos in a town called 
Mai Ja Yang, which contribute significantly to their revenue.15
The New Democratic Army – Kachin
Another Kachin group, the New Democratic Army – Kachin (NDA-K) 
have a decidedly different relationship to the Tatmadaw. This particularly 
influential militia had its origins in the CPB, which members of the KIA 
under the command of Zahkung Ting Ying and Layawk Zalum had 
joined in 1968 in order to fight both the Tatmadaw and the KIA as the 
CPB’s Unit 101 (Lintner, 2011, p.435; Lintner, 2015, p.260). In 1989, 
Zahkung Ting Ying, Layawk Zalum and other commanders within the 
CPB mutinied, resulting in the collapse of the party, and they formed 
the NDA-K (2011, p.435; 2015, p.260).16 The same year, they agreed on 
a ceasefire, cooperating with the Burmese government. The state then 
formally recognised the territory controlled by the NDA-K in Chipwe 
and Tsawlaw Townships at the Chinese border as Kachin State Special 
Region 1. The export of heroin and natural resources from the area to 
China made the group’s leaders rich (Aung Myint, 2016).17 Layawk 
Zalum lost his influence after a failed mutiny in 2005 and Zahkung 
Ting Ying continued to run the NDA-K on his own (Martov, 2012). In 
2009, Zahkung Ting Ying agreed to transform the NDA-K into a unit 
of the Burmese BGF and to turn the Kachin State Special Region 1 into 
a constituency. Zahkung Ting Ying got elected to parliament in 2010 to 
represent this constituency, which includes the townships Injangyang, 
Chiphwi and Tsawlaw.
A former NDA-K general explained that Zahkung Ting Ying sold all 
of the guns the NDA-K had held to the KIA at significant profit before it 
became part of the BGF.18 And even though the territory is now formally 
under the control of the Myanmar government, Zahkung Ting Ying 
remains, as another interviewee put it, the ‘regional king’,19 who controls 
a private militia of an estimated 1,000. The former general explained: 
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‘the NDA-K is now part of the official government forces, with uniforms 
and salaries. But the government gave Zahkung Ting Ying a licence for 
guns and he continues to have his personal militia. He still controls the 
townships and the government gave him the powers to operate there.’20 
An interviewee from the Kachin State Special Region 1 explained that 
people in the area ‘don’t really have any other option but to support 
him’.21 Another interviewee pointed out: ‘People who live in the area 
have to join his militia when they turn 18. If they don’t do it, they have 
no security. Anything can happen.’22
Zahkung Ting Ying won his election to become a member of parlia-
ment in 2015, but lost his seat a year later after opponents in that election 
alleged in court that he had intimidated them into not running against 
him. A lawyer who helped with the court case against Zahkung Ting 
Ying remembered: ‘The trial took place in Myitkyina. But the problem is 
that nobody stops Zahkung Ting Ying from bringing his militias into the 
city. So he brought his militias into the courtroom to intimidate everyone. 
They came wearing uniforms and were fully armed. On the uniform it 
said ‘Pyithusit’ [militia] and on their arm patch they have two crossed 
arrows and a bow.’23 Even though Zahkung Ting Ying lost his seat in 
parliament after this court case, the lawyer said, Zahkung Ting continues 
to treat his former constituency as his own property and has made plans 
to ensure his son succeeds him in dominating the region.24 He concluded: 
‘his kingdom will be inherited by his two sons.’25
THE SMUGGLING ECONOMY
The Smuggling of Goods
The neighbouring economies of Kachin State and Shan State are closely 
connected to China. Large quantities of goods, including most of the 
extracted natural resources, are exported there. Major border crossings 
in Kachin State are located at Phimaw, Pang War, Kampati (also spelled 
Kampaitee or Kan Paik Ti) and Laiza. However, it is difficult to get 
significant information distinguishing legal exports from smuggled 
goods. One interviewee claimed that he has seen significant goods pass 
the border and never seen anyone pay a custom fee. ‘Everything is smug-
gled’, he concluded.26
The production of jade alone in Myanmar in 2014 is estimated to have 
brought profits of US$31 billion (Global Witness, 2015). Rubies and 
timber are also big business. In addition, less valuable goods are smug-
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gled into China, often in large quantities. For instance, trucks full of cows 
are taken across the border every day. According to local media reports, 
500 cattle are smuggled into China from Kachin daily (see Inkey, 2015). 
And just outside of Myitkyina, in Waingmaw Township, there are large 
banana plantations – an estimated 90,000 acres, according to an inter-
viewee from the area. The companies running them are registered under 
the name of Burmese citizens, but are owned by Chinese people, and the 
entire product is shipped to China (see also Khaing, 2018; Myint, 2017).27 
An interviewee noted: ‘Big trucks cross the border into China, but they 
are only checked from the outside, so we don’t know what they take.’28
Some trucks may be carrying drugs. According to the UNODC (2018c, 
p.iii) Myanmar Opium Survey, 36,100 ha of opium poppy were culti-
vated in Shan and Kachin State in 2018.29 The border region of Thailand, 
Laos and Myanmar, in Shan State, is known as the ‘Golden Triangle’ 
due to its prodigious opium production.30 Heroin addiction is high in 
Kachin, with some interviewees even suggesting that half of the adult 
population of Myitkyina is addicted.31 But they also think that most of the 
heroin made in the state is smuggled to China. Nonetheless, according to 
the interviewees, heroin production is on the decline in Kachin State as 
opium from Afghanistan dominates the global market, while the produc-
tion of methamphetamines, such as yaba, is increasing.32
As yaba is a chemical drug, it can be produced almost anywhere and, 
in theory, does not need to be smuggled across borders (see e.g. UNODC, 
2013, p.62). Nonetheless, Shan State is the largest producer of yaba in the 
world. A lack of prosecution offers particularly low prices. According to 
a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the methamphetamine 
business is now considerably bigger than the entire formal sector in Shan 
State (2019, p.2). From here the drug is exported to China, Thailand, 
Bangladesh and elsewhere (Figure 3.4). Crystal meth is also produced 
in Shan State, almost exclusively for export (ibid., p.10).33 The drug 
smuggling, according to the ICG, is ‘increasingly professionalised’. 
For instance, crystal meth is ‘packed in branded tea packets, both to 
facilitate concealment and to give it a specific product identity’ (ibid., 
p.11). UNODC estimates that 80% of the methamphetamines produced 
in Myanmar are concealed in vehicles and smuggled at regular border 
crossings where the remainder cross at irregular crossings (2013, p.63).
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Figure 3.4 Common yaba smuggling routes
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The Smuggling of People
Myanmar is one of the main countries of origin of migrant workers, 
trafficked people, and refugees in the region. For instance, as of August 
2012, the Ministry of Labour in Thailand estimated that of the 743,538 
migrant workers with active work permits, 623,555 (83.8%) came from 
Myanmar (Feingold, 2013, p.209). In 2017, more than 700,000 Rohingya 
refugees left Myanmar for Bangladesh.
Also in Kachin, in addition to the smuggling of goods, the smuggling of 
people is frequent. The border with China is fairly open and easy to cross. 
Due to the large-scale displacement in Kachin caused by the ongoing 
conflict, many decide to seek shelter with relatives on the Chinese side 
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of the border. Many others cross the border into China for economic 
reasons. The economy in Kachin State is weak, and the unemployment 
rate is high, while in China the economy is booming and cheap labour is 
in high demand. Hence, countless people decide to cross the border to 
find work in China. As many people in remote regions or conflict zones 
in Myanmar lack proper identification documents (see US Department 
of State, 2017, p.107), and as it is often complicated to get the necessary 
documents to legally work in China, many – if not most – decide to cross 
the border without such documents and work in China illegally.
When working in China, migrant workers can make an income far 
greater than they would earn in Kachin State, where many people only 
earn around US$150 per month (see Dapice, 2016). An interviewee from 
Myitkyina described his life as a migrant worker in China:
I used to be a driver here in Myitkyina. But now the situation is very unstable. 
There are no more jobs. So I have been working in a paper factory in China for 
a year now. It’s an industrial zone, where products are made out of wood, such 
as furniture and paper. Thousands of people from Myanmar work there. They 
are mainly from Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine. The wages range between 1,500 
and 4,000 Yuan [c. US$230–615] per month. I am paid 3,000 plus overtime, 
which adds up to 3,600 Yuan [c. US$555] per month. If you speak a little bit 
of Chinese, you are quickly favoured by the boss and are not looked down on 
by the Chinese. Officially, we get no holidays. But I get unpaid leave because 
I get along with the boss.34
There are two options for people in Kachin State to cross into China 
legally. A red border pass allows them to stay for seven days. However, 
this limits people to the border area and does not allow them to travel 
further into China. Alternatively, people can apply for a work permit, 
which is a green booklet that allows them to stay and work in China for 
up to several years. However, the application process is considerably 
more challenging. A migrant worker told me: ‘The green booklet is very 
difficult to get. It is very expensive (…) and one has to go to Yangon 
to get it. So most of my friends don’t have one.’35 Another interviewee 
said: ‘I have no documents at all. (…) Originally I had a green booklet, 
but when I washed my clothes it got wet and I can’t use it anymore. It’s 
really difficult to get a new one. You need a certificate [of good health] 
from the doctor.’36
It is thus common to enter legally and overstay the seven days and 
return via an irregular route. One migrant worker said: ‘I usually cross 
legally into China at Kampati border with a border pass and then, on my 
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back to Myanmar, go through the village [an informal crossing].’37 A man 
who works in China and who was on holiday in Myitkyina explained:
On your way to the border at Kampati, you travel through NDA-K territory. 
They are now part of the government, but they sometimes have checkpoints. 
The official border crossing itself is controlled by actual government forces. 
Basically there are two options when you get to the border. Either you go 
through the government checkpoint, where they check the goods you have 
with you, and check your documents and stamp them. But you are only 
allowed to stay in China for six nights or seven days. (…) Alternatively, you 
can cross the border at Baokwan village. There, the local villagers have check-
points. They don’t check your documents or goods, but they ask every person 
for 10 Yuan [c. US$1.50]. The Chinese government doesn’t bother them, and 
it enables them to make some money. In the past there was no formal border 
crossing. So that’s why the government lets them continue to make an income 
this way.38
People who do not speak Chinese, do not know where to go in China 
or are less confident about travelling on their own rely on brokers. 
Two migrant workers from Kachin State in China whom I interviewed 
together explained on a video-call:
We had a broker who organised a car that took us to China. We didn’t have to 
worry about anything. The driver knew everything, and knew how to deal with 
the checkpoints, going around them, sometimes hiding the car in the bushes. 
(…) So there is no need for any documents. When we went for the first time, 
the broker kept all the money. So we ran away and found a new place to work. 
Now we work directly for a company, without a broker or middleman.39
Another migrant worker had a more positive experience with a broker, 
however: ‘I went with a group of people and a broker took care of 
everything. It is safe to go with a broker. Ours was from Myanmar, but he 
also spoke Chinese. He had already worked in China for a long time, and 
then came back to find workers for three factories.’40
The brokers appear to run their businesses independent of each other. 
One migrant worker explained: ‘Some brokers have more; others have 
fewer employees. The brokers have different areas. For instance, one 
may work in lower Myanmar, another one in Kachin. The brokers also 
pay different salaries.’41
More challenging than the border crossing is daily life as a migrant 
worker in China, as the police frequently search factories for illegal 
migrant workers. The two migrant workers on the video call said that 
their ‘biggest problem’ was having to run if the police come, as they do 
This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
Users can redistribute the work for non-commercial purposes, 
as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, as detailed in the License. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd must be clearly credited as the ownerof the original work. 
Any translation or adaptation of the original content requires the written authorization 
of Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Meth & militias: the Myanmar–China border region 57
not have documents.42 However, arrests do not deter migrant workers, 
who usually return to China soon after being deported. An interviewee 
described being arrested in 2017 and held for about 24 hours, interro-
gated, then sent back to Kampati where the Myanmar police picked him 
up and brought him back to Myitkyina. ‘I went back to China the next 
day’, he concluded.43
As the interviewees suggested, brokers sometimes exploit migrant 
workers. Especially vulnerable are those who are travelling to China 
for the first time. The brokers often act as middlemen and negotiate the 
migrant workers’ salaries and time off. One interviewee said that he 
received variable payments that were nonetheless always lower than 
what Chinese workers receive: ‘In the first month I got 3,500 Yuan [c. 
US$535] as promised. But then it got less over time. The salary is paid 
through a broker.’ At the same time, ‘it’s still four or five times higher 
than in Myanmar.’44
Most interviewees agreed that despite exploitation they were earning 
a higher salary in China than in Myanmar. For instance, another migrant 
worker reported:
The broker receives the monthly salary for the workers from the boss but then 
only passes on a share to the workers. We don’t know how much he is paid by 
the boss and our salary fluctuates. After Chinese New Year we may get 1,000 
Yuan [c. US$150]; in the middle of the year maybe only 500 [c. US$75]. But 
it’s still better than the salaries here [in Myanmar].45
Trafficking in Persons
At times, people who believe that they would be smuggled as migrants 
end up being trafficked. Most people trafficked in Kachin state are 
women, who are forced into marriages with Chinese men.46 However, 
men can be victims of human trafficking as well, ending up in situations 
of debt bondage or other forms of forced labour (US Department of State, 
2017, p.108). An interviewee explained that, for instance, ‘some are 
forced to work in the charcoal industry or with silk worms, but are not 
receiving any salary.’47
A report of the Union of Myanmar (n.d.) indicates that, out of 641 
reported cases of trafficking in the country between 2006 and 2010, 80% 
had China as the destination country. Feingold finds that 85% of the 
identified cases involved the trafficking of women (2013, p.112). China 
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faces a substantial gender-imbalance, with men outnumbering women by 
1.16:1, creating a large demand for women.
The victims are promised jobs with Chinese families by brokers, but 
end up being forced to marry Chinese men.48 I found no evidence of 
institutional connections between brokers who perpetuate this crime and 
political authorities.49 Interviewees further insisted that it is individual 
actors and not organised groups that are responsible,50 for example:
There are brokers who organise the trafficking. It’s usually local people who 
have lived in China for a long time, and know the Chinese people well. Many 
men in China can’t find a wife. So they ask somebody from Myanmar to 
look for a woman. Then this person comes here and tells a woman that they 
have a job for her in China. He takes her back to China, where she has to get 
married to the Chinese man. Only then she realises that she got trafficked. The 
brokers get at least 30,000 to 40,000 Yuan [c. US$4,600–6,150]. It’s individ-
uals, who do everything themselves, not organised groups. The same brokers 
do not only traffic women but also pass on labourers to Chinese businessmen. 
Here, they have a different system. While they get a one-off payment for 
women, they take a monthly share of the salaries from the men they bring to 
factories in China.51
According to a UNODC (2016) report, not only most of the victims, but 
also 65% of the traffickers are women. Not all of the ‘traffickers’ have 
bad intentions. Sometimes it is family members who convince women to 
get married to Chinese men, hoping that they will have a better future. 
There is some variation in the experience of women brought from 
Myanmar for marriage; some may be willing to go in the hopes of a better 
life even though they are marrying men they have not met. As one inter-
viewee said, ‘some [women] go voluntarily to make money, to survive.’52 
At the other end of the spectrum there is evidence of women used as sex 
slaves, and the same interviewee said that victims are ‘[o]ften’ ‘sold 
to another man after giving birth to a child’. The Kachin Women’s 
Association Thailand (KWAT) receives pleas for help from trafficked 
women on a monthly basis.53
Particularly vulnerable are those who live in IDP camps and they 
comprise the bulk of female victims of trafficking (KWAT, 2013). One 
resident of such a camp reported: ‘In every camp the number of human 
trafficking cases is increasing. People think that they go to China to work, 
but then they are actually trafficked. They are told that they will get a job 
in China, but then are married to a Chinese man… Most of these cases 
happen in the IDP camps close to the border.’54
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Interviewees pointed out that few measures have been taken to deal 
with the problem. Some civil society organisations help families to find 
their relatives in China and bring them back. However, a central problem 
appears to be the cooperation of Chinese authorities. Civil society activ-
ists argue that the Chinese authorities sometimes agree to help victims 
of human trafficking, but that more often they ignore requests for help 
even when the exact location of a victim of human trafficking has been 
identified. Hence, many victims of human trafficking remain in China.
SMUGGLING AND ARMED CONFLICT: THE ROLE 
OF INSURGENTS
The Smuggling of Goods
Compared to armed conflict in Southern Thailand, armed conflict 
in Myanmar plays a considerably more direct role in the context 
of the smuggling of goods. Non-state armed groups, the Tatmadaw, 
and state-affiliated militias all benefit from smuggling revenue at the 
Myanmar–China border, often linked to the exploitation of natural 
resources. According to a Global Witness report, the extraction and 
smuggling of jade is the KIO/A’s main source of income (2015, p.14). 
However, the report also illustrates in great detail that Tatmadaw officers 
in the area ‘are making personal fortunes’ extorted from the jade business 
and that therefore ‘the battle for control of jade revenues [has become] 
a strategic priority for both sides in the conflict’ (ibid.). This competition 
over who controls the mines and the trade routes for jade is a driver of 
the ongoing conflict.
Different actors and authorities are in control of different border cross-
ings in Kachin State. An interviewee from the Shan community in Kachin 
State complained: ‘We have three governments here. The Tatmadaw, 
the KIA, and the NDA-K. And each of them is in control of at least one 
border gate. Sometimes one even has to pass the checkpoints of [mul-
tiple] different authorities on the way from Myitkyina to the border.’55 
Both licit and illicit goods pass through all border gates. However, like 
their counterparts in Southern Thailand, smugglers usually prefer peace-
ful areas to conflict areas for the transportation of goods. An interviewee 
from an ethnic minority group in Kachin explained the impact of this:
In the past, all sorts of things were smuggled through the KIA gates, including 
jade, amber, logs, opium, and amphetamines. But since the end of the cease-
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fire, most of the smuggling is happening through the areas controlled by the 
NDA-K rather than the KIA, because there is no fighting. At the moment, it’s 
mainly animals, cows, and buffalos that are smuggled through the KIA gates. 
But even that is happening on a larger scale in the NDA-K areas, where they 
use trucks to do so. In the KIA areas they walk them across.56
Controlling territory at the border is important for armed groups as 
business people prefer to operate in such a way that they can deal with 
a single authority from the sourcing to the point a commodity reaches 
the neighbouring country for a given product. Crossing dividing lines 
between competing actors creates risks, unpredictability and additional 
costs, which ultimately cuts into profits. Furthermore, controlling terri-
tory at the border may enable non-state armed groups to generate addi-
tional revenue, by charging fees for people who want to cross the border 
and for the export of goods – particularly of natural resources in the case 
of Kachin State. However, most money is made through concessions and 
taxes, not through bribes at the border crossing. For instance, when smug-
gling logs, smugglers make a one-time payment that covers the extraction 
and export of goods. One interviewee explained: ‘People pay tax to the 
KIA, so they don’t have to pay again at the border.’57 Again, this is an 
incentive for business, as the costs can be budgeted for easily.
In addition to natural resources, two other goods are commonly 
smuggled across the border in northern Myanmar: guns and drugs. 
The smuggling of weapons and ammunition is left almost exclusively 
to non-state actors. While state actors can legally buy and import such 
goods, EAOs often depend on smuggled weapons. The former NDA-K 
general explained:
Chinese arms are very easy to get. After signing the agreement, you transfer 
the money into a Chinese account. And you get the weapons right away. They 
are delivered to your doorstep. If you pay a bit more, you can keep the car they 
use to deliver the guns. (…) And the ammunition is very cheap. The price for 
a bullet ranges from 7 jiao [c. US$0.10] to 2 or 3 yuan [c. US$0.50] for more 
expensive ones. And all of these bullets work in the M21, M22, and M23 
[types of guns that are prevalent in the area].58
While the smuggling of guns is acknowledged, KIA supporters deny 
that drugs pass through the areas that they control, arguing that only the 
government and militias are benefitting from the drug trade. They blame 
heroin addiction in Kachin State on the Tatmadaw. The Kachin Baptist 
Convention, which is closely connected to the KIO/A, has even set up 
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Figure 3.5 Drug Rehabilitation Centre, Myitkyina (January 2018)
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several ‘Drug Rehabilitation Centres’ (Figure 3.5), and their anti-drug 
militia, the Pat Jasan, pick up drug users on the streets and bring them 
to the centres. The methods used in these centres, however, are ques-
tionable. At a visit to one of them, some people were kept in cages (see 
also Cousins, 2016; Shaw, 2017). The director explained that they were 
running three-month programmes and that people were only locked up 
waiting for their programme to begin. He explained that the programme 
would consists of 14 hours of ‘prayers, teaching, work in the camp, and 
exercise’. He also said that when the centre was set up staff assumed 
that ‘only bad people were using drugs’ but that they soon realised that 
users’ backgrounds were quite varied. ‘Some people even come back 
repeatedly’, he said.59
It is widely accepted that the KIO/A is not involved in the drug trade and 
my research in Kachin State found no evidence that contradicts this view. 
How their role with regard to drugs is perceived by the public is particu-
larly important for the KIO/A. In its ‘Myanmar Opium Survey 2018’, 
UNODC (2018c, p.3) says that the KIA controls or ‘influence[s]’ the 
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areas in Kachin State with ‘the highest density of poppy cultivation’. The 
KIO (2019a) strongly rejects this claim, and it responded to UNODC’s 
report with an open letter that states that the published maps erroneously 
identify an area that the government-controlled BGF controls as con-
trolled by the KIO/A. It claims the KIO ‘is well aware of the danger of 
narcotic drugs to our people’ (ibid.) and has been ‘actively involved in 
carrying out opium eradication, punishing dealers, and conducting reha-
bilitation programs for users’ (ibid.). In support of their claim, the KIO 
(2019b) even released a ‘Drug Issue Report’ of its ‘Fact-Finding Mission 
in Kachin and Northern Shan States’ that closely resembles the format of 
UN reports. Clearly, the KIO considers it important to debate the claim. 
A study of the Transnational Institute (TNI, 2019) supports the KIO’s 
view, confirming ‘that there is presently no substantial opium cultivation 
in KIO-controlled areas’ and that it is ‘unclear how the UNODC arrives 
at its completely opposite claims about Kachin State, but it seems to be 
based on wrong assumptions about who “controls” which areas’.
However, EAOs that claim to be against the drug business can none-
theless in some cases benefit from it indirectly. For instance, the Ta’ang 
National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Shan State is a vocal opponent of 
opium production and one of its founding purposes was to combat drugs. 
But the ICG’s recent investigation finds that opium farmers pay the 
TNLA’s ‘revolutionary tax’, its primary source of revenue. The report 
concludes that ‘smuggling and drug trafficking provide some of the most 
lucrative opportunities for the TNLA’s taxation, with higher taxes report-
edly being levied for these activities, and seized drugs reportedly often 
sold by the TNLA back into the supply chain’ (2019, p.14).
Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons
The armed conflict in northern Myanmar is a key push factor that con-
tributes to migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Many communities 
in ethnic minority regions are displaced by ongoing violent conflicts 
between the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups. Across Kachin and 
northern Shan State, an estimated 120,000 people have been displaced 
since 1961, either internally or into China; many now depend on aid 
(see BBC, 2018a). The US Department of State argues: ‘Ethnic minority 
groups in Burma – particularly internally displaced Rohingya, Rakhine, 
Shan, and Kachin communities – continued to be at elevated risk of 
forced labor, as a result of ongoing military incursions’ (2017, p.107). 
However, violent conflict also works through less direct mechanisms, by 
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decimating the local economy and contributing to the high rates of unem-
ployment that lead people to seek employment in China. The particularly 
vulnerable IDPs are especially targeted by brokers who traffic people to 
China.
I found no indications that non-state armed groups smuggle people 
or are involved in human trafficking. Most interviewees stated that the 
‘broker business’ was neither linked to the government nor to the NDA-K 
or the KIO/A.60 Local people can cross the border between Myanmar 
and China easily, and do not need the help of armed groups to do so. If 
they need help to find work in China, independent brokers offer support. 
These agents who help and convince people to work abroad appear to 
be business people linked to Chinese companies. Meanwhile, those who 
convince people to get married to Chinese men appear to be locals from 
the respective communities, who often got married to Chinese men pre-
viously themselves.
Meanwhile, Kachin civil society organisations (CSOs), and report-
edly also the KIO/A itself, actively fight human trafficking, and help 
trafficked women to return to Kachin State. For instance, the chairman 
of the Kachin State Progressive Party stated that while KWAT was 
playing a key role, the KIA was also involved in combating human traf-
ficking.61 In some cases, non-state armed groups even cooperate directly 
with the government to address trafficking. For example, an inter-
viewee explained: ‘Like the police, the NDAA [the National Democratic 
Alliance Army, a non-state armed group based in Mong La in Northern 
Shan state] tries to arrest brokers. If they get them, they hand them over to 
the Myanmar police. And if the police try to arrest a broker in Mong La, 
they come to the NDAA’s liaison office and ask for help.’62 Similarly, the 
United Wa State Army was described as collaborating with Myanmar’s 
police forces in cases of human trafficking.
However, non-state armed groups in Myanmar do participate in 
a particular type of people smuggling. Some groups are able to issue 
documents that are accepted in neighbouring countries and that allow 
people to cross the border in areas these non-state armed groups control. 
For instance, interviewees explained that the KIO/A issues border passes 
that enable Kachin to cross the border in Laiza. A KIO/A supporter 
explained: ‘The KIO/A and the Chinese government have an agreement. 
The KIO/A issues red border passes that can be used to cross the border 
into China at Laiza. It costs 30 Yuan [c. US$4.50]. They look almost like 
the ones issued and used by the Myanmar government at Kampati border. 
(…) But most people think that they do not need any documents.’63 The 
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spokesperson of the KIO’s TAT denied this, and stated that they were 
only able to issue border passes before the fighting broke out.64
Similarly, an officer of the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan 
State Army – South’s (RCSS/SSA-S) Peace Committee Liaison Office in 
Kengtung told me that the Thai authorities accept documents his group 
issues, which enable members of the group, but not civilians living in 
their territory, to enter Thailand for up to seven days: ‘We have RCSS 
documents, stamped by RCSS. They are accepted in Thailand; people can 
stay for five to seven days. It’s a normal A4 document which states the 
name of the person going and the purpose of the trip.’65
Domestic Human Trafficking & Forced Recruitment
A related issue that might be described as domestic human trafficking 
is the forced recruitment of soldiers and fighters. While this does not 
involve taking people across international borders, it does involve forcing 
people to cross the internal borders that separate different warring fac-
tions, often making it difficult for them to return home.
The work of international non-governmental organisations shows that 
the Tatmadaw as well as non-state armed groups like the KIA have used 
children to fight for them (see e.g. Child Soldiers International, 2015). 
However, in my interviews, the forceful recruitment of adults was also 
raised repeatedly. While a large number of Kachin support the KIA, 
many do not want to fight for the group. But there are reports of the KIA 
recruiting people against their will, including people from other ethnic 
groups in Kachin State, and people of other ethnic groups were most 
likely to mention the practice. For instance, a Rawang man explained:66 
‘The KIA forcefully recruits people from our community. We are an 
abandoned community.’67
According to the interviewees, such recruitment not only happens in 
the areas that are controlled by the KIA, but also in areas that they can 
access. One interviewee in Myitkyina pointed out: ‘It usually doesn’t 
happen downtown, but it does happen at the edges of the city. (…) This 
has always been going on, but it’s high season at the moment. Most 
people are recruited for fighting, but some of the women they take also 
become nurses.’68
A member of the Shan community reported on his personal experiences:
My youngest daughter (…) and her friend got taken by the KIA in 2007. She 
was around 20 years old at the time. They were taken into their territory and 
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got locked up by KIA’s 2nd Battalion. My daughter’s friend tried to run away, 
but she was captured and shot. During the ceasefire, I went to the KIA and 
asked them to release my daughter. I then went to the military intelligence 
and they contacted the KIA, and she was ultimately released. I knew they 
had her, because the KIA had released a list of people with photos who had 
signed a petition against the 2008 constitution. She is fine today. But this 
forceful recruitment is still ongoing (…). They are never allowed to go home 
again. And if they are captured when trying to escape, they are shot to scare 
the others.69
A member of the Gurkha community in Kachin State also knew a young 
person who had been forced into service:
I was involved in one of these cases as a lawyer in Waingmaw Township 
[Figure 3.6] about a year ago. A boy had been picked up at night, captured 
by traffickers. His friend managed to run away. We went to the police 
and then travelled to the village where the kidnapping had happened. The 
anti-trafficking unit got involved, and ultimately a man got arrested. I ques-
tioned him myself, and he admitted that he had handed over the boy to the 
KIA. Then the police and the anti-trafficking unit dropped the case, because 
they can’t go there. The boy doesn’t even count as a victim of human traffick-
ing, because he didn’t cross an international border. This happens all the time, 
but nobody talks about it. (…) The KIA has an entire Gurkha unit as part of its 
Battalion 8. Most of these people have been recruited by force. But the KIA 
is the strongest armed group around here. Nobody dares to criticise them. If 
you do so, you might get targeted. I would estimate that 20% of the KIA were 
forcibly recruited. Usually they take people below the age of 18. When they 
get to their base they try to convince them of their ideology. Some people try 
to run away. But the Unlawful Associations Act makes it difficult to do so.70
The Unlawful Associations Act (India Act XIV, 1908) has been used to 
jail people who were in contact with non-state armed groups in Myanmar, 
including the KIA (see Saw Myint, 2013).71
Dissatisfaction with the lack of international attention to forced recruit-
ment to insurgencies was widespread among interviewees. ‘[N]obody 
cares about what the KIA does’, the lawyer from Waingmaw lamented.72 
According to the interviewees, the international community only cares 
about forced recruitment conducted by the military, not about taking 
action against similar methods employed by non-state armed groups. The 
interviewees felt that the government was unable to do anything about it, 
and CSOs were not of much help either for ethnic minorities in Kachin 
State, because most of them were linked to the Kachin community. As 
a consequence, an interviewee pointed out, many people who are part 
of an ethnic minority are so scared that they decide to move away.73 De 
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Figure 3.6 View across Irrawaddy river on Waingmaw Township 
(January 2018)
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la Cour Venning (2019) shows that the KIO/A’s Central Committee, 
concerned about its international legitimacy, passed an order to halt the 
recruitment of children in 2015 and formalised policy on this issue was 
issued in March 2017. However, enforcement of this policy remains 
weak and international organisations have little leverage as they are 
limited in their ability to access areas controlled by non-state armed 
groups like the KIO/A (ibid.).
It is not just the KIO/A that is accused of such practices. For instance, 
in northern Shan State, interviewees reported that the TNLA was forcibly 
recruiting members of other ethnic groups. Similarly, the RCSS/SSA-S 
is accused of forcing Ta’ang to serve. Many armed groups have a ‘one 
household, one gun’ rule, and will therefore leave family members alone 
if anyone is serving with any group. However, due to the competition of 
non-state armed groups in certain areas, interviewees pointed out, it can 
happen that one household has to provide fighters for competing armed 
groups.
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SMUGGLING AND ARMED CONFLICT: THE ROLE 
OF THE STATE
State actors play a key role in the context of cross-border trade and 
smuggling in the China–Myanmar border region. Corruption appears to 
be widespread and systemic, enabling state officials and state-sponsored 
militias to benefit from the exploitation of natural resources and the 
smuggling of licit and illicit goods in various ways.
The Tatmadaw benefit directly through concessions for the large-scale 
exploitation of national resources that are then exported to China. As in 
the case of EAOs, just on a larger scale, the concessions matter more 
than bribes at the border crossing. One interviewee summarised: ‘People 
who have the right documents [issued by the Tatmadaw] can take 
anything across the border, as much as they want to.’74 To conceal the 
involvement of the state, it often operates through its own companies, 
the Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar Economic 
Corporation (Global Witness, 2015, p.11). The Global Witness report 
describes how systemic the corruption is: ‘Myanmar’s jade licensing 
system is wide open to corruption and cronyism. The main concessions 
are in government-controlled areas of Hpakant Township, Kachin State, 
and blocks are awarded through a centrally-controlled process which 
multiple industry sources say favours companies connected to power-
ful figures and high-ranking officials’ (ibid., p.10). Hence, the report 
concludes, ‘the army families and companies that own many of the jade 
mines would lose out in an equitable peace deal’ (ibid., p.14).
But petty corruption matters also. For instance, an employee of a travel 
agency in Myitkyina explained that he can arrange official Myanmar ID 
cards for MMK 2 million (c. US$1,450) and that Chinese businessmen 
often buy them to be able to operate businesses in Myanmar.75 Such doc-
uments allow people not only to reside in Myanmar, but also enable them 
to buy and own land there, facilitating the exploitation of border areas.
Beyond corruption and direct involvement of officials, state-affiliated 
militias like the former NDA-K and Zahkung Ting Ying’s private forces 
are involved in the business of smuggling goods across the border 
to China from areas under their control. The fact that Zahkung Ting 
Ying and his forces control territory at the Chinese border allows them 
to exploit the natural resources there and export them to China. For 
instance, in June 2018 it was reported that 2,000 logs weighing 1,300 
tons were smuggled from Chipwi and Tsawlaw townships, areas which 
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are under his control, to China (see Naing Zaw, 2018). An interviewee 
argued: ‘His militias don’t help to ensure security; they only ensure 
his personal profit.’76 Another interviewee described his observation of 
Zahkung Ting Ying’s activities:
[H]e is selling all the natural resources from the area. He is doing logging, 
he is selling the animals and he is mining gold, minerals and marble. But his 
main business is poppy farming and he has around 30,000 acres. Before 2005, 
he used to do everything himself, being in direct control of the poppy cultiva-
tion and the factories producing heroin. Up to that point he also had his own 
factories for weapons, run with Chinese investments, technology, and staff. 
Now he works indirectly. He lets Chinese people use ‘his land’ for poppy 
cultivation and simply taxes them.77
An ICG study (2019) shows the key role militias play in the drug trade, 
and the impunity with which they can operate in Shan State. The study 
describes the background of a drug seizure in 2018 that found ‘30 million 
yaba pills, 1,750kg of crystal meth, more than 500kg of heroin and 200kg 
of caffeine powder’ (p.6) in a location ‘relatively close to Lashio, not far 
from the main road to the Chinese border at Muse – Myanmar’s biggest 
overland trade route – in an area controlled by a militia allied with the 
Tatmadaw’, ‘not a remote, rebel-controlled part of Shan State beyond the 
authorities’ reach’ (ibid.).
There have also been reports of officials involved in migrant smug-
gling and human trafficking cases (see e.g. US Department of State, 
2017, p.107). However, there is little evidence of an institutionalised 
direct involvement of the Tatmadaw. Even some non-state armed groups 
and CSOs appreciate the efforts of the police anti-trafficking task force, 
although they note its limitations with respect to bureaucratic constraints, 
inefficiencies, and a lack of capacity. In their 2013 report, KWAT found 
that the anti-trafficking border liaison office at Loije (also Lweje) does 
not seem to be operational, and that local communities are not aware 
of its existence (2013, p.16). Nonetheless, a number of interviewees, 
including civil society activists, acknowledged that members of the task 
force are well-meaning, and that the task force tries to address the issue 
of human trafficking, especially if they hear of a particular case.78 The 
chairman of the Kachin State Progressive Party supported this claim, 
arguing that ‘the government is cracking down on human trafficking.’79 
Hence, some armed groups cooperate with the Anti-Trafficking Task 
Force, even across lines of territorial control and despite the ongoing 
armed fight against the Myanmar military.
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Just like the EAOs, the Tatmadaw are accused of forced recruitment, 
including of children (see e.g. Child Soldiers International, 2016). In 
2018, UNICEF reported that the Tatmadaw had released more than 900 
children following a Joint Action Plan with the UN. Particularly in Shan 
State interviewees were concerned about the Tatmadaw’s recruitment 
practices. However, interviewees were even more concerned about 
the corrupting influence of the incentives that militias provide. One 
interviewee from Shan State’s Lashio stated: ‘Many militias don’t pay 
a salary. They provide “opportunities” – such as land ownership, the 
permit to set up a check-point and to collect tax… If you join a militia you 
can hold a gun. You don’t need to register your vehicle. You can drink for 
free if you say “you know who I am”.’80
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has illustrated striking differences as well as noticeable 
similarities between the KIO/A on the one hand and the Tatmadaw and 
state-affiliated militias on the other hand. All three actors are political 
authorities with territorial control in areas that border China. In these ter-
ritories they generate revenues from the extraction of natural resources, 
which are then exported or smuggled to China. Hence, competition over 
the control of territory, in which extracting companies can be taxed, 
and over border crossings, which enable access to China, are among the 
driving forces of the violent conflict.
Local populations rarely have access to revenue from natural resources, 
which primarily benefit business elites and the armed actors on all sides. 
Even worse, the ongoing violence has resulted in a weak economy and 
high unemployment rates in places like Kachin State. Hence, many 
people try to find work across the border in China, sometimes with the 
help of brokers who function as middlemen. More directly, the armed 
conflict has also resulted in a large number of displaced people. Those 
living in these camps typically have even fewer opportunities to generate 
an income, and are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking. Driven 
by a demand for women in China, many women from northern Myanmar 
have ended up being married to men in China against their will. Few 
people have returned to Myanmar, also because of a lack of systematic 
cooperation of Chinese authorities with authorities and civil society in 
Myanmar.
In contrast to the smuggling of goods, the smuggling of migrants and 
the trafficking of people appears to be a business that individual brokers 
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run. It seems that these brokers do not have any strong institutionalised 
links to the Tatmadaw or non-state armed groups. Instead, people smug-
glers tend to cooperate with companies in China, which are in need of 
cheap labour, and with men, who are looking for marriage. On the other 
hand, both the Tatmadaw and the KIA are accused of forcing people to 
fight for them, particularly ethnic minorities in Kachin State, where they 
take people across the borders that separate KIO/A-controlled areas from 
Tatmadaw-controlled areas, which could be viewed as domestic human 
trafficking.
There are also key differences between the KIO/A, the Tatmadaw, and 
militias. Most obviously, their political visions are different. However, 
they also differ with regard to their involvement in the smuggling 
economy. Non-state armed groups like the KIO/A have to construct or 
maintain local legitimacy. Considering the ongoing conflict with the 
Tatmadaw, local support is crucial for military success, particularly in 
the absence of international support and where financial resources are 
limited. Accordingly, they have to consider and respond to the expecta-
tions of the people in the areas they control. Hence, to some extent, they 
have to be legitimacy-seeking rulers. For instance, being involved in 
jade smuggling does not threaten the KIO/A’s local legitimacy, and it is 
a critical source of revenue.
In fact, if the KIO/A was a recognised de jure state, the extraction and 
trade of jade would be considered a legal economic activity, not a crime. 
But being a non-state armed group criminalises its cross-border activities. 
For instance, the KIO/A also cannot legally import weapons. Groups 
like the KIO/A therefore ‘smuggle’ weapons and ammunition into the 
country. This makes it important for non-state armed groups to control 
border regions, which allows them to import weapons without any inter-
ruption by the Tatmadaw. Despite its de jure non-state status, the de facto 
state-like status of the KIO/A is recognised by Chinese authorities in that 
they informally accept some documents the KIO/A issues that enable 
people to ‘legally’ cross the border.
By contrast to its near-open involvement in the jade trade, the 
KIO/A actively portrays itself as a group fighting the opium industry 
as a way to seek local and international legitimacy. Heroin addiction 
has turned into a major problem in Kachin areas, and it is widely seen 
as harmful to the local community. Without being able to draw on this 
source of revenue the KIO/A has to rely more on local taxes, which 
creates a greater imperative to respond to people’s expectations in order 
to be able to justify taxation. Conversely, the issue of forceful recruit-
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ment of children poses a threat to the KIO/A’s local and international 
legitimacy. That the leadership has developed a policy against this 
practice reflects this concern. However, the continued practice of forcible 
recruitment shows that the perceived necessity to have more fighters on 
the local level may override such strategic concerns, particularly if the 
forceful recruitment targets other ethnic communities that are not a key 
audience for the group’s legitimacy.
Conversely, the Tatmadaw can act much more ruthlessly in the border 
areas that are populated by ethnic minorities, drawing on the support 
they have in central Myanmar. Even less concerned with local legitimacy 
are the state-affiliated militias that are almost exclusively driven by 
economic interests. In contrast to the non-state armed groups they do not 
need to listen and adjust to any great degree to the concerns of the people 
in the territories they control. They have external legitimacy, as they 
are protected by the Tatmadaw and ‘mandated’ to extract and exploit. 
In a way, they are legitimacy-indifferent rulers, who face no constraints 
in their involvement in the smuggling economy, ensuring market-access 
for the resources extracted in the areas they control. The large-scale 
production of yaba in militia-controlled areas in Shan State further illus-
trates that such areas are also more attractive to operate in for smugglers 
and criminals. It is a comparatively peaceful and stable environment, 
compared to the risk of being shelled by the military when working in 
a KIO/A-controlled area. Hence, while, for instance, jade is extracted and 
exported from areas under control of all three authorities, the Tatmadaw 
and especially pro-state militias can also generate revenues from the 
production and export of drugs.
NOTES
1. Interview, 6 January 2019.
2. Meehan (2016) argues that opium production goes up when the Tatmadaw 
engages in statebuilding exercises, including ceasefires. The Tatmadaw 
allows the armed groups to grow opium, using the groups to control the bor-
derlands and incentivising them with the profit they can make from opium 
cultivation.
3. The KIA also manufactures its own Chinese-style AK47s and ammunition. 
4. The military government changed the country’s name from the ‘Union of 
Burma’ to the ‘Union of Myanmar’ in 1989, arguing that the name would be 
more inclusive of non-Bamar ethnic groups. Aung San Suu Kyi stated she 
preferred the old name and many civil society organisations as well as some 
governments, including the UK, continue to refer to the country as Burma 
(see Selth and Gallagher, 2018, for a discussion of the name).
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5. See Myanmar Peace Monitor (2016) for an overview of resistance groups. 
6. The signatories were the Karen National Liberation Army–Peace Council 
(KNLA-PC), the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), the 
Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Arakan Liberation 
Party (ALP), the Chin National Front (CNF), the Restoration Council of 
Shan State/Shan State Army – South (RCSS/SSA-S), the Karen National 
Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Pa-O National Liberation Organization 
(PNLO).
7. The FPNCC comprises the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/
AA), the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army 
(KIO/KIA), the Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party/Myanmar 
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNTJP/MNDAA), the Palaung State 
Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA), the Shan 
State Progress Party/Shan State Army – North (SSPP/SSA-N), the Peace 
and Solidarity Committee/Shan State East National Democratic Alliance 
Association (PSC/NDAA) and the United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/
UWSA).
8. See Sadan (2013) for an exploration of the Kachin identity and an analysis 
of the conflict.
9. Interview, 6 January 2018.
10. Interview, 9 January 2018.
11. See South (2018) for a detailed analysis of displacement in Kachin State.
12. Interview with resident of Mali Yang IDP camp, 7 January 2018.
13. e.g. interview with former insurgent, 5 January 2018 and interview with 
resident of Myitkyina, 5 January 2018.
14. Interview with civil society activist, 7 January 2018.
15. e.g. interview with former insurgent, 5 January 2018 and interview with civil 
society activist, 9 January 2018.
16. See also KNG (2015).
17. e.g. interview with lawyer from Myitkyina, 6 January 2018.
18. Interview with former NDA-K general, 5 January 2018.
19. Interview, 6 January 2018.
20. Interview with former NDA-K general, 5 January 2018.
21. Interview, 6 January 2018.
22. Interview, 6 January 2018.
23. Interview, 6 January 2018.
24. Interview, 6 January 2018.
25. Interview, 6 January 2018.
26. Interview with resident of Mali Yang IDP camp, 7 January 2018.
27. Interview with local politician, 7 January 2018.
28. Interview, 6 January 2018.
29. Opium is the term for the dried latex derived from the poppy plant.
30. See Chouvy (2009) for a detailed analysis of the opium trade routes in Asia.
31. Heroin is produced from opium by adding chemicals as well as, in some 
cases, other substances. 
32. Yaba is produced by mixing low-purity methamphetamines with caffeine 
(ICG, 2019, p.2). Yaba is sold as pills and is consumed orally. According 
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to UNODC (2013, p.62), Thailand is the epicentre of yaba use in the 
region. However, the popularity is also growing in other countries, such as 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines.
33. Crystal meth is a high-purity methamphetamine (ICG, 2019, p.2).
34. Interview with migrant worker, 7 January 2018.
35. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
36. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
37. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
38. Interview with migrant worker, 7 January 2018.
39. Video-interview with two migrant workers, 8 January 2018.
40. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
41. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
42. Video-interview with two migrant workers, 8 January 2018.
43. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018. The interviewee further 
explained how the Chinese police operate and deal with migrant workers: 
‘Many people get arrested. Every time they check, they arrest 30 to 40 
people. (…) People with expired documents are fined 50 Yuan. People who 
don’t have any documents are put into jail for a day and a night and then are 
sent back. But they don’t have to pay a fine. (…) They use the money from 
the people with expired documents to send the others back. And if the police 
check factories and workplaces and find people without documents, they 
have to pay a fine of 100 Yuan and are sent back.’
44. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
45. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
46. For a comprehensive study of this issue, see HRW (2019).
47. Interview with resident of Mali Yang IDP camp, 7 January 2018.
48. Interview with KWAT, 6 January 2018.
49. e.g. two interviews with lawyers, 6 January 2018.
50. Ibid.
51. Interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
52. Interview with resident of Mali Yang IDP camp, 7 January 2018.
53. Interview with KWAT, 6 January 2018.
54. Interview with resident of Mali Yang IDP camp, 7 January 2018.
55. Interview, 7 January 2018.
56. Interview, 7 January 2018.
57. Interview with resident of border area, 7 January 2018.
58. Interview, 5 January 2018.
59. Interview, 8 January 2018.
60. E.g. interview with migrant worker, 8 January 2018.
61. Interview, 5 January 2018.
62. Interview with civil society activist, Kengtung, 14 January 2018.
63. Interview, 7 January 2018.
64. Interview, 9 January 2018. The KIO/A certainly maintains a sophisticated 
administration. De la Cour Venning’s (2019) work describes the seal used 
on official documents that reads, ‘Wunpawng Mungdan Shanglawt Asuya’ – 
‘Government of Kachin Republic’. This seal can also be found on the KIO’s 
open letter to UNODC.
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65. Interview, Kengtung, 15 January 2018.
66. The Rawang are one of the smallest recognised ethnic groups in Myanmar. 
They are known as Dulong in China (see Wang, 2016).
67. Interview, 5 January 2018.
68. Interview with lawyer, 6 January 2018.
69. Interview, 7 January 2018.
70. Interview, 6 January 2018.
71. It defines ‘unlawful association’ as ‘an association – (a) which encourages 
or aids persons to commit acts of violence or intimidation or of which the 
members habitually commit such acts, or (b) which has been declared to be 
unlawful by the President of the Union under the powers hereby conferred’. 
It further states that ‘17. (1) Whoever is a member of an unlawful associ-
ation, or takes part in meetings of any such association, or contributes or 
receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of any such association 
or in any way assists the operations of any such association, shall be pun-
ished with imprisonment for a term [which shall not be less than two years 
and more than three years and shall also be liable to fine]’ and ‘(2) Whoever 
manages or assists in the management of an unlawful association, or pro-
motes or assists in promoting a meeting of any such association, or of any 
members thereof as such members, shall be punished with imprisonment for 
a term [which shall not be less than three years and more than five years and 
shall also be liable to fine]’ (see ICNL, n.d.).
72. Interview, 6 January 2018.
73. Interview, 6 January 2018.
74. Interview with resident of border area, 7 January 2018.
75. Focus group discussion, 6 January 2018.
76. Interview, 6 January 2018.
77. Interview, 6 January 2018.
78. Interview, 6 January 2018.
79. Interview, 5 January 2018.
80. Interview, 19 January 2018.
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4. International crisis & instant 
coffee: the Bangladesh–Myanmar 
border region
So many people wanted to cross the river [from Myanmar into Bangladesh]. 
There were Burmese helicopters above us, shooting down at us. Then they 
started throwing grenades. Everyone started running towards the river. People 
with money were able to cross first. There was no fixed rate [charged by the 
boatmen]. Of the people without money they simply took the nose jewellery 
or whatever they had left.1
This is how an interviewed Rohingya woman described her escape from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh. The border region she crossed had gained 
international attention after a protracted episode of state-led violence in 
August 2017, resulting in the displacement of around 700,000 Rohingya 
from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, who crossed the border into Bangladesh 
and now live in camps (Figure 4.1). A number of non-state armed groups 
are active in the area, among them, most prominently at the time, the 
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).
I conducted research in the refugee camps at Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh 
in November and December 2017 and again in March 2018, investigating 
the conflict that caused the displacement of the Rohingya, the smuggling 
economy and the activities of ARSA. This border area differed from 
Myanmar’s border with China and the Thailand–Malaysia border in that 
a large international presence of humanitarian UN agencies and inter-
national NGOs were providing shelter, food and basic services for the 
Rohingya. In addition, journalists from around the world were covering 
the crisis. Suddenly a remote borderland had become the centre of inter-
national attention, with the conflict in Rakhine and the border crossing of 
many people into Bangladesh being breaking news.
But despite the international attention on the border we know little 
about ARSA or the local cross-border smuggling economy and how it 
connects with the conflict in Rakhine. The smuggling economy at the 
Myanmar–Bangladesh border has been vibrant for decades, long before 
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the crisis in 2017. Rohingya are not the only people who cross the border 
to escape violence in Myanmar; daily consumption goods, drugs and 
weapons are also smuggled across. For instance, the yaba that is pro-
duced in Myanmar’s Shan State is smuggled in large quantities, catering 
to an extensive consumer base in Bangladesh (see also Figure 3.4).
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMED 
CONFLICT IN RAKHINE
The recent wave of violence against the Rohingya in Myanmar has to 
be understood against the backdrop of a long history of marginalisation 
and attempts to drive the community out of the country in order to 
create a national identity centred on Buddhism. The community that is 
commonly described as ‘Rohingya’ is a predominantly Muslim group 
of people from Arakan, what is today Myanmar’s Rakhine State. The 
earliest records of the term ‘Rohingya’ exist from the late eighteenth 
century, but a Muslim population already lived in the area at the time of 
the independent Kingdom of Mrauk U (1429–1785) (Poling, 2014). The 
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Myanmar government does not use the term ‘Rohingya’, but calls the 
community ‘Bengali’ and views them as indelibly foreign.
Burma issued National Registration Cards to all residents whose 
families had been in the country’s territory for at least two generations 
in 1952, including many Rohingya (Wade, 2017). However, after 
General Ne Win took power in 1962, they were gradually stripped 
of their rights and declared to be illegal Bengali immigrants (ibid.). 
Their National Registration credentials were replaced with Foreign 
Registration Certificates in 1974. In 1978, the state displaced 200,000 
Rohingya to Bangladesh during a military campaign. In 1982, as part of 
a new Citizenship Act, all Rohingya living in Myanmar became de facto 
stateless as they were not considered to be one of the 135 ‘national races’ 
that now defined citizenship (ibid.).
A number of Rohingya political groups with armed wings evolved 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s seeking to fight for the community’s 
rights (Brennan and O’Hara, 2015). The best-known group was the 
Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) (ibid.). RSO was supported 
by Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (BJeI), a major political party that had 
pursued the establishment of Islamic principles and code of law in 
Bangladesh until the country outlawed it in 2003 (Fair et al., 2017). With 
this backing, RSO was able to maintain bases on the Bangladeshi side of 
the border and train its fighters there. The Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front 
(ARIF) had splintered from the RSO in 1986, but they reunited in 1999 
and became the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) (see 
ARNO, 2006; ICG, 2016, p.4). The consolidated armed wing was named 
the Rohingya National Army (RNA).
Meanwhile the Burmese government established a complex social engi-
neering project, called Na Ta La, in 1988 (Wade, 2015). It aimed at weak-
ening the Muslim population of Rakhine State by encouraging Buddhists 
from other parts of the country to migrate there (ibid.). In the mid-1990s 
inmates from prisons were offered early release when they agreed to resettle 
in Rakhine (ibid). In the 1990s the government also began to limit the move-
ments of Rohingya in the country, making them obtain special permits in 
order to leave their townships (Wade, 2017). Efforts to settle more Buddhists 
in northern Rakhine (Figure 4.2) continued (Rahman, 2013). After 9/11, the 
Myanmar government embraced the US discourse of fighting a global ‘War 
on Terror’ (Allchin, 2019, p.131). It actively reached out to the Americans, 
sharing ‘intelligence’ with the US embassy in Yangon and attempting to link 
the Rohingya resistance to global terrorism by claiming that ARNO was in 
contact with Osama bin Laden and had its fighters trained by Al Qaeda in 
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Libya and Afghanistan (ibid.). However, according to Allchin, these claims 
were unfounded. According to his analysis, ARNO at this point was nothing 
more than a ‘rag-tag group of aspirant organisations, some of which had 
perhaps a limited stock of arms’ (ibid., p.132).
In the early 1990s around 230,000 Rohingya refugees left Myanmar for 
Bangladesh, living in camps close to Cox’s Bazar. Most of them were repat-
riated to Myanmar in the following years, many of them forcibly (Refugees 
International, 2005). Following months of anti-Rohingya propaganda after 
decades of dehumanisation, violence erupted in Rakhine state in May 
2012, triggered by an alleged gang rape and murder of a Rakhine Buddhist 
by Rohingya men (Green et al., 2015). A few days later, Rakhine Buddhist 
mobs attacked a bus Muslims were riding, killing ten. Members of the 
Rohingya community responded by attacking Buddhist property in Sittwe 
(Wade, 2017). Rakhine politicians called for Buddhists to cut all ties with 
the Rohingya, and riots quickly started to spread. The Myanmar govern-
ment arrested a number of aid workers, including UNHCR staff, accusing 
them of ‘stimulating’ the violence (Robinson, 2012). When António 
Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, tried to 
negotiate their release in Yangon, the Myanmar government requested 
he resettle one million Rohingya to camps or a third country (ibid.). By 
August 2012, more than 100,000 Rohingya had been displaced due to the 
violence and were confined in camps (Wade, 2017).
In October 2012, coordinated mobs attacked Rohingya communities in 
nine townships of Rakhine state (Green et al., 2015). Following the vio-
lence, the Myanmar government revived the Na La Ta programme and 
reinforced its segregation measures, for instance by banning Rohingya 
from pursuing higher education (Nicosia, 2017; Wade, 2017). It built 
more villages for new settlers, this time also inviting Buddhists from 
Bangladesh, where they are a minority group, to move to Rakhine (Wade, 
2017, pp.95–6; Rahman 2013). According to the Rohingya I interviewed, 
the Myanmar government seized land they had owned and gave it to the 
newcomers. One Rohingya refugee in Bangladesh reported:
We had a good relationship with the Buddhists in our community. But then the 
government invited Buddhists from Bangladesh and gave them our land. They 
[the newcomers] told us that the Bangladeshi authorities had kicked them out. 
They only spoke Bangla, no Burmese. If a Rohingya had eight acres of land, 
the government took six and gave it to them [the Bengali settlers]. They also 
built them houses, while we had to survive on food aid from WFP [the World 
Food Programme]. I think that the Tatmadaw brought these people in to create 
violence.2
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Figure 4.2 Rakhine State, Myanmar
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In response to the perceived injustice against Rohingya, a new insurgency 
movement evolved, called Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement) (ICG, 
2016). Ata Ullah Abu Ammar Junooni, a Rohingya who had been born 
in Pakistan and grew up in Saudi Arabia and received funding for his 
movement from the Rohingya diaspora community in Saudi Arabia and 
other countries, led the group (ibid.). As the RSO/RNA had been largely 
inactive, trained fighters – possibly up to 700 – joined the new movement 
(Sakhawat, 2017). On 9 October 2016, the International Crisis Group 
reports, ‘several hundred local Muslim men, armed mostly with knives 
and slingshots and about 30 firearms, launched simultaneous attacks on 
three BGP [Myanmar’s Border Guard Police] posts in Maungdaw and 
Rathedaung townships near the north-western border with Bangladesh’ 
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(ICG, 2016, p.6; see Figure 4.2). The Myanmar government reported 
that nine police officers were killed and 62 firearms were stolen (ibid.). 
In August 2017, Harakah al-Yaqin was renamed ‘Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army’ (ARSA), shifting its communicated ideology from 
a religious base to an ethno-national one. The Myanmar government 
considers ARSA to be ‘terrorists’.
Another growing insurgency group is active in Rakhine State and is 
fighting against the Tatmadaw: the Arakan Army (AA). The AA was 
established in 2009 in Kachin State and was trained by the KIA in the 
early years. It views itself as representing the indigenous Buddhist 
Rakhine people and is fighting for independence and self-determination 
of Rakhine State. Drawing on its links with the KIA, the members of the 
AA not only receive a much more professional training than members of 
ARSA and are considerably better equipped with weapons, but the AA 
is also much larger; media reporting estimates that AA has around 7,000 
fighters (The Irrawaddy, 2019a). Furthermore, the AA is suspected to 
be active in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) north of Cox’s 
Bazar, which enables the group to operate across the border.
The August 2017 Escalation of Violence
On 25 August 2017, ARSA supporters, most of them untrained and only 
armed with machetes and sticks, conducted simultaneous attacks on an 
estimated 30 small BGP and army outposts (ICG, 2017b, p.6). According 
to the Myanmar government, 14 soldiers and 371 ARSA members were 
killed in the course of the attacks (ibid.). Three days later Ata Ullah 
directed ARSA’s fighters to burn down Rakhine Buddhist villages. Most 
disregarded the order but three villages were attacked (ibid., pp.6–7). 
In one village in Maungdaw Township, ARSA members allegedly 
killed a large group of Hindus (ibid., p.7). While survivors first blamed 
Buddhist nationalists, Myanmar media later reported that the massacre 
was conducted by ARSA (ibid.). This case gained international atten-
tion through a subsequent Amnesty International (2018a) investigation, 
which reported that ARSA was responsible for the killings.
Following the attacks on 25 August, the Myanmar Tatmadaw, the 
BGP, the police, and groups of vigilantes pursued a large-scale cam-
paign of violence against Rohingya in Rakhine State that lasted until 24 
September 2017. The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Myanmar states in its final report that ‘the operations were designed 
to instil immediate terror, with people woken by intense rapid weapons 
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Figure 4.3 Burning village in Rakhine viewed from Bangladesh 
(December 2017)3
International crisis & instant coffee 81
fire, explosions, or the shouts and screams of villagers. Structures were 
set ablaze and Tatmadaw soldiers fired their guns indiscriminately into 
houses and fields, and at villagers’ (Human Rights Council, 2018, p.178).
The Myanmar security forces and those who joined them killed an 
estimated 6,700 to 22,000 Rohingya (Green et al., 2018, p.14; MSF, 
2017). An estimated 40% to 75% of the villages in northern Rakhine 
were destroyed (Figure 4.3; Green et al., 2018, p.14; Human Rights 
Council, 2018, p.178). Around 725,000 Rohingya fled across the border 
to Bangladesh (Human Rights Council, 2018). Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF, 2017) estimates that 28.4% of the displaced men and 23.3% of the 
women who arrived in Bangladesh had experienced violence. Both men 
and women were shot, beaten and burned in their houses. Sexual vio-
lence against women, including gang rapes, was widespread (see Human 
Rights Council, 2018, p.178; MSF, 2017). According to the Fact-Finding 
Mission, ‘a total of 80 per cent of incidents of rape corroborated by the 
Mission were of gang rape, and 82 per cent of these gang rapes were 
perpetrated by the Tatmadaw’, while other security forces and vigilantes 
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Figure 4.4 Burned house and animals in northern Rakhine State 
(September 2017)5
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were responsible for the remaining share (Human Rights Council, 2018, 
p.216).
Many interviewees shared their experience of 25 August and the 
following days in their interviews with me. For example, a young man 
reported:
On 25 August the problems started. The military came to our village at night. 
They stayed for about two hours, killing three children. Everyone else escaped 
from the village. We were worried that they would come back. The next day 
some people decided to leave for Bangladesh. I and some others decided to 
stay. I stayed with relatives close to my village. Two days later the military did 
come back. They burned half of the village. I saw it myself. They stayed for 
maybe five hours. I left a few days later. It was raining a lot. When I crossed 
the border river by boat the BGP and the military shot at the boats. Some boats 
capsized and many people drowned.4
He shared with me the photos (Figure 4.4) he took of his house after it 
was burned.
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Another interviewee in one of the camps close to Cox’s Bazar in 
Bangladesh remembered:
On 25 August we heard a blast sound. I came out of the house and saw the 
military coming into the village. But they didn’t stay and left again. Nothing 
happened on 26 and 27 August. On 28 August the military came again, with 
more people. They were very organised and started shooting. They were 
organised in three groups. Two groups shot villagers. A third group, which 
also included mogs [Rakhine Buddhists], took the valuable things from the 
houses and grabbed the animals. We heard that they were coming in revenge 
for an ARSA attack that happened on 25 August. We have a police outpost 
close by, it’s just half a mile away from my office. And the military base is six 
miles away. 200 to 250 people came, consisting of locals from these bases and 
externals. We decided to flee to Tula Toli village. The chairman of the village 
there told us that everyone would be safe. He had talked to the military. He 
told us that they would come but wouldn’t hurt us. The next day the military 
approached the village from three directions. We saw what was happening 
from the other side of the river. Some people started fleeing. Others were sur-
rounded in the village. They separated eight women from a group, probably to 
rape them, and shot everyone else. In another group, they separated 20 to 30 
women and took them to houses, taking turns raping them. Then they burned 
the houses with the women inside. I saw 12 groups of dead bodies. They put 
petrol on them and burned them. It was raining at the time. I hid in the hills for 
another day and then came to Bangladesh.6
According to the Fact-Finding Mission’s report, ‘The few women who 
survived, and who spoke with the Mission, displayed both serious burn 
marks and stab wounds, which were consistent with their accounts’ 
(Human Rights Council, 2018, p.182). It is estimated that 750 people 
were killed in Tula Toli village in August 2017 (ibid., p.183).
Many interviewees reported that the Myanmar Tatmadaw had been 
trying to create divisions between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim 
Rohingya in their communities, for instance through the Na Ta La pro-
gramme, in the course of the previous years. Nonetheless, there were also 
some reports of Buddhists trying to help the Rohingya in the wake of the 
violence that occurred in August 2017. For example, an interviewee told 
me:
We used to have a good relationship between Rohingya and Buddhists in our 
village… Our village leader was Buddhist. When the situation got harsh he 
called all Rohingya and told us not to worry, he wanted to protect us. But then 
the military came, threatened him and arrested him. The next day the military 
came to burn the village. I got woken up by gunshots in the morning… I only 
took the clothes I was wearing and ran… We later called the village leader 
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Figure 4.5 Rohingya Refugee Camp, Bangladesh (December 2017)
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and complained, but he said he couldn’t help because he got arrested. He tried 
to help and protect us. He didn’t even charge us high amounts of money to 
protect us as other village leaders did.7
The Rohingya who fled from Rakhine and escaped across Naf river into 
nearby Bangladesh joined an existing community of at least 200,000 
Rohingya (some estimate up to 500,000) who had arrived in the previous 
decades. They now live in numerous camps between Cox’s Bazar and 
Teknaf and are confined to this area (Figure 4.5). There are Bangladeshi 
army and police checkpoints on the road leading to Cox’s Bazar, where 
Rohingya who try to leave the camps were stopped at the time of my 
research.
While the Tatmadaw and affiliated actors perpetrated much of the 
atrocities interviewees reported, the civilian government of Myanmar is 
accused of bulldozing and handing over the land previously owned by the 
Rohingya to Buddhists. In February 2018, after analysing satellite data, 
Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that the Burmese government had 
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cleared many of the Rohingya villages, including some that were not pre-
viously damaged by the dire attacks, destroying evidence of the atrocities 
committed. The government continues to try to attract Buddhists from 
Bangladesh, offering them free land as well as free food for five years in 
Rakhine (The Straits Times, 2018). Of 1.4 million Rohingya who lived 
in Rakhine in 2014, only about 150,000 to 200,000 are left, most of them 
confined in camps (Green et al., 2018, p.14).
The Controversy Surrounding ARSA
Despite the international attention that followed the violence and 
mass-exodus of Rohingya in 2017, one actor remains shadowy and little 
understood: the Rohingya insurgency group ARSA. Other Rohingya 
organisations like ARNO distance themselves from ARSA and blame 
it for triggering the violence against Rohingya. They argue that ARSA 
did exactly what the Tatmadaw wanted the Rohingya to do, providing an 
excuse for a large-scale violent displacement. Many observers entertain 
the idea of ARSA actually being controlled by the Myanmar government.
This claim was also reiterated by some of the interviewed Rohingya 
in the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Others stated that they ‘had never 
heard of ARSA’,8 ‘had never seen ARSA members’,9 or that ‘ARSA is 
just an excuse used by the Burmese military to arrest people.’10 However, 
still others were supportive of ARSA and viewed it as the only active 
defence left for the Rohingya. They said that people did not talk about 
ARSA in order not to create risks for its members, some of whom had 
allegedly been arrested by Bangladeshi law enforcement or intelligence, 
or else were too afraid to talk about ARSA as they feared retribution.
Regardless of these competing perspectives, an entity that calls itself 
ARSA certainly exists. Not only does ARSA have a polished Twitter 
account, there were also people in the refugee camps who self-identified 
as ARSA members. Ata Ullah’s whereabouts are unknown, with some 
claiming that he remains in northern Rakhine and others stating that he is 
in Bangladesh, but most of the rank-and-file members have left Myanmar 
with the other Rohingya refugees. However, it took a long time to iden-
tify them and all of them appeared to be very afraid of being interviewed.
Those ARSA members who did agree to be interviewed describe 
the main goal of their group as fighting for ‘citizenship’11 or ‘general 
rights’.12 Some also said they wanted to be able to live according to 
Islamic Law.13 They stated that they were not fighting for independence 
but simply wanted more rights, and the ability to return to their land 
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within Myanmar. None of the people I interviewed had met Ata Ullah 
in person. Two main commanders report to Ata Ullah: Mr Hashem and 
Mr Kahild, who split responsibilities between northern Maungdaw and 
southern Maungdaw.14 Below these two main commanders are 12 coor-
dinators, responsible for clusters of around eight villages each, and often 
responsible for recruiting their own followers. All of the coordinators 
interviewed were religious leaders, not fighters. The ARSA members 
of the lower hierarchy level are divided according to three sets of ‘spe-
cialities’: fighters (the ‘Tigers’), intelligence, and mines/improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs). The ARSA members communicate with each 
other mainly via WhatsApp.
As interviewees described, at the individual village level, there are 
often 15 to 30 ARSA members. Most only ever had sticks and machetes 
for weapons. According to the interviewees, one to three ‘strong people’ 
aged 12–30 in each village were singled out for training.15 The details 
of the training are kept secret. One interviewee explained that he had to 
promise ‘a big vow’ to not talk about its details.16 I suspect that one factor 
prompting the secrecy surrounding the training is its low quality, given 
the rudimentary weapons and lack of experience of the trainers, which 
the interviewees pointed out. One interviewee stated that even during 
the training sessions they always only use wooden fake weapons, never 
touching real ones.
According to interviewees, commanders had established the impres-
sion that other ARSA groups and ARSA members had guns, and that they 
would just have to wait for guns to arrive. For instance, one group was 
told ‘your group doesn’t have guns, but the groups further up in the north 
do.’17 Others were told they would get guns after their training.18 But then 
after training they were told ‘if you follow Allah everything will be okay. 
You will get arms if you follow Allah.’19 Only one of the interviewees 
had ever used a gun, and he said that four other members of his group had 
a gun. He said, ‘I did have a gun during the attacks in August. But I got 
a 9mm instead of a rifle.’20 Similarly, a senior commander told me that 
some of his subordinates had rifles and pistols.21
According to the interviewees, the Tiger group had about 200 members 
of which around 40 had access to guns. They explained that they had only 
been successful in stealing guns from police stations or military barracks 
through raids once or twice, which they had carried into battle on 9 
October 2016.22 Generally, the lack of guns was repeatedly brought up as 
a main concern by ARSA members.
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Rank-and-file ARSA members said that they had not been particularly 
violent. They stated that their main responsibility was to watch and warn 
the women in case of arriving military forces. One interviewee explained: 
‘When we saw the military, all the women left to another village. Men 
tried to remain alert, but we didn’t fight back.’23 When I asked them 
directly about the accusation that ARSA’s actions had triggered the 
Tatmadaw’s response, the interviewees claimed that ARSA’s mission 
was resistance against the violence the Rohingya community had been 
experiencing for a long time. One interviewee stated: ‘ARSA was 
resisting. The genocide did not happen because of our attack.’24 Another 
interviewee asked: ‘What other option do we have to stand up against the 
government?’25
In addition to the lack of equipment and the crack-down of the 
Tatmadaw on the Rohingya, ARSA also has to deal with the growing 
influence of the AA. The AA and ARSA share an enemy: the Tatmadaw. 
Both the indigenous Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslim Rohingya are 
historically part of the same Arakan Kingdom. The Tatmadaw claim 
ARSA and the AA are collaborating (e.g. The Irrawaddy, 2019b), but 
this seems unlikely since the relationship between Rohingya and Rakhine 
is often strained. Instead, the relationship between the groups is more 
likely to be one of mutual recognition and non-interference. The AA 
strongly denies any collaboration and, in March 2019, the deputy leader 
of the AA, Nyo Tun Aung, stated publicly that the group would even be 
willing to cooperate with the Tatmadaw to crack down on ARSA (see 
Mon, 2019).
THE SMUGGLING ECONOMY
The Smuggling of Goods
It is not only Rohingya who cross the border from Bangladesh to 
Myanmar at Cox’s Bazar. Whenever I stopped at one of the many small 
shops in the refugee camps at Cox’s Bazar for a coffee break, the coffee 
was made in Myanmar. This instant coffee is quite easy to identify 
without even reading the label because of the ‘3 in 1’ nature that is 
popular in Myanmar, containing coffee, milk and sugar – most likely in 
reverse order.
I found it intriguing that simple goods such as coffee, which could also 
be purchased easily in Bangladesh, are smuggled across a border at which 
many have been shot or drowned. While the border was formally closed 
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at the time of my research, a range of products from Myanmar were 
available in the Rohingya refugee camps. Smuggling routes for such 
goods have existed for a long time as the communities on both sides of 
the border are closely connected, not least because Rohingya have been 
displaced to Bangladesh repeatedly since the 1970s.
Illicit goods are also traded across the border and have been for a long 
time, independently of the recent migration of Rohingya refugees. The 
yaba produced on a large scale in Myanmar’s Shan State, as well as 
other drugs, used to be smuggled across the Naf river into Bangladesh on 
fishing vessels. There is limited data available on the scale of yaba use 
in Bangladesh, but it has clearly become an immensely popular drug in 
the country. It is widely and easily available, not just in Cox’s Bazar but 
across the country, including in Dhaka (see e.g. Thompson, 2017).
According to Bremner (2018), ‘boatmen would hide the pills in onions, 
watermelons, or in plastic bags that they sunk underwater and attached to 
the gunwale of their boats.’ However, with the influx of Rohingya, the 
refugees have turned out to be a cheaper alternative for the smuggling 
networks. Some Rohingya refugees brought yaba with them, knowing it 
to be a valuable currency in Bangladesh. But, more crucially, smuggling 
networks in Bangladesh now use refugees and ask them to go back to 
Myanmar and return to Bangladesh with more yaba (ibid.). Desperate 
to make a living, refugees are willing to take big risks for low payment. 
From the border area, the drugs are smuggled to the refugee camps. The 
smuggling networks appear to draw particularly on Rohingya women for 
this work, as they are less likely to be checked (ibid.). Once in the camps, the 
drugs can be hidden easily, due to the camps’ enormous size and a 7pm curfew 
for Bangladeshi officials. This scheme puts most of the risk on the vulnerable 
Rohingya while the powerful businessmen from Bangladesh profit.
According to many interviewees, it is an open secret in Cox’s Bazar 
that one person running much of the criminal activities in the area is a 
local MP, a member of the ruling Awami League party, and his family. 
The MP is sometimes referred to as the ‘Yaba Godfather’. Even the 
Bangladeshi Department of Narcotics Control describes him and his 
family as the key players in control of the yaba ‘import’ from Myanmar 
(Haque and Barua, 2014). Following the beginning of a ‘war on drugs’ 
in Bangladesh, the MP briefly left the country in June 2018 (Saad and 
Rahaman, 2018), but he has since returned to Bangladesh. In December 
2018, after I had concluded my research, his wife took over his seat in 
parliament. In February 2019, some of his family members surrendered 
in a formal ceremony. However, the former MP did not attend.
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In addition to drugs, guns are smuggled across the border. While on 
a smaller scale overall, a number of large shipments of guns have been 
reported. In the past, shipments of weapons from China and Thailand 
were smuggled on boats to Cox’s Bazar or Chittagong, often via 
Myanmar. From there they were transported on trucks via the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts, supplying, for instance, insurgency groups in northeast India 
and western Myanmar (Reddy and Reddy, 2007, p.70). In 2004, ten truck-
loads of weapons, including sub-machine guns, rocket launchers, grenade 
launchers and hand grenades, were discovered in Chittagong’s port (BEI 
et al., 2013, p.29; Habib, 2004). In the trial that followed, Motiur Rahman 
Nizami, the former leader of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party, the 
former home minister Lutfozzaman Babar, and two senior intelligence 
officers, as well as ten others, were sentenced to death. In 2010, a plan by 
the insurgency group NSCN-IM, based in northeast India, to ship 1,000 
AK rifles and 50 machine guns from the China–Vietnam border to Cox’s 
Bazar was foiled (bdnews24, 2014).
While Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar remain prominent entry points 
for smuggled guns (see e.g. Daily Asian Age, 2018), the area around 
Cox’s Bazar has also evolved into a production hub for weapons. In 
2017, an illegal arms factory was discovered in Cox’s Bazar (see Dhaka 
Tribune, 2017a). According to media reports there are around 50 illegal 
arms manufacturing workshops in the Greater Chittagong area (Dhaka 
Mirror, 2013). Hence, guns are now also smuggled from Bangladesh 
to Myanmar. An ARSA member told me that the group also tried to 
smuggle weapons from Bangladesh into Myanmar, but Bangladeshi law 
enforcement officers captured the gun runner.26
The Smuggling of People
At the time of my research, however, what was smuggled the most were 
people: Rohingya escaping from Myanmar. As Bangladesh opened its 
border to the Rohingya in 2017, the crossing did not formally qualify 
as ‘smuggling’ anymore. Nonetheless, the large number of people who 
wanted to cross the Naf river (Figure 4.6) from Myanmar to Bangladesh 
was an opportunity for people who had been active in the people smug-
gling business before, such as local fishermen.
The Rohingya refugees I interviewed described fluctuating prices 
for the border crossing, depending on time and geography; around 
BDT 10,000 (c. US$120) was common, and many had to hand over 
their jewellery to the boatmen to be taken across. Some refugees stated 
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Figure 4.6 View from Bangladesh across Naf river (December 
2017)
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that the boatmen only took them to the middle of the river and then 
demanded more money, threatening to let them drown if they did not pay. 
Conversely, the interviewed Bangladeshi boatmen described themselves 
as helpful rather than exploitative. They claimed that they simply wanted 
to help when they saw people stranded at the shore, that they asked for 
no money but that the refugees insisted, ‘we will give you whatever we 
have’.27 Rich refugees paid well and poor people did not. It is certainly 
possible that some boatmen told the truth, but the refugees’ statements 
suggest this was a business opportunity for many.
Transporting refugees is an established business in the area, and people 
have been fleeing Myanmar, sometimes via Bangladesh, for Thailand and 
Malaysia for years. Estimates say that more than 60,000 Rohingya were 
in Malaysia by September 2017 (NST, 2017). The interviewed boatmen 
described having taken up to 60 people, all a particular boat could hold, 
three to four times per month out to bigger boats waiting to take them 
across the Andaman Sea. They described this as a highly organised busi-
ness run by a Cox’s Bazar-based mafia-like group, in which always the 
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same middlemen, who were Bangladeshis from Cox’s Bazar, approached 
them and informed them about the next job. They would be paid BDT 
1,000 (c. US$12) per smuggled person.
This was the starting point of a risky journey, on which many refu-
gees later crossed through the Thailand–Malaysia border (Figure 4.7). 
A female interviewee in one of the refugee camps in Bangladesh reported:
My husband left six years ago – and he hasn’t sent me any money since. In 
advance, he had to pay BDT 20,000 [c. US$240]. In every village there was 
a middleman, who collected the people. When they had enough people, they 
left. He took a very small fishing boat to Bangladesh. He then had to pay 
another BDT 500 [c. US$6] as a fare for the boat. From Bangladesh he then 
took a bigger boat to Malaysia. After reaching Malaysia he was imprisoned 
for two years.28
Another woman shared her story:
My husband left five years ago. He left early in the morning. Other people in 
the village told him: ‘Why are you still here? When you get to Malaysia, there 
will be a job for you.’ And we do have six children to care for. He paid three 
lakhs [MMK 300,000; c. US$220] before boarding the boat. They went out in 
small boats, with about ten people in each from different villages. In the deep 
sea there was a big boat waiting for them. Everyone who entered that big boat 
disappeared.29
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the smuggling of refugees can turn into 
human trafficking, as some of the refugees were later kept in camps in the 
Thailand–Malaysia border area as hostages until their family members 
paid for their release. Others were held captive, sometimes raped, tor-
tured and killed, on fishing vessels (Fortify Rights and Suhakam, 2019). 
In August 2017, there were 300 cases against human traffickers pending 
at the court in Cox’s Bazar. However, all of these cases were against mid-
dlemen or boatmen, rather than more senior persons within the networks 
(see Illius, 2017). A refugee reported what had happened to his brother:
In 2012, my brother left for Malaysia. This is when the atrocities in Myanmar 
started. Many young people got arrested. So he decided to leave. He took 
a small boat from the shore and there was a bigger boat waiting for them. 
The Burmese border guards charged everyone another 1 lakh before they 
allowed them to get on the boat [MMK 100,000; c. US$75]. When they got to 
Thailand, they got detained by the smugglers. I got a phone call and I could 
hear my brother crying. He told me that he hadn’t had any food in five days 
and that they would kill him. We managed to collect 5 lakhs [MMK 500,000; 
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Figure 4.7 The route to Malaysia
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c. US$365) for them. We gave the money to a shop in Maungdaw. The shop 
is owned by a Buddhist. But the smuggling business is run by a mixed group 
of Rohingya and Buddhists. But instead of releasing him, they sold him to 
another group. He worked for them for six months for free as a mechanic. This 
is happening to many people: they are kept as hostages.30
Since the recent influx of Rohingya into Bangladesh, the camps and the 
borders in the area have been tightly controlled, preventing people from 
moving further into Bangladesh or leaving for Thailand and Malaysia 
by sea. While rich refugees were still able to travel to Malaysia using 
fake documents and air travel, smuggling via boat had virtually come 
to a standstill at the time of my research in 2017/18. However, the 
interviewed fishermen stated that they were waiting for the border 
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controls to be relaxed again to resume their activities in support of the 
migrant smuggling networks. Considering the large number of people 
in the camps, many of whom already have relatives in Malaysia, large 
numbers of refugees can be expected to try their luck and to take a boat 
to Malaysia, once the security measures have been relaxed, and once 
they feel certain that they have no future in Bangladesh and no chance of 
returning to Myanmar.
Rohingya refugees, including those from previous waves of migration 
and displacement, are not allowed to leave the camps and work or study in 
other parts of the region or Bangladesh. However, an organised network 
provides Bangladeshi identity papers for those who can afford it. Further, 
at the time of the interviews, a growing number of Rohingya women and 
children were trafficked out of the camps. An organised criminal network 
from Cox’s Bazar was promising young women and children work, for 
instance as domestic helpers, as a ruse to force them into sex work (see 
also BBC, 2018b; Stratford, 2018; UNICEF, 2017). It is unclear whether 
a single centralised network perpetuates this trafficking or whether there 
are several criminal groups with different areas of business – such as 
smuggling of people to Malaysia, providing documents to Rohingya, and 
human trafficking. Sometimes the recruiters are Bangladeshi, whereas 
in other cases Rohingya women are used as middle-women to convince 
other Rohingya, in keeping with common human trafficking approaches 
across the region.
Bangladeshi army officers admitted that they neither had a mandate 
nor the means to work successfully against this mafia-like threat. ‘If 
you get into their way, they simply kill you’,31 a soldier stated. They 
also described a second form of trafficking out of the camps for sexual 
exploitation. According to an army officer, many Bangladeshi men who 
do not appear to be part of any network and who often travel from other 
parts of Bangladesh to the camps take women out with a promise of mar-
riage, intending to sell them or have them as a ‘second wife’.
SMUGGLING AND ARMED CONFLICT
Smuggling and Insurgents
Armed conflict in the Bangladesh–Myanmar border region has created 
numerous business opportunities for criminal networks. Insurgencies are 
commonly assumed to be part of or even in charge of these networks. 
ARSA has been blamed repeatedly, especially by the Myanmar govern-
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ment (e.g. The Irrawaddy, 2019b), for being involved in the smuggling 
of drugs (e.g. Dhaka Tribune, 2017b). The group denied such accusations 
on Twitter, arguing that ‘there are other armed groups, dacoit groups 
[bandits], human trafficking groups, drug trafficking groups and some 
other groups (…) disguising [themselves] as the members of ARSA 
with the intention to tarnish the noble image of ARSA in the eyes of the 
international community’ (ARSA, 2018). Indeed, so far no evidence has 
been found that supports such an accusation (e.g. RFA, 2017). Also my 
research does not suggest ARSA has the means, capacity and level of 
organisation to be an important actor in the drug trade, given that they 
cannot even obtain sufficient weapons to carry out insurgency actions. 
Furthermore, as a Rohingya insurgency, ARSA is unlikely to be a pre-
ferred business partner for the yaba producers in Myanmar’s Shan State 
and, as Allchin (2019, p.137) points out, they lack the patronage networks 
in Bangladesh that would enable them to operate there. Nonetheless, 
other non-state armed groups may very well be benefitting from the drug 
trade. For instance, the AA in Myanmar is often considered an involved 
actor, and they have networks in northern Myanmar and Bangladesh’s 
CHT, which affords them good access to both the production and sales 
markets of yaba (see e.g. Allchin, 2019, p.137).
Conversely, as a non-state armed group, it is likely that ARSA is 
involved in weapon smuggling. The insurgencies in Bangladesh, India 
and Myanmar need arms, which in some cases are smuggled by criminal 
networks through Cox’s Bazar. Cox’s Bazar is only one of the hubs 
for the arms trade. In Myanmar, many groups can more easily source 
weapons from China or Thailand. However, ARSA, with its much more 
limited networks and support in the region, has had not much success 
in its attempts to purchase weapons in Cox’s Bazar or elsewhere and 
smuggle them to Rakhine State. Instead, ARSA obtained most of its 
weapons from raids on compounds that belong to Myanmar’s security 
forces.
As with drug smuggling, I found little evidence that ARSA is involved 
in people smuggling, and AA as well as other political non-state armed 
groups seem unlikely to be involved. In one exception, interviewed 
ARSA members were still going forth and back between Myanmar and 
Bangladesh at the time of my research, essentially smuggling themselves. 
One fighter reported: ‘I went [to Myanmar] 14 days ago. But the army 
noticed. So I had to escape.’32 But it is not only ARSA members that 
cross the border like this; others have returned for various reasons, such 
as checking on what has happened to their property.
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In another exception, ARSA may have played a limited role in people 
smuggling that could be described as an unsuccessful humanitarian 
approach. According to some ARSA members, the group tried to help 
refugees by renting six boats from fishermen for them to take Rohingya 
across the river for free. However, this initiative failed as the boatmen 
nonetheless charged the refugees, and the initiative was therefore 
abandoned. Other ARSA members explained that in some cases they 
helped people with cash to pay the boatmen and afford the journey to 
Bangladesh. In addition, both ARSA members and refugees stated that 
the group in some cases protected refugees at the shore of the Naf river 
by forming a protective circle around them, even though they were not 
armed either. An ARSA member claimed: ‘Every day we went out to 
protect people.’33 An interviewee who received such help explained: 
‘ARSA formed a circle around us when the army was shooting into the 
crowd at the beach. They were not armed and many got killed. But even 
more civilians got killed nonetheless.’34 However, many interviewed 
refugees reported that they had never heard of such incidents.
Smuggling and the State
As I found at other borders, state actors are a considerably more impor-
tant player in the smuggling economy at the Myanmar–Bangladesh 
border than non-state armed groups, both with regard to the smuggling 
of people and goods.
On the Myanmar side of the border in Rakhine State, corruption – in 
the form of paying bribes to the Tatmadaw – enabled some Rohingya 
to escape from the violence in some cases, according to interviewees, 
even during the brutal clearance operation in August 2017. An Amnesty 
International report found that ‘In most cases, only those who were able 
to pay huge bribes to the security forces were released, leaving those 
from poor families at greater risk of prolonged detention and further 
torture’ (2018b, p.26). Also the Myanmar coastguard benefitted from the 
Rohingya refugees. Interviewees reported that even though they were not 
charged at the time of the mass-exodus in August 2017, the Myanmar 
coastguard used to charge people a ‘fee’ allowing them to get on a boat, 
when they had tried to leave the country in the past.
Furthermore, the involvement of the state authorities in Myanmar in the 
yaba economy appears to be very systemic. The Dhaka Tribune reported 
in 2019 how the Tatmadaw and border guards help the boatmen, letting 
them use their official jetties at Naf river and loading their boats (Khan, 
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2019). As the area is under the tight control of the Tatmadaw, and already 
was so before August 2017, it is indeed difficult to imagine large-scale 
yaba smuggling operations without their acceptance or involvement. 
This fits into the analysis of the Bangladesh government that suspects 
the involvement of state authorities on the Myanmar side (see Bremner, 
2018) and it matches the observations made about the involvement of 
the Tatmadaw in the drug trade in other parts of Myanmar. Restricted 
access to the area does limit actual independent evidence. However, 
for instance, in October 2017, two Tatmadaw soldiers were arrested in 
Rakhine with almost two million yaba pills, most likely from Shan State 
(Frontier Myanmar, 2017).
Evidence is similarly scant regarding state authorities on the 
Bangladeshi side of the border, but what exists suggest they are a note-
worthy actor in the smuggling economy. It is not just corrupt officials 
that look the other way – there appears to be a more direct and systemic 
involvement. This can be illustrated by what I was told when I asked 
about the trafficking of Rohingya out of the camps. A Bangladeshi army 
officer in the camps told me that they were arresting around 50 people 
a day, whom they caught attempting to smuggle women or children out.35 
This was hardly a surprising number, since every day when I left the 
camps in the evening, I experienced a significant number of checks by 
the military.36 Based on their mandate, the officer explained, the army 
had to hand over all people they arrested to the local police. Acting on 
this, I went to the police station, hoping to meet some of the traffickers 
or, failing that, to gain an understanding of how the police treat them. 
The responsible high-ranking police officer at the station told me that 
they only had a very few, isolated cases of people smuggling and human 
trafficking and that there currently were no people under arrest. Human 
trafficking, he stated, was not a major concern.37
It would be premature to accuse the police of corruption, possibly 
releasing large numbers of arrested people daily. However, considering 
the vast difference in the accounts of the army and the police this seems 
to be a likely explanation, even if the army’s statement were exaggerated. 
Evidence also suggests the local Bangladeshi police are not preventing 
the trafficking of women and children out of the camps. A Dhaka Tribune 
article reported that Bangladeshi intelligence agencies had prepared a list 
of around 40 suspected traffickers active in the camps. Meanwhile, the 
Superintendent of Police of Cox’s Bazar commented that ‘there are no 
human traffickers in the Rohingya camps, and police have full control 
over the camp areas’ (Mahmud, 2017).
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Looking at the drug smuggling activities in the border area illustrates 
that some local authorities in Bangladesh are part of or closely connected 
to criminal networks – as not least the case of the local MP shows. If 
dealers pay a certain weekly fee, these state-linked networks ensure that 
they and their drug mules remain unharmed. A drug dealer interviewed 
by a newspaper stated that they had to pay ‘up to $120 a week on bribes to 
create safe passage for their mules’ to ‘contacts’ (Bremner, 2018). These 
contacts ensured that the police would not hold them (ibid.). He added: 
‘A lot of the authorities around here are not only not preventing the 
crime, but they are also part of it’ (ibid.). And a high-level Bangladeshi 
official acknowledged that they are ‘well aware that both the authorities 
in our own country and in Myanmar are involved in the trade [of yaba]’ 
(ibid.). Indeed, in 2015, 26 police officers from Cox’s Bazar were on 
a list the Bangladeshi intelligence agency compiled of people involved 
in the drug smuggling business (Momin, 2015). As the case of gun 
smuggling illustrated above shows, it is not just local authorities but in 
some cases also high government officials that support and profit from 
the smuggling economy.
In addition to this institutional link, state authorities, particularly 
officials from law enforcement agencies, appear to be making use 
of criminal opportunities in the smuggling context as they arise. For 
instance, newspaper reporting shows that police officers who confiscate 
yaba only declare part of the haul and keep the rest to sell themselves. 
For instance, in September 2017, police officers from Cox’s Bazar seized 
730,000 yaba pills, but only declared 8,000 (Daily Star, 2018). While 
confiscating some yaba creates the impression that the police are doing 
something against the drug trade, such measures may also be used to put 
pressure on independent drug dealers to join the state-linked network and 
pay a weekly fee, thus ensuring their protection.
CONCLUSIONS
The case of the Myanmar–Bangladesh border areas illustrates a number 
of dimensions that link armed conflict to the smuggling economy. 
While the smuggling economy is long-standing, the conflict did create 
new opportunities and expanded existing ones. On a local level, the 
state-perpetrated violence in Rakhine resulted in large-scale displace-
ment of people, and the sudden swell of people seeking to cross the 
Naf river from Myanmar into Bangladesh created ad hoc business 
opportunities for local fishermen, who charged people for helping them. 
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Meanwhile, having a fairly open border also enabled some refugees to 
make some money from smuggling yaba across the border, helping them 
to survive in the camps.
Going beyond the activities of such ‘little fish’, the displacement and 
resulting situation has also created a growing business opportunity for 
more organised criminal networks. Such networks ‘organise’ many of the 
activities that relate to smuggling. They are in charge of the smuggling 
of yaba from Myanmar to Bangladesh, using the Rohingya to do the 
dangerous part; they provide false documents for refugees who can afford 
it, which allows them to leave the camps and, if they want to, to travel to 
Malaysia; they traffic women and children out of the camps into forced 
labour and prostitution; and they organise the smuggling of refugees to 
Malaysia via boat, with the help of local fishermen.
It is not clear to what extent these businesses are operated by one or 
multiple networks. However, the networks seem to not only be working 
across international borders, but also bridging nationalities and ethnic 
groups. For instance, on the Myanmar side, according to the accounts of 
victims, both Buddhists and Rohingya are part of the people smuggling 
operations. On the Bangladeshi side of the border, Bengali people seem 
to dominate the business, while Rohingya are only used at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, for instance to transport drugs.
On both sides of the border, criminal networks appear to be closely 
linked to state authorities, including both high-level officials and local 
officers. The key role that state actors play in the local smuggling 
economy became particularly apparent in the context of smuggling illicit 
goods, such as, most prominently, yaba. With little or no risk of detection 
and prosecution, the smuggling activities can run much more smoothly 
and more cost-efficiently than any ‘independent’ smuggler would be able 
to achieve.
Conversely, non-state armed groups play little role in smuggling at 
the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. For criminal networks, non-state 
armed groups like ARSA are not a relevant partner as they do not control 
the border or any territory, and are not able to block or facilitate their 
activities. Further, ARSA members are considered to be ‘terrorists’ in 
Myanmar who are actively searched for and association with them carries 
risks. Hence, ARSA’s role seems to be limited to being customers of 
criminal networks, for instance, when wanting to buy arms.
Not controlling territory, ARSA can be categorised as a rebel, which 
limits its ability to play a significant role in the smuggling economy. 
However, compared to the situation for a group like BRN in Southern 
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Thailand, the situation is even more difficult for ARSA. Almost the 
entire ethnic group ARSA claims to represent, the Rohingya, has been 
displaced from their territory in Myanmar and is at risk when returning. 
Hence, it is unlikely for ARSA – or any other exclusively Rohingya 
organisation – to play any influential role in the smuggling economy. 
Legitimacy considerations are secondary to territorial constraints. It 
remains unclear whether building local legitimacy is a priority for ARSA. 
On the one hand, ARSA is responding to local expectations, resisting the 
Tatmadaw and, in some cases, helping people to flee from Myanmar. On 
the other hand, many Rohingya believe ARSA triggered the large-scale 
violence against the Rohingya.
The AA is far more influential than ARSA, and it has networks across 
the border and controls some territory. This gives it more opportunities 
to get involved in the smuggling economy, including the smuggling 
of drugs, and is a more attractive business partner for smugglers. 
Nonetheless, compared to the systemic involvement of state actors in 
the smuggling economy of this border region its role appears also to be 
minor.
Violence and armed conflict, such as that at Myanmar’s border with 
China and at the Thailand–Malaysia border, deters smugglers who prefer 
stable environments and routes that offer predictability and low risks. 
Meanwhile, the smuggling economy at Myanmar’s Bangladesh border 
has flourished in spite of the violence that occurred in Rakhine state in 
August 2017. The conflict increased the demand for people smugglers 
and the displacement created the demand for goods smuggled in from 
Myanmar to Bangladesh. Perhaps more surprisingly, the smuggling of 
transit goods, that only pass through the area, such as yaba, continues on 
the same if not a larger scale. 
Three differences, when compared to Southern Thailand and Kachin 
State, may help to explain these dynamics. First, violence in Southern 
Thailand and Kachin State is not intended to push a large number of 
people out of the country and across the border. Hence, the violence does 
not spark a new demand for people smuggling or the smuggling of daily 
consumption goods. Meanwhile, the displaced Rohingya wanted to cross 
to Bangladesh, requiring the help of fishermen, and in Bangladesh they 
continue to consume goods from Myanmar that need to be smuggled. 
The existence of vast refugee camps in Bangladesh in turn has created 
opportunities for human traffickers. The second difference compared to 
the other two borders is that there is no alternate route for drug smuggling 
from the drug production in Myanmar’s Shan State to the consumers 
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in Bangladesh’s Dhaka that offers a more peaceful connection and that 
has good roads. Shifting the smuggling route would almost certainly 
require considerable detours or much more tedious smuggling operations 
in rough terrain. The third difference is that the episode of violence in 
Rakhine was short and the activities of non-state armed groups such 
as ARSA do not affect the smuggling economy greatly. Being closely 
linked to and protected by state authorities, smugglers continue to have 
a high level of predictability for their business that enables them to con-
tinue their operations.
NOTES
1. Interview, 2 December 2017.
2. Interview, 2 December 2017.
3. The photo was digitally edited to enhance the visibility of the background.
4. Interview, 4 December 2017.
5. This photo was taken by the interviewee.
6. Interview, 6 December 2017. The interviewee’s account matches other 
reports of a large-scale massacre in Tula Toli (see e.g. HRW, 2017; Human 
Rights Council, 2018, pp.178–84).
7. Interview, 2 December 2017.
8. E.g. interview, 2 December 2017.
9. Interview, 6 December 2017.
10. Interview, 6 December 2017.
11. E.g. interview, 1 December 2017.
12. Interview, 5 December 2017.
13. Interview, 6 December 2017.
14. Reportedly, the two commanders had switched their responsibilities a few 
days before 25 August.
15. Interview, 2 December 2017.
16. Interview, 3 December 2017.
17. Interview, 2 December 2017.
18. Interview, 3 December 2017.
19. Interview, 2 December 2017.
20. Interview, 3 December 2017.
21. Interview, 6 December 2017.
22. E.g. interview, 1 December 2017; interview, 5 December 2017.
23. Interview, 2 December 2017.
24. Interview, 5 December 2017.
25. Interview, 5 December 2017.
26. Interview, 3 December 2017.
27. Interview, 5 December 2017.
28. Interview, 2 December 2017.
29. Interview, 2 December 2017.
30. Interview, 2 December 2017.
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31. Interview, December 2017 (date anonymised).
32. Interview, 3 December 2017.
33. Interview, 3 December 2017.
34. Interview, 2 December 2017.
35. Interview, 5 December 2017.
36. The level of control and the number of checkpoints were subsequently 
reduced again.
37. Interview, 6 December 2017.
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5. Rice & ransoms: the Indonesia–
Philippines–Malaysia border region
‘So long as the seas have no fence, it will not stop’, an interviewee 
prophesised, referring to smuggling in the border region of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, where all the borders are in the sea. The 
area is large and includes many small islands, which makes it difficult 
to patrol. The region also has its share of non-state armed actors. In 
Mindanao, in the south of the Philippines, organised non-state armed 
groups fight for more regional autonomy for the Moro people. In 
Indonesia, more extremist networks, some linked to the Islamic State, 
conduct attacks that are often directed against civilians. The region also 
has groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that are nominally political 
but, as Gutierrez writes, ‘better understood as a network of dangerous 
criminal entrepreneurs, similar to an armed mob’ (2016, p.184) than 
a non-state armed group with political motives.
As the border region is large, this chapter uses two case studies (Figure 
5.1): in the east, the route connecting Mindanao in the Philippines, 
Sabah in Malaysia and North Kalimantan in Indonesia; in the west, 
the route connecting Mindanao in the Philippines and North Sulawesi 
in Indonesia. I conducted research in Indonesia’s North Kalimantan 
(Nunukan) and North Sulawesi (Manado, Tahuna, Bitung) and in 
Mindanao (Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato) in the Philippines, in April 
2018 and in May–June 2018.
In the east, between Mindanao and North Sulawesi, local people 
from the Philippines and Indonesia cross the border on a regular basis, 
particularly for fishing. Both licit and illicit goods are smuggled between 
the countries on the same route. The illicit goods smuggled include 
the weapons that are used for some of the attacks in Indonesia and are 
imported from the Philippines. However, less people smuggling happens 
on this route, because the distance between Indonesia and the Philippines 
is comparatively far, and because there are few pull factors for migrant 
workers, who tend to consider Malaysia to be a more attractive destina-
tion for work.
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In the west, between North Kalimantan, Sabah and Sulu, where small 
islands are close together and boats can easily make stops on the way, 
the smuggling activities are more diverse. Daily consumption goods 
such as rice are smuggled from Malaysia to the Philippines as well as to 
Indonesia. Migrant workers cross from Indonesia into Malaysia to work 
on the palm oil plantations. In addition, there are more irregular border 
crossings from and into the Philippines in this border area and non-state 
armed groups that do not control territory use it to smuggle fighters. The 
Philippines has proven a safe haven and space for training for members 
of armed groups from both Indonesia and Malaysia.
BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMED 
CONFLICT IN THE REGION
Armed Conflict in Mindanao
The south of the Philippines, particularly Mindanao, the country’s 
second biggest island, has been a hotspot for conflict since the late 1960s. 
While Christians dominate the country, comprising more than 90% 
of Filipinos, a third of Mindanao’s population is Muslim, commonly 
termed Moro people. Islam arrived in the Philippines in the thirteenth or 
fourteenth century, several hundred years before the arrival of Spanish 
Catholics, and sultanates such as Sulu and Maguindanao were estab-
lished. A number of these sultanates remained independent until the 
USA colonised the Philippines. The colonial government offered free 
land to Christian Filipinos who would resettle in Mindanao beginning 
in 1912, creating the intended effect of establishing a Christian majority 
(Hernandez, 2017).
For example, the independent sultanate Sulu (Figure 5.2) only became 
part of the then US colony of the Philippines in 1915. By 1878, the Sulu 
Sultanate had handed over a part of its territory, Sabah, to the British for 
an annual amount of 5,000 Malayan dollars (an amount that was raised to 
5,300 in 1903). Sabah has become a flashpoint because of its particular 
history, and the question of whether the deal was a lease or the territory 
was ceded remains controversial to this day. While the territory was 
‘ceded’ according to the British version of the contract, it was only leased 
according to the Sulu version. Sabah gained independence from the 
British in 1963 and became a part of Malaysia. However, the Philippines, 
after gaining independence from the USA, claimed that Sabah was part of 
the Philippines as the legal successor of the Sulu Sultanate (e.g. Republic 
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Figure 5.2 Sabah and the Sultanate of Sulu1
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of the Philippines, 1968). Meanwhile, Malaysia continued to pay an 
annual fee of MYR 5,300, which they called ‘cession money’, to the heirs 
of the Sulu Sultan, a practice that continues to this day (Lee Brago, 2015).
In 1968, a group of Moro from Sulu were recruited into a paramilitary 
unit and received military training, financed by the government of 
the Philippines, as part of a secret operation called ‘Merdeka’, later 
renamed ‘Jabidah’, to destabilise Sabah and justify a Filipino military 
intervention. For much discussed but unknown reasons, however, the 
army killed at least ten and possibly as many as 68 of the Moro recruits 
and no one was held accountable (see e.g. Asani, 1985; Rodell, 2015). 
What became known as the ‘Jabidah Massacre’ led to the creation of the 
Muslim Independence Movement (MIM; later renamed the Mindanao 
Independence Movement), which sought to establish ‘Bangsamoro’, 
a nation of Moro. The MIM was a predominantly non-violent movement 
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and disbanded when its leader joined the government through negoti-
ations with President Ferdinand Marcos in 1970 (Stanford University, 
2015a). However, Malaysia then started to provide arms to Moros and, in 
1972, former members of the MIM’s youth division established the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) (ibid.). In September 1972, Marcos 
established martial law, which weakened the influence of non-violent 
Moro groups and empowered armed groups, including the MNLF (ibid.). 
Due to the conflict, by 1976, 120,000 people had been killed, 100,000 
people had fled to Malaysia and another one million people had been 
internally displaced (USIP, 2005, p.4). Backed by Libya, the MNLF 
quickly became the dominant armed group, fighting for a separate 
state on the basis of nationalist (rather than religious) claims (Stanford 
University, 2015a). The group was funded through foreign actors, 
including Libya, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, and demanded ‘zakat’, 
a religious obligation to share wealth, as a form of tax locally in the areas 
it influenced (ibid.).
In 1976, Libya mediated the so-called ‘Tripoli Agreement’ between 
the MNLF and the government of the Philippines, in which Marcos 
committed to creating an autonomous area for the Moro people within the 
country (ibid.). However, the government did not implement the agree-
ment directly, and instead held a referendum in the affected provinces 
(ibid.). Because the Moro people only constituted a majority in a few 
provinces, it resulted in two small disconnected semi-autonomous areas, 
that became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 
1989. Dissatisfied, the MNLF took up arms again in 1977 (ibid.).
Also dissatisfied with the result, a group later termed the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split off from the MNLF the same year, 
demanding a stronger focus on Islam. MILF’s popular support grew 
steadily as it provided effective governance in the areas it controlled, 
while its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), 
conducted bombings infrequently to illustrate its strength to the outside 
world. The MILF continued to collect zakat and applied rigid Islamic 
principles, governed in a participatory manner and provided government 
services (Adam, 2018; Stanford University, 2015b). It gained legitimacy 
through its religious ideology that reflected the ideal of socioeconomic 
equality, positioning the MILF in opposition to a government and elites 
that were perceived as corrupt (Adam, 2018, p.20).
In 1996 the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the government 
that expanded the territory of ARMM, promised development and 
investments, and integrated MNLF fighters into the Filipino police force. 
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However, ARMM and its administration were widely seen as corrupt and 
inefficient. Interviewees described ARMM as a ‘kingdom in the clouds’, 
with little control over local governance, dependent on funds allocated 
by the central government.2 The MILF became the dominant armed 
group that channelled continued discontent. In the years that followed, 
the government pursued varying strategies towards MILF, resulting in 
more violent and more peaceful phases. Four in ten households in Central 
Mindanao were displaced between 2000 and 2010 (Vinck & Bell, 2011). 
Most displacement was internal but it did spur emigration, primarily to 
Malaysia.
In 2012 and 2014, the MILF and the government signed agreements 
to establish a new region with more autonomy called ‘Bangsamoro’ to 
replace ARMM.3 The agreements gave the government of Bangsamoro 
the right to tax its citizens directly and to retain 75% of tax revenue, 
passing the rest on to the central government. But the passage of the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which would have implemented the 
agreements, was delayed. President Duterte warned the public and the 
legislature in January 2018 that further delay would lead to ‘war in 
Mindanao’ (Regencia, 2018). It was a reasonable fear as the MILF had 
an estimated 30,000 armed fighters at the time.
In May 2018, both chambers of the Congress of the Philippines, the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, had passed the BBL, but with 
more than 100 amendments the Senate version rolled back concessions 
considerably, making the proposed Bangsamoro scarcely more autono-
mous than ARMM. At a conference that I attended in June 2018, MILF 
vice-chairman Ghazali Jaafar stated: ‘If there is no BBL, there is no 
decommissioning.’4 Civil society activists I interviewed in Cotabato City 
stood behind the MILF, saying that the group had the mandate of the 
Moro people. They argued that a failure of the BBL could result in the 
development of more extreme armed groups. In the past, they pointed 
out, failed agreements, agreements that did not live up to the expecta-
tions of the population, or agreements in which the leaders appeared to 
be ‘bought’ by the government, had led to the growth of more radical 
splinter groups.5
Finally, in July 2018, President Duterte signed the BBL, renamed 
Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), and the population in Mindanao 
approved it in a two-part plebiscite in January and February 2019. 
The ratified law provides for the creation of a new Bangsamoro 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) replacing ARMM. 
The approved version gives BARMM more autonomy and greater terri-
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tory than ARMM, comprising Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao as well 
as the islands Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi (see Figure 5.1). Its capital 
is Cotabato City. The interim parliament, the Bangsamoro Transition 
Authority, is led by Murad Ebrahim, the chairman of the MILF, as the 
Chief Minister.6 The MILF started decommissioning in September 2019.
Other Non-State Armed Groups in the Philippines
Despite the notable progress in the peace process, a number of non-state 
armed groups remain active in Mindanao, some of which may be poised 
to gain steam from the decommissioning of MILF. Possibly best known is 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has existed since 1991. Its founder, 
Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, was a former member of the MNLF who 
established the group after studying in the Middle East and travelling to 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Stanford University, 2015c). 
Janjalani and the supporters he gathered, many of whom had a poor 
economic background, demanded independence but were more radical 
than the MNLF/MILF (ibid.). They reportedly maintained links with Al 
Qaeda and became famous for their violent tactics, including bombings, 
assassinations and kidnappings (ibid.). Police killed Janjalani in 1998, 
but the ASG nonetheless conducted a number of high-profile attacks in 
the 2000s.
The ASG has never had broad-based support like the MNLF/MILF 
and currently has an estimated 400 members (ibid.). Since the late 
2000s, the group’s main visible activity has been kidnappings, including 
of foreigners, for ransom. However, the ASG also tried to undermine 
the peace process, for instance, by killing a group of Muslims during 
a celebration of the end of Ramadan in 2014 (ibid.). In 2014, the group 
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State but the extent of their cooperation 
is unknown (ibid.). Instead, the group is known for its violence against 
civilians and its focus on sourcing money (ibid.). Most people, including 
the supporters of MNLF/MILF I spoke with, consider the ASG to be 
a criminal rather than a political group. In particular, the list of kidnap-
pings for ransom conducted by the ASG is long. Often the group beheads 
the hostages if its demands are not met. For instance, in 2015 the ASG 
beheaded a Malaysian hostage. In another case, the group held a Dutch 
birdwatcher hostage for seven years, and then killed him in 2019.
Since 2013, another armed group, the so-called Maute group (also 
known as Islamic State of Lanao), has been active in Mindanao. Key 
members of the group, including the brothers Omar and Abdullah Maute, 
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were part of the MILF, but split off because of the peace talks in which 
the MILF was engaged. They pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 
2015 and in 2017, with the help of ASG fighters as well as reportedly 
up to 100 foreign fighters (see e.g. Ellis-Petersen and Fonbuena, 2018), 
overran the city of Marawi. They burned buildings, beheading police 
officers, and announced a caliphate.7 President Duterte declared martial 
law across Mindanao and the army defeated the group after many months 
of fighting, ultimately killing the Maute brothers. In total, it is estimated 
that 1,200 people were killed in the Battle of Marawi (ibid.). While the 
group was severely weakened, it has since reorganised. According to an 
interviewee in Cotabato, around 300 fighters are still active.8 In January 
2019, the group struck again, killing several soldiers in Lanao del Sur.
A third non-state armed group with a presence in Mindanao is driven 
by a very different kind of ideology. The New People’s Army (NPA) 
was formed in 1969 as the armed wing of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines. It is active in various parts of the country and its approxi-
mately 5,000 members seek to overthrow the government and redistrib-
ute the land (Stanford University, 2015d). The group builds on support 
in rural areas where it controls some territory (ibid.). Rubin (2019, p.2) 
shows that communities often support the NPA because it offers gov-
ernance that improves the status quo. The group finances itself through 
a ‘revolutionary tax’ for businesses and commits violence against pol-
iticians, government agencies and security forces as well as businesses 
that are unwilling to pay the tax. The Philippines government considers 
NPA to be a terrorist organisation. In late 2018, Duterte announced that 
he wanted to establish ‘death squads’ to hunt members of NPA (see e.g. 
DW, 2018).
Jemaah Islamiyah – A Regional Player
Across the Celebes Sea, in Indonesia and Malaysia, armed groups are 
active that do not control any territory and are best described as networks. 
They usually draw on very small, but also very radical, support bases 
with links to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda or the 
Islamic State. In contrast to the ASG they do have political objectives. 
However, they are not concerned with achieving political control by 
building a large local support base. Instead, they aim at destabilising the 
states in the region through attacks. As Abuza puts it, such groups ‘do not 
need large numbers to be dangerous’ (2006, p.84).
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One prominent group is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It was established by 
two Yemeni-born Indonesian clerics in Malaysia at some point in the 
late 1980s or early 1990s, who wanted to create a pan-Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia (Stanford University, 2015e). Many of its early members 
were trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and had reportedly established 
links to Al Qaeda there. In the following years, its members were trained 
in the Philippines, where the group established ties with MILF. In 2001, 
the Singapore government prevented a planned attack on a number of dip-
lomatic missions in the country. In 2002, the group conducted an attack 
on night clubs in Bali, killing 202 people. A number of other large-scale 
attacks in Indonesia have been attributed to JI, including in Jakarta in 
2002, 2004, and 2009 and again in Bali in 2005. The group finances itself 
through donations; however, according to media reports the group also 
sustains a palm oil plantation business (Soeriaatmadja, 2019).
While JI had a presence in five countries in 2001 – in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia – following 
crack-downs by the countries’ law enforcement agencies, its military 
structure had been reduced to a single unit in Indonesia by 2005 (IPAC 
2017a, p.2). From 2007 to 2010, after a clash with the Indonesian police, 
the group prioritised ‘dakwah’ (preaching and religious outreach) over 
violent jihad (ibid., p.1) to rebuild its base. JI re-established its military 
wing in 2010, and sent people to Syria for training between 2011 and 
2014 (ibid. pp.7–8). However, the Indonesian police raided an arms 
factory that served the group in 2014 and arrested a number of key 
members (ibid., p.10). In June 2019, they arrested the group’s suspected 
leader, Para Wijayanto, in Jakarta. Nonetheless, the Institute for Policy 
Analysis of Conflict warned that further splintering of JI could lead to 
groups more militant and professional than ‘anything Indonesian extrem-
ism has to offer today’ (ibid.).9
Jamaah Ansharut Daulah – Radical Islam in Indonesia
More active in Indonesia at the time of research were Jamaah Ansharut 
Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansarul Khilafah (JAK). JAK has been 
responsible for fewer attacks but the UN Security Council has described 
it as a ‘growing threat’ in 2018 (2018, p.8). JAD is best described as 
a network of groups and individuals that sympathise with the IS. A report 
finds that the JAD cell in Bandung (Western Java) evolved out of former 
supporters of the disbanded group Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia 
(DI/NII)10 as, in 2015, they became fascinated by the IS in Syria, which 
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controlled and governed territory according to Islamic law. Hence, its 
members were trained to support and fight for the IS in Syria. However, 
when it became increasingly difficult to go to Syria, and when the IS 
encouraged people to conduct attacks in their home countries in 2016, 
they changed their plans and focused on targets within Indonesia (IPAC, 
2018, p.8).
Like JI, JAD does not control territory and does not aim at building 
a large local support base, instead focusing on undermining states 
through violent attacks. It finances itself through external sources, 
through a number of individuals abroad who are assumed to be linked 
to the IS (see e.g. The Jakarta Post, 2019). The network first gained 
attention through an attack carried out in central Jakarta in January 2016, 
killing 25 people. In May 2017, two people linked to JAD carried out 
a suicide attack on a bus terminal in East Jakarta (Chew, 2017). In May 
2018, a family carried out suicide attacks in three churches in Surabaya, 
Indonesia. According to media reports, the family had been to Syria, 
where they fought for the IS (BBC, 2018c).
THE SMUGGLING ECONOMY
The Border Areas
The region that hosts such a large number of armed groups is also home 
to an extensive smuggling economy. A study on illicit trade in Sulu and 
Tawi-tawi, in the south of Mindanao, finds that the shadow economy 
may exceed the size of the official economy (Villanueva, 2016, p.276). 
In Tawi-Tawi, customs regulations are considered to be ‘disruptive’, 
increasing the prices of goods such as rice (Quitoriano, forthcoming).11 
Most smugglers are local people who know the waters and the small 
islands dotted across the area.
The two border regions explored in this chapter have different geo-
graphic features and distances between countries. In the west, the border 
city Tawau in Malaysia’s Sabah is a short boat ride from Nunukan in 
Indonesia’s North Kalimantan. Here also the southern islands of the 
Philippines that are part of the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region 
in Muslim Mindanao are close. Meanwhile, the distance between the 
Philippines and Indonesia’s North Sulawesi in the east is bigger.
In both border regions, trade has happened for centuries and many 
links exist between communities across the borders of today’s nation 
states. In the west, the Sulu Sultanate, today a part of the Philippines, 
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used to comprise Sabah, which is now part of Malaysia. In the east, there 
is the Sangir tribe, which is from Indonesia’s Sangir (or Sangihe) Talaud 
islands,12 north of Indonesia’s Sulawesi (Celebes) island. The Sangirs 
have always crossed between what are Indonesia and the Philippines 
today. Some Sangirs now reside in the southern part of the Philippines 
and have become Filipino citizens, while maintaining a strong bond 
with their Indonesian roots (Hastings, 2010, pp.146–71; Valesco, 2010). 
In addition, people in the borderlands have historically married across 
national lines and there are no physical characteristics that make it easy 
to differentiate between today’s nationalities.
The Smuggling of Goods
The border between the three countries in the Celebes and Sulu seas is 
dubbed ‘the smugglers’ paradise’. Most of the goods smuggled are ordi-
nary consumption goods. As in Southern Thailand, goods are imported 
and exported depending on where they are cheaper, while avoiding the 
payment of customs duty. The vast scale of this ‘irregular’ trade makes it 
difficult to call these activities smuggling.
The west
In the west (Figure 5.3), an extensive informal trade network connects 
irregular harbours in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. I visited 
some of these harbours in Indonesia’s Nunukan (Figure 5.4), in close 
proximity to Tawau in Malaysia. While the harbours are quiet during the 
day, they are busy places at night, when the local police checkpoint is 
closed. The interviewees explained that they use boats with particularly 
quiet engines to avoid detection by Malaysian patrol vessels.13
Similarly, from Semporna in Malaysia, Tawi-tawi in the south of the 
Sulu archipelago in the Philippines can be reached quickly. This route 
is used to smuggle goods, including the rice that is much demanded in 
the Philippines (see e.g. Jacinto, 2018). A rice shortage in Mindanao has 
resulted in a rapid increase of prices, particularly in Zamboanga City and 
Basilan. In Tawi-tawi, an estimated 90% of the rice and other daily con-
sumption goods - such as sugar, cooking oil, and fuel - are from Malaysia 
(Villanueva, 2016, p.265; see also Quitoriano, forthcoming). A study 
describes an extensive and organised network running the operations, 
consisting of small traders, brokers, boat owners, customs, police, port 
operators, port labourers, truck operators and warehouses (Villanueva, 
2016, p.264). An increase in border patrols and coordination between 
This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
Users can redistribute the work for non-commercial purposes, 
as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, as detailed in the License. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd must be clearly credited as the ownerof the original work. 
Any translation or adaptation of the original content requires the written authorization 
of Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Figure 5.3 Border area – west
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Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines that were agreed on in 2016 
because of the kidnappings by the ASG led to a shift of at least some 
smugglers from Sulu further to the northwest, to Palawan, which is also 
readily accessible to Malaysia, but the smuggling economy for licit goods 
remains strong.
Smugglers also move illicit goods in this border area. For example, 
drugs, particularly methamphetamines, which are often called ‘shabu’ 
in the region, often pass from Malaysia through the border crossing at 
Nunukan to Kalimantan in Indonesia (see e.g. Adri, 2017; Daily Express, 
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Figure 5.4 Irregular harbour in Nunukan, Indonesia (April 2018)
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2018). The use and production of shabu used to be high in Mindanao 
(Cagoco-Guiam and Schoofs, 2016, p.126). The shabu was taken to 
Tawi-tawi and from there smuggled across the border to Sandakan in 
Malaysia’s Sabah to be distributed there or to be smuggled further to 
Indonesia across the border at Nunukan. However, increasingly, meth-
amphetamines are smuggled all the way from Myanmar (see Figure 3.4). 
They are smuggled through Thailand (see Chapter 2) into Malaysia. On 
domestic flights from Kuala Lumpur they are then taken to Sandakan and 
Kota Kinabalu airports in Sabah.
The east
The eastern route (Figure 5.5) that connects the Philippines with 
Indonesia is also popular with smugglers even though the boats here 
have to cross considerably longer distances on the open sea. In Tahuna, 
on the remote Indonesian Sangihe island, in close proximity to the 
Philippines, the main road is packed with shops selling goods smuggled 
from the Philippines, such as sandals and shoes, mattresses, perfume, 
Coca Cola, umbrellas and plastic brooms.14 In addition, the eastern route 
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is a well-known gateway for cigarettes, alcohol and weapons. A man who 
had worked for Filipino smugglers at Marore port, a small Indonesian 
island further north of Tahuna, explained in a newspaper interview that 
the route, which he calls the ‘rat alley’, was largely unmonitored and it 
was easy to track navy ships that might interfere with smuggling opera-
tions (Hanifan, 2017). However, he pointed out that Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti had tightened surveillance (ibid.).
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The Philippines is a source of weapons that supply non-state armed 
groups, a switch from the 1970s when the MNLF relied heavily on arms 
from Libya. Back then, these weapons were mainly smuggled through 
Sabah to the Philippines, as the Sulu leader had strong ties with Malaysia. 
Today, most guns traded illegally in the Philippines to clients as far off 
as Japan’s Triad were originally bought from legal gun traders or corrupt 
security forces (Villanueva, 2016, p.274). In addition to legally produced 
weapons, knockoffs of international brands called paltik are smuggled 
from the country (Miani, 2011). According to media reports, Danao City 
is known for having the Philippines’ best illegal gunsmiths (McGeow, 
2013; Quitoriano, 2013). Armed groups in Indonesia seek and commonly 
use weapons from the Philippines. A former JI member explained in an 
interview that JI disassembled weapons, boxed them, and wrapped them 
like gifts to avoid attention.15
A story by a local Indonesian crime magazine, Gamma (2000), 
describes the small gun smuggling business in Sulawesi between 1999 
and 2000. At the time, the police caught a man named Meyer – a smug-
gler of pornographic DVDs and fighting cockerels – on a transport boat 
that served Bitung (North Sulawesi) and General Santos (Mindanao) with 
weapons. Meyer was smuggling a grenade and a Colt 38 from General 
Santos and was on the way to Bitung. He received IDR 750,000 (c. 
US$85) as a payment for each smuggled weapon. The same journalist 
also interviewed a man called Manase from Sangihe Talaud, who was 
arrested in February 2000 with two semi-automatic pistols from the 
Philippines. Manase said that selling guns was a lucrative business, as he 
bought the guns for PHP 2,500 (or IDR 500,000 at the time, c. US$50) 
each in General Santos, and could dispose of them for four times as much 
in Indonesia.
While details have likely changed in more than two decades, the routes 
and methods remain. For example, the weapons used by JAD in the 
attack in Jakarta in January 2016 were reportedly from the Philippines 
(e.g. GMA News, 2016; Renaldi, 2018). Likewise, in September 2017, the 
police confiscated seven illegal weapons in Sangihe Talaud.16 However, 
the smuggling of arms appears to happen on a small scale.
Meanwhile, the smuggling activities in the region are not limited to 
the borderlands and irregular harbours where I conducted my research. 
Quite the contrary, as most of the smuggling of both licit and illicit goods 
is conducted through the main trade hubs. Manila’s port is frequently in 
the news in the context of large-scale smuggling cases. For instance, at 
Manila Container Port, customs seized smuggled goods worth PHP 33 
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million (c. US$620,000), much of it rice, coming from China in May 
2018 (see Rappler, 2018). In 2017, 600kg of methamphetamines worth 
US$126 million that had been declared as kitchenware were found at the 
same port, resulting in accusations that customs officials were involved 
in the business (see e.g. Parpan and Lardizabal, 2017). According to the 
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, organised mafia-like criminal 
groups with links to China are the key actors responsible for most of 
the drug smuggling into the Philippines (see e.g. Cagoco-Guiam and 
Schoofs, 2016, p.138; Dumlao, 2017).
The Smuggling of People
Due to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Framework 
Agreement on Visa Exemption, citizens of the ten member states, which 
include Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, usually do not need 
a visa for a stay of up to 14 days in another member state. People – 
including supporters and members or armed groups – can easily travel 
between the countries. Most people take a plane or ferries. However, 
work permits are far more difficult to get. Demand for labour in Malaysia 
has driven migrant smuggling. Indonesians as well as Filipinos, some 
of them displaced by conflict, are seeking work in Malaysia, yet many 
Filipinos also do so further away, including in Europe and in the Middle 
East.
The west
Labour migration was a particularly prominent phenomenon in the 
western area. Sabah and other parts of Borneo – the way the island that is 
named Kalimantan in Indonesia is called in Malaysia – have many palm 
oil plantations, which require a lot of labour, much provided by migrant 
workers. Some of these migrant workers in Malaysia came because of the 
violence in the Philippines. Civil society activists in Mindanao explained 
how many people escaped the fighting by crossing into Sabah via Sulu 
(see Figure 5.3). For Indonesians, a popular border crossing to Sabah is 
Nunukan, an island in close proximity to Tawau in Malaysia. The people 
crossing the border here are usually from North Kalimantan, Sulawesi 
and Java. While there are legal pathways for Indonesians to work in 
Malaysia, my interviewees stated that most people choose to go illegally, 
using irregular routes, as they are faster and less complicated.
In Nunukan, agents that specialise in placing migrant workers wait at 
the harbour and offer their services to the people arriving who are looking 
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for work. Such agencies arrange much of the smuggling of migrant 
workers into Malaysia through the port, using established links with 
companies and plantations in Malaysia. Most of these agencies operate 
illegally, and arrange migrant passage to Malaysia using irregular routes. 
They often provide forged documents, giving them some security in case 
they are checked by the police.
Nonetheless, many migrant workers get deported. According to local 
civil society activists, each week around 100 deportees from Malaysia 
arrive in Nunukan alone.17 Interviewees said that they were avoiding 
leaving the plantations in Malaysia to avoid arrest. Some had hidden in 
the forest because police approach their place of employment. In addition 
to the threat of deportation, migrant workers without documents receive 
lower pay than other workers, MYR 600–700 (c. US$150–75) instead of 
MYR 1,200 (c. US$300) per month.
The business is highly profitable for the agents, who receive payments 
from employers for delivering workers and can garnish the wages of 
workers they deliver, as well as collecting upfront fees for their services 
and the documents provided. According to some interviewees, legal 
pathways would actually be cheaper for migrants, but getting a work 
permit for Malaysia requires a sponsor there, which is difficult to find for 
migrants without connections. Some people simply do not know that they 
need documents and others do not want to wait until they could obtain 
documents, figuring they can make up for some of the cost of going ille-
gally by earning more quickly. Many others are not even aware that they 
could obtain documents to migrate legally.18
The east
Irregular border crossings are also common in the east, but rarely involve 
smuggling others. Most are undertaken by locals who, for instance, 
illegally fish in the waters of a neighbouring country, sometimes without 
noticing that they have crossed a border. The Indonesian Marine and 
Fisheries Supervision (PSDKP) patrols the waters and tries to identify 
boats from the Philippines. PSDKP told me they had arrested about 400 
Filipino fishermen in 2017.19 In the past, captured boats have also been 
destroyed or sunk as a deterrent (see e.g. Reuters, 2017a).
There are cases of large fishing vessels, from the Philippines and 
elsewhere, exploiting Indonesian waters. However, most of the ‘illegal’ 
fishing in the area does not happen on an industrial scale. Often it is 
caused by geographic proximity and facilitated by how easy it is to cross 
the border between Indonesia and the Philippines. Through research on 
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each side of the border, I learned that many Indonesians have settled 
in the south of Mindanao and many Filipinos have settled in North 
Sulawesi. Often they are married to locals and are part of the local 
community, but lack legal papers. Many Filipinos in Indonesia’s North 
Sulawesi, for instance, do not have an Indonesian ID card. Hence, when 
they are found by PSDKP officials, they run the risk of being arrested and 
deported. PSDKP officials admitted that it can be difficult to determine 
where a person is actually from. They said that they sometimes instruct 
people whom they suspect to be from the Philippines to draw the number 
‘8’. They believe that Filipino schools teach people to start drawing the 
8 at the top, while people who were educated in Indonesia start drawing 
the 8 in the middle.20
According to interviewees, though, most of the time they cross the 
border easily, which is fortunate as some have extensive family ties in 
both countries. A Filipino fisherman explained to me in April 2018 (see 
Figure 5.5):
We often cross the border between the Philippines and Indonesia. There are no 
checks and no passports are needed. From Manado, we take a regular passen-
ger boat to Tahuna. That takes about six hours. From Tahuna, we take a small 
fishing boat to Kawalusu island, and from there we continue the journey to 
Marore island. If the weather is good, that takes about one day. From Marore, 
we take another small boat to Balut island, which is already in the Philippines. 
From there, it is another half day journey to General Santos.’21
By air
Several interviewees pointed out that most migrant workers leave the 
country by plane, whether they have the necessary documents or not. 
Recruiters try to convince people, including minors, to work abroad. The 
prospective migrant workers pay US$500–700 to the recruiter, who then 
takes care of the formalities, including their travel documents. The inter-
viewees said that the recruiters could easily obtain passports for people 
without birth certificates, and could change people’s names if they had 
been deported before in another country. The officially issued passport 
then allows the migrant workers to take a regular plane to work abroad.22
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SMUGGLING AND ARMED CONFLICT
Smuggling and Insurgents
As the smuggling economy is fairly formalised, yet organised in 
a decentralised manner, consisting of various small traders and boatmen, 
non-state armed groups do not play any substantial role in this economy, 
neither with regard to licit nor illicit goods. As in the other borderlands 
discussed, official accounts often assume that non-state armed groups in 
the region are key actors in the smuggling economy. As part of the US 
Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) attempt to link ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘drug trafficking’ after 9/11 in order to assert the agency’s signifi-
cance, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence of the DEA Steven W. 
Casteel told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in a statement on 
‘Narco-Terrorism’ in 2003 that the DEA had information implicating the 
MNLF and MILF in drug trafficking activities (Casteel, 2010, p.150). 
This view has remained dominant and has been reflected in a number of 
reports.
Cagoco-Guiam and Schoofs (2016), who reviewed the reports and 
evidence, and conducted their own research on the issue, found that 
‘drug production and trafficking occurs in areas controlled by the 
MILF’ (p.137). However, they found no evidence that the MILF was 
supporting or benefitting from these activities (ibid.). Evidence impli-
cating the Communist NPA in the drug trade is limited to the finding 
that they impose their ‘revolutionary tax’ on local marijuana plantations 
(ibid., p.136). In 2016, the NPA as well as the MNLF/MILF agreed to 
join the government’s campaign against drugs (Philippine Star, 2016). 
Cagoco-Guiam and Schoofs conclude that it is not the armed groups but 
the armed conflict, the weak rule of law, and the geography of the region 
that created the conditions for the drug economy in Mindanao (2016, 
p.138).
More plausibly, Casteel accused ASG of involvement ‘in a variety of 
criminal enterprises, including kidnappings, drug and arms smuggling, 
extortion, and virtually any other criminal activity that is profitable’ 
(2010, p.150). And, indeed, particularly the ASG’s active role in con-
ducting kidnappings for ransom has been well-documented (see e.g. 
Gutierrez, 2016, pp.179–84). Even supporters of other non-state armed 
groups in the Philippines described the ASG as ‘purely criminal’. 
However, evidence of drug trafficking involvement is thin. While there 
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are some reports of members of the ASG being involved, data, particu-
larly from the more recent years, is limited (see Cagoco-Guiam and 
Schoofs, 2016, pp.137–8). It appears though as if this was not the result 
of the group’s ideology. The ASG’s small size and limited networks 
beyond Sulu give them little capacity for smuggling. Law enforcement’s 
strong focus on the group, due to their high presence in international 
media, make the group an unattractive business partner for organisations 
that dominate the drug trade.
Looking beyond the Philippines and considering non-state armed 
groups in Indonesia and the region, such as JI and JAD, there is no evi-
dence they are involved in drug trafficking either. However, in contrast to 
the groups in the Philippines, they do play a role in the business of smug-
gling weapons, much like ARSA in Myanmar. The Indonesian groups 
depend on weapons smuggled in from the Philippines. Nonetheless, there 
is no particular evidence they are more than customers for this trade.
Again, much like the ARSA members who essentially smuggle 
themselves between Myanmar and Bangladesh, non-state armed groups 
in the region also travel illegally, in their case often for training. The 
Philippines have replaced Syria and Iraq as the main destinations for 
extremists from Indonesia and Malaysia to gain military training that 
could be used in attacks at home, reflecting geographic proximity, lower 
travel costs, and the decreasing territorial control of the IS in the Middle 
East. In addition, the connections between armed groups in Indonesia and 
the Philippines facilitate such crossings (Abas, 2005).23 For instance, JI 
used to have a training camp in the Philippines called Hudaibiyah, adja-
cent to other camps belonging to a local non-state armed group. Some 
Indonesians have also been trained in the MILF training camps, including 
Jabal Quba in the early 2000s.
An additional factor in the self-smuggling of insurgents is that a number 
of Indonesians have gone to the Philippines to support fellow Muslims in 
their fight for Bangsamoro, some of them joining more extremist factions 
like the Maute Group. In 2017, IPAC (2017b, p.4) reported on a telegram 
appeal the Maute Group sent from Marawi that read:
If you find it difficult to go to Sham (greater Syria) because of cost and 
security concerns, why not try the Philippines? Truly, our brothers in the 
Philippines are awaiting your arrival, why are you so slow in answering their 
call? Does it make sense that we have a neighbour being attacked by a swarm 
of criminals, but we aim for a further neighbour rather than one closer by? We 
give more importance to the further neighbour and make the close one lower 
priority.
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Such calls turned out to be effective, as some Indonesians were found 
fighting alongside the Maute Group in Marawi.24
However, migrants who cross looking for work are far more numerous 
than insurgents. Likewise, since they do not seek formal employment, 
their crossing itself is only illegal if insurgents do not have a passport, 
have overstayed their visa (for instance, after going underground in 
another country), are wanted by authorities or are suspected of supporting 
an extremist network. For instance, police arrested an Indonesian named 
Nurhadi in late November 2017 at an airport on Borneo island (Kholid, 
2017; Santoso, 2017). Although his flight to Malaysia was legal under the 
ASEAN Framework, police alleged he had plans to continue to Marawi 
to join the IS (Kholid, 2017; Santoso, 2017).
The western route, which passes through Malaysia’s Sabah, is the pre-
ferred option for members of armed groups to cross from Indonesia to the 
Philippines. An interviewee explained that the small islands spanning the 
sea between Malaysia and the Philippines make it easier to hide, as one 
can stop at one of the islands about every 45 minutes.25 The eastern route, 
through North Sulawesi, does not offer such comforts. But the routes are 
subject to change, depending on how tight the border security is. While 
tightened security might reduce the amount of smuggling happening, it is 
more likely to affect the routes taken, if necessary shifting the smuggling 
of people, including that of members of armed groups, from the west to 
the east.
Key destinations in the Philippines for insurgents from Indonesia 
are Zamboanga and General Santos. There are both legal and illegal 
ways to get there. An official ferry connects Sandakan in Malaysia 
with Zamboanga (see Figure 5.3). Meanwhile, people, including insur-
gents, are smuggled from Semporna or Lahad Datu in Malaysia to the 
Philippines (Hanifan, 2017). The boat usually leaves Semporna at night 
and takes people to Sitangkai island in the Philippines, which is 85km 
away.26 The journey then continues to Tawi-tawi island (ibid.). From 
Tawi-tawi, IS-linked insurgents then continued their journey to Jolo and 
Basilan before reaching Marawi.27
Non-state armed groups use a range of tools to facilitate passage. 
Nasir Abas, one of the founders of and trainer at JI’s Hudaibiyah camp, 
said that the group was able to send people even when security was tight 
after an ASG kidnapping of tourists from Sipadan and Ligitan in 2000 
that made international news.28 According to Abas, some JI members 
mastered the languages and taught each other the basics for conversation. 
In addition, they gave gifts to the locals to win their support. For instance, 
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he took things from Indonesia, such as clove cigarettes to the Sangirs in 
Mindanao. For Indonesians, he took Coca Cola from the Philippines. 
Locals then were willing to tell them about patrol times and to describe 
them as visiting relatives to agents. As Abas put it: ‘We know the captain 
and the captain can say you are his relatives.’29 More than a decade later it 
seemed that fighters from newer organisations (such as Jemaah Ansharut 
Daulah in Indonesia and Ansarul Khilafah in the Philippines) were using 
similar routes and tricks. Nonetheless, their overall numbers make them 
a fairly trivial actor in the smuggling economy.
Smuggling and the State
I found less visible evidence for corruption and state involvement in the 
smuggling business in the borderlands connecting Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines than I had in, for instance, Southern Thailand. Some 
selected smuggling activities, such as that of weapons for non-state 
armed groups from the Philippines to Indonesia, happen without involve-
ment or even passive toleration of state authorities and without corrup-
tion. Instead, it seems more likely that the armed groups are successfully 
avoiding detection by state authorities. Nonetheless, corruption of state 
authorities plays an important role for the smuggling of goods and people 
in the region. The large-scale smuggling operations of licit goods, such as 
rice, depend on the tolerance of police and customs officers. Villanueva 
maintains that state authorities ‘play a critical role in the value chain of 
this informal economy’ (2016, p.265).
At the Malaysian–Philippine border, Malaysian state authorities 
appear not to be sanctioning, and in many cases are also not charging 
‘fees’ for, the irregular export of consumption goods to the Philippines, 
even if it happens on a large scale. Reportedly, Malaysian state author-
ities tolerate and even encourage such activities for both economic and 
political reasons (Villanueva, 2016, p.266). In the Philippines, however, 
authorities try to stop the large-scale smuggling of products like rice into 
the country. The Philippines Coast Guard routinely informs the public 
about the detection of smuggled goods such as sugar or rice. For instance, 
they declared they had discovered 5,000 sacks of smuggled sugar worth 
US$200,000 in Tawi-tawi in August 2018 (Lacastesantos, 2018).
However, in the Philippines, smugglers can also protect themselves 
through ‘special arrangements’ with the state authorities, including the 
coast guard, customs and the navy. Villanueva (2016, p.266) describes 
how under such arrangements, smugglers have to pay an ‘extra fee’ but 
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are de facto exempted from all regular custom duties and fees. The ‘extra 
fee’ is carefully calculated on the amount of sacks, cartons or containers. 
For example, PHP 20 (c. US$0.40) are charged per 25kg sack of rice. 
Following this arrangement, smugglers are not allowed to use the formal, 
ordinary ports but have to dock at irregular ones.
Similarly, close by, at the Indonesia–Malaysia border in the west, 
at Nunukan, Indonesian state authorities appear to tolerate most of the 
smuggling activities. Interviewees explained that the police station in 
close proximity to one of the irregular harbours only operated during day 
time, ignoring smuggling activities at night.30 The use of quiet engines 
gives smugglers extra assurance. However, state authorities on both sides 
of the border also make deals that allow the smuggling of goods and 
people during the day. An interviewee said: ‘The boatmen have deals 
with the Malaysian police. People who go to Malaysia legally [but work 
there without the required documents] often go back to Indonesia illegally 
after their visa has expired.’31 Another interviewee confirmed: ‘the police 
[are] involved. There are a lot of goods coming from Malaysia, such as 
gas, and there are many people going to Malaysia.’32 In contrast to the 
‘fee-per-sack’ payment system in the Philippines, here often monthly 
fees are paid, similar to those at the Thailand–Malaysia border. An inter-
viewee explained: ‘For the smuggling of goods they have monthly deals 
with the police that allow them to take large amounts.’33
State authorities also play a role in the drug trafficking business. The 
region is known for severely punishing the trafficking and often even the 
consumption of drugs. Both Malaysia and Indonesia impose capital pun-
ishment for drug trafficking, although Malaysia suspended executions 
in 2018. President Duterte announced the beginning of a ‘war on drugs’ 
in the Philippines in 2016 upon taking office in Manila, encouraging 
police officers to shoot and kill suspected drug users. More than 5,000 
people were killed in the course of anti-drug operations in the Philippines 
between July 2016 and April 2019 (e.g. The Guardian, 2019). However, 
for instance, a study conducted by International Alert indicates that in 
Bangsamoro state actors play an important role in the drug smuggling 
economy. It describes ‘narco-politicians’ that ‘actively undermin[e] and 
abus[e] the fragility of local governance institutions’ in ways that foster 
the drug trade (2014, p.3).
To organise the smuggling of large amounts of drugs, criminal net-
works often rely on state-controlled infrastructure such as big ports and 
airports, avoiding remote borderlands that lack such infrastructure. From 
a smuggler’s point of view, it is considerably easier to operate through 
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such trade hubs, where large amounts of drugs can be offloaded and 
distributed quickly. It also lowers the risk of detection and, ultimately, 
it decreases the cost as fewer authorities have to be involved. However, 
it requires good links to powerful state authorities that will look the 
other way. Cases of such tolerance have repeatedly made the news in 
the Philippines. For instance, the military colonel Allen Capuyan was 
accused of arranging for passage of a PHP 6.4 billion (US$125 million) 
shipment of shabu through Manila International Airport without inspec-
tion in 2017 (Avendaño, 2019). Far from holding his involvement against 
him, Duterte’s administration appointed him to lead the government’s 
peace talks with the NPA in 2019.34
Other types of smuggling also occur at major trade hubs. Even if 
organised criminal groups are in charge of the smuggling activities, the 
involvement of state officials is likely. For instance, corruption ensures 
that people can receive passports to work abroad, even if they do not have 
the required documents, or if they have previously been deported. This 
way they can simply take the plane and do not have to make their way 
through the borderlands.
CONCLUSIONS
Due to its maritime character the border region of Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines is in many ways different from the borderlands 
explored in the previous chapters. Smuggling across water appears to 
be a lot easier than on land as boats can take many different routes to 
get to the neighbouring country. But boats, particularly in the case of 
large-scale smuggling, need infrastructure on land such as ports or har-
bours that can be patrolled quite easily. Hence, there also are surprisingly 
many similarities to land borders.
As in the borderlands described in earlier chapters, people and 
goods are smuggled across the borders of Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines on a considerable scale, often enabled by corruption of state 
authorities. The smuggling of daily consumption goods, particularly rice, 
is mainly conducted by local traders. In fact, the drawing of national 
borders through their traditional trade routes turned business that existed 
for centuries into smuggling. The prevalence of illegal fishing reflects 
this dynamic. However, some of the smugglers may also transport a small 
number of weapons when offered a good price. Attempted crack-downs 
by state authorities tend to simply shift the smuggling routes. Meanwhile, 
more organised criminal groups are responsible for the smuggling of 
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most of the drugs, likely facilitated by state authorities at times. People 
smuggling, particularly that of migrant workers from Indonesia to 
Malaysia, is organised by private enterprises and networks similar to the 
ones in the other case studies researched. Migrants may even be willing 
to pay fees for being smuggled that exceed the fees for a legal process, if 
it is less complicated and considerably faster.
The ongoing conflicts in the region and the smuggling economy are 
connected in multiple ways. Most importantly, conflict increases the 
demand for smuggling. For instance, some of the people who are dis-
placed by the conflict in Mindanao try to get to Malaysia to work there. 
That increases the demand for people smugglers. Conflict also increases 
the demand for smuggled goods as it disrupts the formal economy. 
Further, conflict and weak rule of law in Mindanao make it easier to 
produce and smuggle drugs. Nonetheless, in line with the respondent 
who said there would need to be a fence in the sea to stop it, it is safe to 
assume that smuggling in the region would continue without conflict. For 
example, most of the Indonesians who work on the palm oil plantations 
in Malaysia are not doing so because of conflict. Likewise, conflict does 
not drive the illegal fishing and the rice smuggling.
Considering more direct links between conflict and smuggling, similar 
to our findings in the previous chapters, the non-state armed groups in 
the region play a limited role in the smuggling economy, both in terms of 
licit and illicit goods. In the Philippines, non-state armed groups like the 
MNLF/MILF and NPA have territorial control and are keen to maintain 
and expand their local legitimacy, making them legitimacy-seeking 
rulers. This is particularly crucial for the MILF leadership that, as part of 
the new government of Bangsamoro, will be funded through taxes and 
will have to justify them. Similarly, the NPA is funded through taxes. 
And even though the NPA has probably benefitted from also taxing 
marijuana plantations at times there is little evidence supporting the idea 
that groups like the NPA or the MNLF/MILF are directly involved in 
the production or smuggling of drugs. Both the MNLF/MILF and the 
NPA even offered to join the government’s campaign against drugs. This 
illustrates the extent of their concern that drugs may undermine their 
local legitimacy.
Some groups may to some extent be benefitting from the smuggling 
economy more directly. The Abu Sayyaf Group in particular is involved 
in a rage of criminal activities, including kidnapping. As it does not 
control territory and does not have an interest in the construction of local 
legitimacy, it can be described as a legitimacy-indifferent rebel, only 
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driven by economic incentives. However, due to its apparent focus on 
generating income and its lack of political motives it can also simply be 
seen as a criminal group. Nonetheless, its lack of territorial control makes 
the ASG a fairly unattractive business partner for drug smugglers.
Finally, there are those groups that are assumed to be affiliated with 
international terrorist networks, most prominently in Indonesia, such as 
JAD and JI. They neither control territory nor do they aim at building 
local legitimacy. Instead they aim at creating instability through attacks. 
However, in contrast to all other groups, being linked to international net-
works they also rely less on local funding. Instead, they can use external 
funding provided by networks such as the IS to support their activities. 
Being small in size and having a reduced economic incentive to generate 
revenue, their involvement in the smuggling economy is limited to those 
activities that are necessary for their operations: the smuggling of guns 
and the smuggling of their own fighters across borders, for instance, for 
training.
In contrast to non-state armed groups, state actors play a considerably 
more important role in the region’s smuggling economy – across all of 
its sectors. In some cases, state actors simply tolerate the smuggling, 
but often they also benefit from ‘extra fees’. Even the large-scale smug-
gling of drugs through ports and airports is assumed to be facilitated by 
officials. Major international trade hubs, such as Manila, are likely to 
play a more important role for the smuggling of goods and people than 
remote, rural borderlands. This is in line with the findings from Southern 
Thailand, where drugs were smuggled to Malaysia from well-connected 
urban areas instead of disconnected, rural areas. While some smuggling 
happens in rural and insurgency-controlled areas, smuggling large quan-
tities of any commodity requires good infrastructure. Hence, smuggling 
is more likely to occur in major ports and urban areas with streets and 
railways, which enable easier distribution of smuggled goods and people. 
Being able to draw on the support of state officials makes business much 
easier for smugglers.
NOTES
1. See Economist (2013).
2. See Rood (2012) for an analysis of the incentives that shape autonomy 
in Mindanao and limit the ability to address the grievances that drive the 
conflict.
3. They signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 
and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014.
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4. National Conference on BBL and Federalism, 7 June 2018, Makati City.
5. Interview, 5 June 2018, Cotabato City.
6. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority will be responsible for creating the 
foundation of BARMM until the first elections in 2022. Key issues that need 
to be decided on are education, administration and the rights of indigenous 
people.
7. See Jones (2018) for a detailed analysis of radicalisation in the context of 
Marawi and the Islamic State in the Philippines.
8. Interview, 5 June 2018.
9. For example, some former JI members formed the ‘East Indonesia 
Mujahideen’ (in bahasa Indonesia, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT); 
however, after several military operations only a small number of fighters 
are left, hiding around Poso in Central Sulawesi.
10. Darul Islam (DI) was a movement led by Kartosoewirjo. In 1949, he 
proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) 
and was subsequently arrested and executed. But the idea has served as 
an inspiration for Islamist communities until today. Most Islamist groups 
in Indonesia, non-violent and violent ones, including JI, can be seen as DI 
off-shoots (see Alamsyah and Hadiz, 2016).
11. For a detailed analysis of the violence and the smuggling economy in 
Tawi-tawi see Quitoriano (forthcoming).
12. The district of Sangihe and Talaud consists of 124 major and minor islands 
spread across three main islands, the Talaud, Big Sangihe or Sangir, and 
Siau Tagulandang.
13. Interview, 15 April 2018.
14. Visit, 11–13 April 2018.
15. Phone interview, November 2017.
16. The weapons found were a .45 calibre Colt handgun, two bullet clips and 
twelve rounds of 45mm ammunition in Tabukan sub-district. Residents 
handed over a US revolver and four rounds of ammunition in East 
Melonguane Sub-District in August 2017. On 3 September, the intelligence 
services confiscated a Philippines-made revolver and 36 3.8mm calibre 
rounds in Nusa Tabukan, and a US-made gun on Marore island. It is not 
clear what happened to the people who possessed the weapons (Manado 
Post, 2017).
17. Interviews, 14 April 2018.
18. Interviews, 14 April 2018.
19. Interview, April 2018 (date anonymised).
20. Ibid.
21. Interview with fisherman, Bitung, 10 April 2018.
22. Interview, Cotabato, 5 June 2018.
23. According to Abas, a former commander of JI, the ties between Jemaah 
Islamiyah and the Islamic Moro fighters can be traced back to around 1985, 
when people from both groups went to the Afghanistan Mujahiddin Military 
Academy in Sadda, Pakistan, and were continued by involvement in insur-
gencies in Afghanistan (Abas, 2005, pp. 141–2; see also Banloi, 2007, 
pp.194–222).
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24. One of the Maute brothers, Omarkhayam, is married to an Indonesian.
25. Phone interview, November 2017.
26. During the Marawi battle, IS-linked militants preferred Lahad Datu as 
a crossing point.
27. In the past, militants often gathered in Basilan before going to Zamboanga, 
and then continued to Marawi via land in a nine-hour-long trip. However, 
when the battle in Marawi erupted, the authorities tightened security in 
Zamboanga. All bus and car passengers were asked to step out of the vehi-
cles, to walk through a security post and to show their ID cards. A marine 
officer told Hanifan (2017) that as a consequence the militants simply 
shifted the route from Zamboanga to Malabang, a small town 73km south of 
Marawi. Malabang is an important node to go to small towns near Marawi 
where lakes make it possible to get to Marawi by boat.
28. Phone interview, November 2017.
29. Phone interview, November 2017.
30. Interview, 14 April 2018.
31. Interview, 14 April 2019.
32. Interview, 15 April 2018.
33. Interview, 14 April 2019. Likewise, Quitoriano concludes that ‘the eco-
nomic benefits that state actors generate from a shadow economy’ have 
made it impossible to stem the spread of illicit guns in Mindanao (2016, 
p.110).
34. Meanwhile, the president’s son, former Vice Major of Davao Paolo Duterte, 
was accused along with the president’s son-in-law, Manases Carpio, of facil-
itating the smuggling of 602kg of shabu from China into the port of Manila 
in 2017 (Reuters, 2017b).
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6. Conclusions
I asked the smuggler in Southern Thailand from the opening of this book 
who had matter-of-factly shown me where the drugs cross, why that spot 
was right next to an army checkpoint. His facial expression told me that 
I had asked a stupid question. I had imagined people with backpacks 
hiking across mountain ranges. He explained: ‘The drugs arrive here by 
train. Why should we bring them somewhere else first before taking them 
to Malaysia?’
A CONFLICT–CRIME DISCONNECT?
In many borderlands of Southeast Asia smuggling is a key economic 
activity, which exists regardless and independently of armed conflict. 
In many cases ‘smuggling’ is the normal way of doing business across 
borders, which were often drawn by colonial powers through closely 
connected communities. Most smuggling is cross-border trade of licit 
daily consumption goods that is not conducted via official border cross-
ings. Everything is ‘smuggled’, from cooking oil to clothes. And it is 
also people who ‘smuggle’ themselves, by not using the official border 
crossings, many who simply want to visit family across the border, who 
want to go shopping or who work in the neighbouring country during the 
day. While smuggling in some cases provides cost savings in customs 
fees, time savings may be more significant if the next border crossing is 
far away.
Just as in the formal economy and with normal trade relations, the 
smuggling business is organised to varying extents. This book has 
described smugglers who work under different types of organization. 
Some smugglers are individual business people, such as those transport-
ing daily consumption goods in Southern Thailand. In the context of the 
smuggling of people, some smugglers often appear to be operating as 
part of cross-border networks, sometimes bridging just one border, such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia or Myanmar and China, and in other cases 
reaching across countries, from Myanmar to Bangladesh, Thailand and 
Malaysia. In contrast to the ‘tough’ policies on immigration at the EU 
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and US borders, such policies appear to be weaker or less enforced in 
Southeast Asia, resulting in a less organized and monopolized people 
smuggling economy with room for smaller-scale smugglers. Meanwhile, 
in response to the tough policies on drugs in Southeast Asia, the smug-
gling of drugs appears to be very organised, as, for instance, the case of 
the Myanmar–Bangladesh border illustrates.
Contrary to my vision of people with backpacks in remote and difficult 
terrain, the case studies show that most smuggling does not appear to be 
happening in remote areas. Instead, smugglers prefer routes and border 
crossings that offer good infrastructure. Inland connectivity via road or 
railway is key as the market for goods and labour typically is not imme-
diately at the border. Hence, major hubs for legal trade such as ports are 
also important centres for smuggling operations, as the case of Manila in 
the Philippines illustrates.
Following the same economic rationale, smugglers and smuggling net-
works that transport goods or people across longer distances try to avoid 
conflict zones. Conflict zones are challenging to navigate. In such areas 
smugglers may need to cross through territories controlled or influenced 
by competing actors, they may need to deal with ongoing fighting, and 
they may have to work around an increased presence of security forces 
and checkpoints. For example, as we saw at the Thailand–Malaysia 
border, the western area with less conflict is the main avenue for the 
smuggling of migrants. Fewer checkpoints, less insecurity, and a single 
authority, the state, being in control of the entire territory offers predict-
ability and efficiency.
Even though conflict zones are not popular transit routes for smug-
glers, they tend to be the origin of many illicit goods, particularly 
drugs. For instance, Afghanistan produces opium and Myanmar makes 
meth. However, the areas where illicit goods are produced within such 
conflict-torn countries are not necessarily the areas of heavy fighting. 
Like smuggling activities, drug production is much easier in an environ-
ment of stable governance. Just like any other business, producing drugs 
is difficult in the midst of fighting or in an area that is often shelled. The 
case of yaba production we looked at in Myanmar’s Shan State illustrates 
that the drug is not produced in a conflict area, but in an area that is more 
stable and controlled by a pro-government militia.
Overall, smuggling is best understood like any other economic 
activity, consisting of entrepreneurs and businesses, who want to make 
a profit. As in a legal economy, geography and the practices of authorities 
(the extent to which they tolerate, tax, or interfere) shape the smuggling 
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economy. The smuggling economy does not always lie in the shadows. In 
fact, for many people, smuggling is part of the normal economy.
THE CONFLICT–CRIME NEXUS
Nonetheless, the different borderlands we have looked at also illustrate 
a number of links between armed conflict and the smuggling economy. 
Most strikingly, armed conflict can increase the demand for smugglers to 
smuggle both goods and people.
Conflict drives people away. It often results in displacement of people 
who then decide to leave the country. While most people are usually 
displaced internally and move to relatives, friends or camps in their own 
country, others, particularly those living close to international borders, 
hope to be able to escape from the violence by crossing the border. The 
most prominent example is the large number of Rohingya refugees from 
Myanmar in Bangladesh. This episode of violence created an ad hoc 
demand for fishermen to become ‘smugglers’, providing them with the 
opportunity to pick up extra money by bringing Rohingya from Myanmar 
to Bangladesh.
However, often conflict works less directly, resulting in a stagnating 
economy with low wages and high unemployment. This creates financial 
incentives for people to work in a neighbouring country. This in turn 
generates demand for smugglers, people with good links on both sides of 
the border, who can not only help them cross the border but, more essen-
tially, find a job abroad. This can, for instance, be seen in Myanmar’s 
Kachin State. Because of the high unemployment rate and low salaries, in 
which the conflict plays a role, many (particularly young) people, hope to 
find better paid jobs in China – to do so many rely on brokers. Employers 
in China, mainly factory owners, pay the monthly salaries to the brokers, 
who keep a share and pass on the rest to the migrant workers.
Armed conflict makes people more vulnerable and puts them at a higher 
risk of becoming victims of hazardous crimes. Both direct destruction and 
displacement, and the more indirect impact of violent conflict on the eco-
nomic situation and employment opportunities, push people towards more 
desperate ways of generating an income or improving their situation. In 
consequence, people are more likely to fall into the hands of human traf-
fickers. This can again be seen in northern Myanmar. China’s substantial 
gender imbalance has created a demand for foreign women. Women in 
Myanmar, who are promised jobs in China by brokers, have become the 
victim of trafficking schemes that satisfy this demand through forced 
This is an open access work distributed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). 
Users can redistribute the work for non-commercial purposes, 
as long as it is passed along unchanged and in whole, as detailed in the License. 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd must be clearly credited as the ownerof the original work. 
Any translation or adaptation of the original content requires the written authorization 
of Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Conclusions 133
marriage or sexual slavery. Particularly affected are those who have left 
conflict areas and who now live in camps, where the promise of a job can 
lure the desperate. Trafficking of Rohingya refugees also takes place in 
Bangladesh’s Coxs Bazar. In addition, here the victims of conflict face 
another form of exploitation that links to smuggling. Criminal groups 
often use Rohingya to do dangerous smuggling work for little payment.
While conflict tends to drive people away, it increases the demand 
for smuggled goods, particularly for daily consumption goods, which 
become hard to produce locally and difficult to import from other areas 
or countries. Similarly, displacement of people to neighbouring countries 
can increase the demand for goods if they cannot be legally imported. For 
instance, Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh increased demand 
for daily consumption goods from Myanmar, such as instant coffee.
Conflict also creates demand for illicit goods, particularly weapons. 
As we saw in the Philippines, some boatmen make additional money 
by transporting weapons from the Philippines to Indonesia every now 
and then. Conflict zones can be both the origin and the destination of 
weapons. For example, in Southern Thailand weapons are easily availa-
ble and were smuggled via Malaysia to supply armed groups during the 
conflict in Indonesia’s Aceh province.
Looking beyond smuggling reveals further dimensions of the conflict–
crime nexus. In some cases, conflict and crime appear to blur as 
armed conflict can contribute to an environment that is conducive to 
non-political violence. In the context of ongoing violence, it is not always 
clear (and often difficult to establish) who is responsible. This allows 
criminal actors to conceal their activities. For instance, if a police officer 
or even a civilian is shot, in most cases the state will blame non-state 
armed groups, even if the killing is unrelated to the political conflict. 
Likewise, state actors, domestic and foreign, link the drug trade to 
non-state armed groups with thin evidence.
THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
The book set out to explore what role non-state armed groups play in the 
smuggling economy. Overall, across the conflict zones and borderlands 
I looked at in Southeast Asia, this role is fairly restrained. The typology 
proposed in the Introduction helped us to categorise groups and explain 
their behaviour. The book shows that armed groups need funds but that 
most of them also are legitimacy-seeking. In addition, many armed 
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groups are rebels without territorial control, not rulers. Both factors limit 
their involvement in the smuggling economy.
Many groups that we can categorise as rebels (i.e. do not control 
territory), such as ARSA in Myanmar and the BRN in Thailand, are in 
a difficult position to get involved in the smuggling economy. Operating 
underground and having to avoid detection by state authorities, they are 
not attractive partners for smugglers and cannot smuggle very much 
themselves. These groups mainly smuggle what they need to be able to 
continue their operations, such as, most importantly, weapons. Indeed, 
ARSA members got caught attempting to buy weapons in Bangladesh 
and smuggle them across the border to Myanmar.
In addition, non-state armed groups also have to smuggle their own 
fighters at times. In many cases such smuggling is the convenience-seeking 
behaviour of crossing at the nearest spot because it is closer than the 
nearest official border crossing. After all, people can legally cross into 
a neighbouring country for a limited number of days at many borders in 
Southeast Asia. However, members of armed groups also use irregular 
border crossings to avoid prosecution, seeking safe haven in a neighbour-
ing country. Some members of the BRN in Thailand crossed the border 
into Malaysia to hide from Thai security forces. And in the case of the 
maritime border region between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, 
non-state armed groups use traditional maritime trade routes of local 
people to smuggle their members across the ocean for training and to 
fight. But at every border I studied, the smuggling of insurgents repre-
sented a small subset of the smuggling activity.
Armed groups that do control territory and can be categorised as rulers, 
such as the KIO/A in Myanmar or the MILF in the Philippines, are in the 
best position among non-state armed groups to play a significant role 
in the smuggling economy. Despite having the opportunity to generate 
revenue this way, such groups often have to limit their involvement in the 
smuggling economy, at least with regard to illicit goods, when they are 
legitimacy-seeking. In order to build substantive legitimacy, they have 
to ensure that their activities are not perceived as harmful locally. This 
can be seen in Myanmar’s Kachin State, where drug addiction rates are 
high. Being associated with the production or smuggling of drugs could 
have damaging effects for the KIO/A, which instead emphasises its drug 
rehabilitation programme.
Hence, armed groups that control territory tend to focus on economic 
activities that the local population does not consider harmful. In the case 
of the KIO/A, this is particularly the taxation of jade that is extracted 
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and exported to generate revenue and the import of weapons to fight 
for the popular cause of Kachin independence. Such activities are often 
considered to be smuggling, not trade, because the KIO/A lacks de jure 
recognition as a state, despite its de facto statehood.
For the most part though, instead of being directly involved in the 
smuggling economy, non-state armed groups that control territory tax 
economic activities, just like normal states. Therefore, in some cases, they 
also benefit indirectly from cross-border trade or ‘smuggling’. However, 
for non-state armed groups that operate underground, enforcing taxation 
is more difficult. Hence, for instance, the BRN in Southern Thailand 
collects membership fees from its supporters. By contrast, ARSA in 
Myanmar appears to be relying almost fully on external funding, which 
reduces the group’s dependency on local legitimacy.
The lack of recognition of non-state armed groups that control territory 
as states results in another form of activity that could be described as 
people smuggling. Like states, some armed groups build international 
relations with neighbouring countries. This includes the issuing of docu-
ments, which enable people to cross the border into neighbouring coun-
tries. Again this can be seen in Kachin State, where the KIO/A issues 
border passes in the area it controls at the Chinese border, which people 
can use to legally cross the border into China as they are accepted by the 
officials there.
However, there are legitimacy-indifferent groups that are not concerned 
about local support and are driven more or less exclusively by economic 
interests. Such groups face no political barriers to being involved in the 
smuggling economy. Rebels like the ASG in the Philippines may be 
involved in all types of criminal activities including smuggling of illicit 
goods. However, their lack of influence and their need to avoid detection 
by state authorities restrains them. Rulers that control territory but are 
indifferent to legitimacy thus have the fewest constraints in their involve-
ment with smuggling. However, my research did not detect non-state 
armed groups in this category. Only the pro-state militias in Myanmar 
have the influence to support smuggling and the indifference to legiti-
macy that makes it worthwhile.
THE ROLE OF STATE ACTORS
State actors turned out to play a considerably more important role in the 
smuggling economy than non-state actors. This finding challenges the 
common narrow focus on non-state armed groups as drivers of crime. 
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However, the finding is surprising in many ways. In contrast to non-state 
armed groups, states have no obvious economic incentive to be involved 
in smuggling. States typically generate their revenue through taxes on 
economic activities while trying to stop smuggling activities that reduce 
their tax revenue. After all, smuggling is defined in opposition to the state, 
as those economic activities that are unauthorized by it. Furthermore, 
states have the power to legalize illicit goods, turning smuggling into 
trade. A legal market would evolve with economic activities that a state 
can tax while reducing the incentive to smuggle that good.
Further research that looks at the perspective of state actors in more 
detail is necessary to gain a better understanding of what drives the role 
of state authorities in the smuggling economy. Nonetheless, the concep-
tual framework and the factors of economic incentives, territorial control 
and legitimacy offer some insights. The three factors may apply to differ-
ent extents in different contexts and may easily overlap.
Just as in the case of non-state armed groups, the main driver of the 
involvement of state authorities in the smuggling economy is to make 
money. However, as states have a limited incentive to generate funds 
through smuggling as an organisation its role is often best described as 
corruption. That is, purely economic motives drive individuals or groups 
of state actors to tolerate or support smuggling. While corruption is 
common across the world, when it happens on a large scale, as in many 
of the cases this book has considered, it suggests states are either not 
capable of preventing it, want to protect those involved or are simply not 
concerned about this issue enough to take steps to halt it.
In contrast to non-state armed groups, states always control some 
territory. Borders, border crossings and trade hubs such as ports are at 
the heart of state authority and tend to be particularly well controlled. As 
smugglers try to avoid conflict zones and prefer to operate in territories 
where only one authority is in charge they are active in state-controlled 
areas most of the time. But states may also tolerate or even enable smug-
gling in order to expand their territorial control. For instance, states may 
decide to allow factions to act with impunity, including in the smuggling 
economy, as part of deal making: to win them over politically and to be 
able to control territory without having to provide resources to maintain 
that control. This is why pro-state militias, such as the ones I encoun-
tered in Myanmar, are heavily involved in the smuggling economy. 
Controlling territory and drawing on external legitimacy and support 
provided by government, as legitimacy-indifferent rulers they are driven 
exclusively by economic considerations and pay little attention to how 
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the local population perceives them. Meanwhile, this enables the state 
to control territory at little cost without having to deploy its own forces.
Finally, legitimacy also matters in explaining the role of state actors 
in the smuggling economy. Tolerating the smuggling of licit daily 
consumption goods can ultimately support state goals. Customs duties 
on such goods are typically low and offer limited revenues to the state. 
People in conflict zones often view the state as oppressive or colonising. 
Allowing people to obtain necessities more easily instead of creating 
barriers to local-level cross-border trade can increase the state’s instru-
mental legitimacy. However, in contrast to non-state armed groups, states 
often do not require broad-based support of minorities in conflict-ridden 
borderlands. Instead, they can draw on the legitimacy and support from 
the centre and large parts of the population elsewhere in the country. 
This enables them to act in a more extractive and less accountable way in 
borderlands populated by minorities as, for instance, the treatment of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar illustrates.
Nonetheless, state involvement in the smuggling of illicit goods raises 
legitimacy concerns on the international stage. Even though certain drugs, 
primarily marijuana, are increasingly being legalized in countries across 
the world, legalizing the production and export of drugs such as meth 
and opium is likely to face international resistance and has the potential 
to result in international isolation and decreasing aid budgets. Hence, it 
is easier for states to describe these activities as criminal and possibly to 
even blame non-state armed groups while benefitting nonetheless from 
the revenues that such activities generate. Such strategic involvement 
in the smuggling economy could also be termed systemic corruption. It 
assumes that the revenue that is generated reaches the central level of the 
state, which is therefore willing to support such a risky strategy.
Conflict zones make it easier to hide both institutional involvement 
of states in the smuggling economy and corruption within the state 
apparatus. Conflict enables state authorities to justify a heavy presence 
of security forces. Meanwhile, state authorities can conceal activities and 
blame criminals or political opponents for the smuggling operations as 
well as violence. In conflict zones it is difficult to conduct investigations. 
And even if everyone in a conflict zone knows who is supporting smug-
gling and who is not, media reporting from conflict zones is limited. This 
ensures limited accountability of state authorities, enhancing their ability 
to get involved in the smuggling economy.
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THE CONFLICT–CRIME COMPLEX
I have defined smuggling in opposition to the state, as unauthorized 
cross-border economic activities. However, evidence suggests that state 
authorities often tolerate or even facilitate smuggling. Meanwhile, 
non-state armed groups play a more limited role, lacking territorial 
control and being more concerned with local legitimacy.
Conflict and crime are often lumped together, as are non-state armed 
groups and criminal groups. And, indeed, conflict and crime are often 
the same. Armed conflicts often result in unimaginable crimes against 
the civilian population, as the case of the Rohingya in Myanmar shows. 
It can be difficult to distinguish non-state armed groups from criminal 
groups, as with the ASG in the Philippines. But the spectrum of non-state 
armed groups I observed is much wider than official rhetoric often 
suggests, and any entity battling the state may eschew many forms of 
criminality because it seeks legitimacy.
Criminals and non-state armed groups do share a key characteristic 
though. Both, by definition, are ‘non-state’ actors. Regardless of their 
political motives, many cross-border economic activities of non-state 
armed groups are simply considered to be smuggling and not trade, 
because they do not have the status of states and because the states in 
question have no interest in authorizing their activities. To the contrary, 
states want to criminalise the activities of non-state armed groups. Quite 
possibly this legal issue lies at the heart of the conflict–crime nexus and 
created the foundation for the many myths surrounding it.
It would be wrong to romanticise non-state armed groups. Their desire 
for legitimacy may be more urgent than that of state actors, but this does 
not always create better behaviour. After all, many non-state armed 
groups are also responsible for violence against civilians. Furthermore, 
the book shows that the more state-like non-state armed groups become, 
the more power they have, the more they also act like states, including 
with regard to their role in the smuggling economy. However, it would 
also be wrong to conclude that non-state armed groups are necessarily 
more criminal than states. The common view on non-state armed groups 
as the ‘source of all evil’, which is particularly reflected in the post-9/11 
discourse on terrorism, has resulted in a blind spot: the crimes committed 
by state authorities.
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‘An engaging and readable account of how state actors, armed militias 
and criminal groups operate in concert to control the political economy 
of trafficking, extortion and illicit markets that underpins much of the 
conflict violence in the borderlands of in Southeast Asia.’
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